The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1959. Nearer the Summit

Press, Volume XCVIII, Issue 28835, 4 March 1959, Page 12

The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1959. Nearer the Summit

It would be rash to predict that, in the sense that Churchill won the Second World War, Mr Macmillan will win the peace. Yet the latest concession by Russia on settling the future of Berlin and Germany may well indicate the success (if, perhaps, only temporarily) of Mr Macmillan’s own special type of personal diplomacy. The Russians, though still anxious for a summit meeting, say they are willing to participate in a Foreign Ministers’ conference, specifically to discuss Berlin, a German peace treaty, and the reunification of Germany, but inferentially to prepare for ending the cold war in Europe. It seems that all the gloom and foreboding occasioned by Mr Khrushchev’s failure to accompany Mr Macmillan to Kiev was premature; Mr Macmillan and Mr Khrushchev resumed their Moscow exchanges happily; and—in the words of American State Department officials—“ a ray of “ hope ” has illumined EastWest relations. Mr Khrushchev began his epistolary bombardment of Western capitals with proposals for a summit conference long before the future of Berlin became a focus of crisis. Throughout the windy correspondence, the Western Powers remained firm in their insistence that adequate preparation, on a Ministerial level, must precede any summit meeting. In other words, the Foreign Ministers of the participating Powers must agree upon a reasonably workable agenda before anything useful could be accomplished by calling together their superiors. Russia has a most unhappy record of impossible contrariness in agenda discussions. The West, by refusing a summit conference that probably would be abortive from the start, has sought to deny. Russia the propaganda material it might see in more overt deadlock among the heads of government; and Western politicians, more vulnerable electorally than Mr Khrushchev, have had good reason for their caution. The latest crisis in the cold war—Berlin—has been gathering for three months; there are three to go before it comes to a head. Even now, though Russia seems to have abandoned its cumbersome scheme for a 31-nation conference to frame a German peace treaty, it has annexed conditions to which the West may not agree. As a first step to block the Russian threat to Berlin, and as a test of Soviet Intentions, the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany joined forces last month to propose to Moscow an EastWest Foreign Ministers’ conference, with East and West German advisers present, to

deal with the whole German problem. In principle, Moscow now appears to have accepted the proposition, but wants Poland and Czechoslovakia to participate in the conference. Does this imply that Russia would concur in a similar widening of Western representation? Hope of a softening of Russian attitudes was seen early this year in concessions made at the Geneva atomic disarmament talks; these talks have since bogged down again. Certainly only the most dogged patience can succeed in dealing with the unpredictable Soviet leadership. Hope is too soon falsified for anyone less patient and astute than Mr Macmillan to pursue the devious avenues of contact. Again, Western unity has recently been weaker than desirable; the ending of the Cyprus dispute paved the way to better understanding with Greece and Turkey; but Marshal Tito’s unwillingness to revive the Balkan Pact removes a chance to exploit a chink in the East European ideological armour. The cold war has persisted so long that definitive peace seems remote. At least, however, we can hope that Soviet acquiescence in more realistic negotiations means that the deadline of Russia’s ultimatum on Berlin (fixed at May 27) will be retarded; and, as long as negotiations continue, resort to force may be delayed. If, as seems likely, the West rejects the latest Soviet proposals, there are likely to be counterproposals. All this conforms to the policy to which the United States Secretary of State (Mr Dulles) won the agreement of the North Atlantic allies on his last European trip—the policy defined by the AdenauerDulles formula as “no con- “ cessions with6ut counter- “ concessions ”, and by VicePresident Nixon as “ firmness “in principle but flexibility in “ tactics ”.

One point remains; and it is ' important. The current negotiations have thrown a trei mendous responsibility upon Mr Macmillan. On his “recon“naissance” trip, to Moscow, he 1 has acted, presumably, for all ' Britain’s allies as well as for the United Kingdom Government. The illness of Mr Dulles ' and the reported infirmity of ' President Eisenhower (particularly since Mr Sherman 1 Adams’s departure) have resulted, it seems, in the transfer of initiative once again to Britain. If a Foreign Ministers’ meeting is arranged, Mr Eisenhower will almost inevitably be forced into naming a successor to Mr Dulles. This would be a daunting task for a bolder President than Mr Eisenhower; and Mr Eisenhower’s time for choosing may be short.