The Montgomery Memoirs CLASHES IN HIGH COMMAND

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28748, 20 November 1958, Page 18

The Montgomery Memoirs CLASHES IN HIGH COMMAND

Progress Of Campaign In Normandy

I tßv Field-Marshal the Viscount MONTGOMERY of K.G.J XXII

ANE of the difficulties in Normandy lay in" the command set-up itself. In the desert “Maori” Coningham and I had equal partners—he count landing the Desert Air Force and I the Eighth A rmy. After the capture of Tripoli he went off to work with Alexander in North Africa, and we didn’t join 1 orces again until both of us were back in England in ■, 1944. And even then we were not equal partners . Not only did I have two badges in my beret—l was w# aring two berets I was at once C.-in-C. 21 Army Groqp and the Ground Force Commander for So I had two Air Force opposite numbers: Leigh-Midlory, who was Air C.-in-C., and “Maori” Coningham, in command of 2nd Tactical Air Force working ivith 21 Army Group. ,

“Maori” was particularly interested in getting his airfields south-east of Caen. They were mentioned in the plan, and to him they were all-important, I don’t blame him. But they were not all-important to me. If we won the battle of Normandy, everything else would follow, airfields and all. I wasn’t fighting to capture airfields; I was fighting to defeat Rommel in Normandy. This Coningham could scarcely appreciate, and for two reasons. First, we were not seeing each other daily as in the desert days, for at this stage I was working direct to Leigh-Mallory. Secondly, Coningham wanted the airfields in order to defeat Rommel whereas I wanted to defeat Rommel in order, only incidentally, to capture the airfields. “Maori” and Tedder were old friends. They had spent those crucial years in the Middle East together. So “Maori” had Tedder’s ear—they were both good airmen. By the middle of July there developed a growing impatience on the part of the Press; it appeared to them that stagnation gripped our lodgement area. Bradley’s first attempt at the break-out, made towards Coutances early in July, had failed. Then came operation Goodwood in the Caen section. The Press regarded this as an attempt to break out on the eastern flank and, as such, that, too, appeared to have failed.

This was partly my own fault, for I was too exultant at the Press conference I gave during the Goodwood battle. I realise that now—in fact, I realised it pretty quickly afterwards. Basically the trouble was this—both Bradley and I agreed that we could not possibly tell the Press the true strategy which formed the basis of all our plans. As Bradley said, “We must grin and bear it.” It became increasingly difficult to grin. Adverse Weather By July 18 operation Cobra, th® final break-out on the American front, was planned, and I approved the scheme. It was due to be launched two days later, but the weather delayed it until July 25. I should mention at this stage that the weather was generally very much against us. Between June 19 and 22 we had a gale of unprecedented violence: just when we needed fresh divisions to proceed with our plans and retain the initiative, those divisions were in ships anchored off the beaches, and unable to land. On June 20 we had four divisions in that situation, two American and two British. The First American Army suffered particularly badly; the American artificial harbour (the "Mulberry”) off Omaha beach had to be abandoned. American ammunition expenditure had to be rationed, and Bradley became a wefck behind schedule in his planned build-up. We had hoped originally to

launch the break-out J operation from the line St. Lo - Coutances, but Bradley finally < lecided to launch it from the general line of the road St. Lo-PVriers. Our hope was to reach t bis line by D plus 5 (June 11); /it was not finally reached till J ply 18. The greater the d<jlay on the American front th i more 1 ordered the British fe rces to intensify their operations and keep the main enemy str a qgth occupied in the Caen sect-air, and there was never any con from Dempsey. The enemy had attempted to rope us off in th b* “bocage” country some 15 to [2O miles inland from the assaiclt area, and for a time this policy# was successful. But it was only [successful by a continuous expen fcliture of reserves to plug hok is; in his defences and at heavy r cost in men and materials. The enemy reserves prevented ai fcy substantial gain on our part c bst and south of Caen, but in de lag this they were not availaole counter the thrusts on the wes b ?rn flank. In short, they weip being committed. As at Alam* in, we had forced the enemy t< > commit his reserves on a wid e front; we were now ready to < commit ours on a narrow fronts and so win the 1 attle. A Cloud Descends Thus on July 25, the day on which the American breakout began, we were on tbb ? threshold of great events. We ♦ were now to reap where we Is id sown—the strategy of the I’l ttlo of Normandy was about M > achieve decisive success. Aibl then, without warning, a cl cud descended on our affairs. On July 26, Ehrmhower had lunch in London >fith the Prime Minister. Exactly wvhat was said at that lunch party I don’t know but Eisenhower wi |ote to me that evening, and one i entence in his letter caused me misgivings, knowing as I did ifhe feeling that existed against nba among his staff vt Supreme ’ Headquarters. That sentence read : He [the P.M.I repeated over and over again that f he knew you understood the necessity for "keeping the front aflaicie.’* while major attacks were in pi ■ >gress. It seemed to me that Eisenhower had comii'ained to the Prime Minister liiat I did not understand what J I was doing. Actually, as I hri ird later, he had told the Prinn"* Minister that he was worried |at the outlook taken by the A merican Press that the British m ere not taking their share of the» fighting and of the casualties. jle gave the Prime Minister •to understand that in his • the British forces on the eas< ern flank could and should be i nore offensive; they were not ft ghting as they should.

This sparked ofli quite a lot of trouble. The nexjt night, July 27, the Prime Minis ser summoned a few responsible persons to meet

Eisenhower at dinner. I very goon heard what had taken place. Eisenhower complained that Dempsey was leaving all the fighting to the Americans. His attention was drawn to my basic strategy, i.e., to fight hard on my left and draw Germans on to that flank whilst I pushed with my right. It was pointed out that he had approved this strategy, and that it was being carried out—the bulk of the German armour had continuously been kept on the British front. Eisenhower could not refute these arguments. He then asked why it was that we could not launch major offensives on each army front simultaneously, as the Russians did. It was pointed out to him that the German density in Normandy was about two and a half times that on the Russian front, and our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25 per cent, as compared with the 300 per cent. Russian superiority on the eastern front. We clearly were not in a position to launch an all-out offensive along the whole front; such a procedure would be exactly what the Germans would like, and it would not be in accord 1 with our agreed strategy. All-out Offensive We had already launched the break-out operation on the right flank. It was an all-out offensive and it was gathering momentum rapidly. The British Second Army was fighting to keep the Germahs occupied on the left flank. Our strategy was at last about to reap its full reward. What was the trouble? It was then pointed out to Eisenhower that if he had any feelings that I was not running the battle as he wished he should most certainly tell me so in no. uncertain voice: it was for him to order what he wanted and to put all his cards on the table and tell me exactly what he thought. Eisenhower clearly was shy of doing this. He was then asked if he would like the Chief of Imperial General Staff to help. Would Eisenhower like the C.I.G.S. to tell me what he had said? Would Eisenhower like the C.I.G.S. to accompany him on a visit to me? Eisenhower didn’t take to any of these suggestions. In a few days’ time we were to gain a victory which was to be acclaimed as the greatest achievement in military history. The British had had the unspectacular role in the battle, and in the end it would be made to appear in the American press as an American victory. All that was accepted. But we all knew that if it had not been for the part played by the British Second Army on the eastern flank the Americans could never have broken out on the western flank. f Copy right—Bernard Law, Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, 1958.] I The next instalment will be printed on Saturday.)