The Press THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1959. France and N.A.T.O.

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 28936, 2 July 1959, Page 10

The Press THURSDAY, JULY 2, 1959. France and N.A.T.O.

Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was founded 10 years ago, France has been an awkward ally. Relations with the United States and Britain have not improved since General de Gaulle’s return to power; and the Western search for a plan of co-existence with the Communist bloc has been complicated at a critical time by strain on the North Atlantic alliance. President de Gaulle clearly prefers national coalitions (perhaps typified by the new relationship between Paris and Bonn) to integrated structures such as N.A.T.0., in which France is less prominent than the President would like it to be. General de Gaulle is obsessed with his desire to reassert the glory of France. This accounts for much of his appeal to the French people; and it has contributed largely to obtaining popular acceptance of the economic austerity imposed as a means to re-establishing the republic as a major Power. French discontent about NA.T.O. is not new; but General de Gaulle has resorted to new bargaining tactics for the redress of supposed grievances. Underlying these tactics is the General’s resentment of France’s relegation to a role inferior to that of the United States and Britain. The upsurge of Fi'ench nationalism has been salutary in its influence on a disheartened nation; but it has also clouded, at least temporarily, French recognition of the realities of world strategy.

General de Gaulle shows no sign of weakening in his determination to put N-A.T.O under a French - British - American directorate that would pursue a joint global strategy embracing the Algerian war, and to that end would make France a nuclear Power equal to the other two and give it higher command posts in the Allied forces. Last September the General advanced this plan in letters to President Eisenhower and Mr Macmillan. Since then he has tried to enforce the plan by unilateral military measures. Four hundred thousand of the best French troops, tied up in Algeria, are not available to N.A.T.O. General de Gaulle has also removed from N.A.T.O. command French Air Force units and the French Mediter-

ranean Fleet. Now he is banning from France both N.A.T.O. missile bases and nuclear arms unless they are put under French control; and General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander, is planning for the redeployment of about 200 fighter-bombers to other N.A.T.O. countries where nuclear bombs will be quickly and easily accessible in an emergency. Both French and American diplomats have denied that political pressure is being brought to bear on Paris; and France itself knows that, in any event, its defence is assured. Meanwhile, the French are pressing forward the development of their own atomic bomb, in the belief that they will thus force an entry to the “ nuclear club ”. They look ■jealously on Britain which, as the result of an amendment to America’s McMahon Act in June, 1958, has access to American atomic secrets. They ignore Britain’s special qualifications for the approval of the United States Congress. Moreover, the admission of France to the “ nuclear club ” would be more than embarrassing to the West now that progress is resulting from the Geneva talks on ending nuclear tests. Passive resistance by France to the present integrated control of N.A.T.O. is a symptom rather than the cause of the real difficulty. This is the Gaullist refusal to see France confined to a European mission. Though still dedicated to the philosophy of a united Europe, France wants to go further and attain parity with the United States and Britain in a world strategy. With this aim in view, French delegates to the recent Atlantic Congress advocated the overhaul of N.A.T.O. to reduce American and British domination of its inner councils. The American press has suggested a meeting between President Eisenhower and General de Gaulle to clear up misunderstandings; a suggestion to which Mr Eisenhower seems receptive. The way for such a meeting might be prepared if General de Gaulle and President Gronchi of Italy succeed in their joint plea for an early conference of the British, French, United States, and Italian Foreign Ministers.