The Montgomery Memoirs END OF NORMANDY

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28750, 22 November 1958, Page 10

The Montgomery Memoirs END OF NORMANDY

Vit ton Complete And Decisive

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■ depended on the concentration of J Allied strength, and therefore of ■ aintenance resources, on the left wing. Bradley agreed en- : t.rely with this outline plan. On August 20 Eisenhower held • a staff meeting at his Advanced - H Q in Normandy to collect ideas :*r the future conduct of the war. My Chief of Staff, de Guingand, attended. Certain decisions were • reached. Briefly these were: I a> To change the system of 1 tnmand on September 1. Eisen-.-.ewer taking persona! command himself of the Army Groups; bi 12 Army Group to be directed towards Metz and the Saar, where would link up with the Dragoon force coming up from southern France. Plan For Allied Advance The staff then began work on' : a directive to be sent to me. De Guingand suggested it might be as well to consult me before any • action was taken; this was ■ agreed, and he came to my Tac- ■ t-cal Headquarters that night. As 1 did not agree with the • decisions which had been reached. ' I sent de Guingand back to see ■ Eisenhower, and gave him some r.:tes to take with him. He spent ’ r»o hours with Eisenhower on ; A-gust 22 trying to persuade him • sn certain points of principle—- " £-senhower was given the notes ■ I r.ad written and was told that ? on August 17 Bradley had ex- ; pressed his complete agreement • vrth my suggested plan. These; • » ere my notes:— 3 | The quickest way to win this *ar is lur tne gieat mass of tne A—ea armies to advance northwaros clear the coast as far as A-twerp, establish a powerful air rrree in Belgium, and advance into | Lne Ruhr. The force must operate as one whore with great conesion. and be > sc strong that it can do the job quickly. Sxng.e control and direction of tne land operations is vital for success This is a whole-time job for one man. The great victory in N W. France has been won by personal com- , —.rd Only m this way will future victories be won. If staff control E cf operations is allowed to creep is then quick success becomes er.-angered To change the system of comnand now. after having won a great victory, would be to prolong •_-.e war Meeting With Eisenhower When de Guingand reported a negative result I decided that I • -st see E:senhower myself. So I asked him if he would come lunch with me at my Tac Headquarters. He accepted gladly. I was anxious to have a further -.? « with Bradley before seeing Eaenhower, but I found to my : arr.azement, when I flew to see t m that Bradley had changed -__i mind. On August 17 he had ; agreed with me, on the 23rd he • -* as a wholehearted advocate of ■ r e mam effort of his Army Group directed eastwards on Metz t and the Saar. I returned to my . headquarters in time to meet Eisenixjwer. and we talked alone - fior sne hour I said that he must - decide where the main effort e - : -ld be made and we must then so strong in that area that ' * e o: uld be certain of decisive : results quickly: we must concen-

LTcte our petrol and ammunition] resources behind his selected I tnrust line —if we spread them evenly all along the front we Bnould fail to achieve a decision. 2 :r.en described to him my own s_ggested plan. I said that if he adopted a broad front strategy, with the -nole line advancing and every- - r.e fighting all the time, the advance would inevitably peter -t. the Germans would be given ■.—. e to recover, and the war - -uld go on all through the winter and well into 1945. I also said that he. as Supreme. C mmander. should not descend into the land battle and become i. ground C.-in-C. The Supreme Commander must sit on a very 1-fity perch in order to be able :: take a detached view of the wr.ole intricate problem—someone must run the land battle for him. We nad won a great victory in Normandy because of unified land control and NOT in spite of it. I sa.d this point was so important mat, if public opinion in America was involved, he should let Brad.ey control the battle and I would gladly serve under him. This suggestion produced an immediate denial of his intention to do any- • thing of the sort. E-ienhower agreed that 21 j Army Group was not strong I enough to carry out the tasks! n the northern thrust alone and unaided. He agreed that I whatever American assistance]