Glubb Pasha Urges Middle East Policy

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 28868, 13 April 1959, Page 9

Glubb Pasha Urges Middle East Policy

(Special Correspondent N.Z.P.A.)

LONDON, April 10. i High praise is given by British reviewers to the book “Britain And The Arabs” by Sir John Glubb, the former commander < of Jordan’s Arab Legion, who f lived in the Middle East for 36 years. • Sir John Glubb beeins his nar- • rative at the year 1908 and ends £lt with the Suez incident. He • points out that at the end of World War II Britian was in friendly occupation of the whole of the Arab world and. together with the United States, her fleets and air forces controlled the Mediterranean. Today, this near mononly has vanished and Britain is back to her position before 1914 as one of many Powers competing in the area and with most of her goodwill lost. Absence Of Policy Britain’s fault has not been an attempt to exploit the Arabs, he says. It has been the absence of policy, neglect of clear thinking, vacillation and drift. Much Of this was due to the speeding Up of communications. “On the one hand, the ease of communication has resulted in the over-centralisation of all power in London, depriving the rnan on the snot of authority,” he says. “On the other hand, the ever-burdening of the Cabinet with more and more duties and the increasing pressure of party politics has rendered the politician at home less and less capable of taking action. '"This inability of London to carry the load has repeatedly bean apoarent in delays in producing decisions and in 30 years of vacillation over the policy in Palestine.” Sir John Glubb also says that for Britain, the crowning disaster fn her dealings with the Arabs •vas letting Zionism into the Middle East He has not altered his view about this and he develops the theme very fully. His point is that, beginning with “the so-called” Balfour declaration, the national home for the Jews was imposed upon a hostile population and the time soon came when Zionists began working for an independent State, which finally came into existence in May, 1948. On Suez, Sir John Glubb says it is still impossible to pronounce an uneauivocal opinion “because the British Government has not published its reasons for the undertaking.” There were, he says, great numbers of Russian tanks and aircraft in Egypt at the time “and it is possible that Her Majesty’s Government had received secret information that Russian troops were abnut to be flown to Egynt. If indeed this were the case, the operation, disastrous as it seemed to be, may well have been the preferable choice.” If this, were not the reason, “the motive is more difficult to appreciate.” Special Board Proposed Sir John Glubb advocates the creation of a special board in Britain composed of the best available brains, whose sole duty

it should be to impress Britain’s viewpoint on the rest of the world. Such a board, he says, should be independent of any other authority and even of the Foreign Office. On the policy towards the Arabs, he says: “To like or dislike President Nasser is not a policy. Policy consists in drawing up a design for the world as we wish to see it and then endeavouring to further the execution of the plan. Such a blueprint for the Middle East, I suggest. would include a sympathetic wish to see the Arabs prosperous and independent; the denial of any desire to dominate them, but to wish for mutually profitable trade relations; the determination to assist them to resist Russian domination or Communist minority rule should they desire such assistance; and continued support of those Arabs who are still our allies, such support to be principally financial or technical, but disavowing any intention to promote or prevent their union with any other Arab States.

“Similarly, whether or not the Arabs desire President Nasser to be their leader is a matter for them to decide. It is Britain’s purpose to be a friend of the Arabs whatever government or leader they may choose. Such a policy would be warm, sympathetic and friendly for the Arabs are warm and emotional people. It is not necessary to confine ourselves to frigid official language in approaching them.

“In brief, the basis of our policy should be to redeem our pledges of 1918 to help the Arab race to rise once more to greatness,” he says.