The Montgomery Memoirs CAMPAIGN IN SICILY AHEAD

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28734, 4 November 1958, Page 15

The Montgomery Memoirs CAMPAIGN IN SICILY AHEAD

Differences On Plans For The Assault [By Field-Marshal the Viscount MONTGOMERY of Alamein, K.G.] [XV] were received in North Africa in January, 1943, that when the Axis Powers had * been turned out of Africa operations would be developed to knock Italy out of the war. It was decided that the first step was the capture of Sicily; the code name was Husky. The Eighth Army now had to learn to adjust its way of doing things, its very behaviour to a larger canvas—to the war as a whole; and this would often mean, would probably generally mean, compromise.

I then left Cairo and returned to my H.Q. in the field in Tunisia. On arrival I found I had a high temperature, and I went to bed in my caravan with influenza and tonsilitis.

Meanwhile Alexander had called a conference at Algiers for April 29, which Ramsay and 1 were to attend. I was in bed so I wired to Cairo that de Guingand was to go in my place, but his aircraft had a forced landing at El Adem and he was removed to hospital with concussion. 1 then asked Oliver Leese to go, and he got there safely, and in time. Conference Fails The conference produced no result. Alexander was unable to get inter-Service agreement, and the conference broke up without coming to any decision. Alexander flew to see me while I was still in bed. I said something must be done, and suggested a full-scale conference at Algiers on May 2. Alexander agreed, but when I arrived at Algiers found that mist and low cloud had prevented him from flying from his headquarters. Wondering what could be done, I went to look for Bedell Smith, Chief of Staff to Eisenhower. He was not in his office and I eventually ran him to ground in the lavatory. So we discussed the problem then and there. He was very upset—he said that for political reasons it was essential to reach a final decision and get on with the job. I said that it was far more important to do so for military reasons, and that I could give him the answer to the problem at once. He asked me to do so. I said that the American landings up near Palermo should be cancelled and the whole American effort put in on the south coast astride Gela and west of the Pachino peninsula, with the object of securing the airfields that were considered so essential by our air forces. The Eighth Army and the Seventh U.S. Army would then land side by side, giving cohesion to the whole invasion. Plan Accepted Bedell Smith said that there would be no difficulty whatever in doing what I suggested; and we then left the lavatory and he went off to consult Eisenhower, who liked the plan but quite rightly refused to discuss it with me unless Alexander was present. Next I persuaded Bedell Smith to assemble a conference. I said it could be a staff conference, and I would sit in with the staff; then when Alexander arrived the next day the staff could present an agreed plan to him and his brother Commanders-in-Chief. So this was done.

I presented my case; everyone agreed with it. I had now got Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff on my side. But Eisenhower quite rightly refused to come to a decision until the plan was recommended to him by Alexander and the other Commanders-in-Chief.

When the conference was over I returned to my operational H.Q. in Tunisia to await events: and at midnight on May 3 I received a signal from Alexander saying that Eisenhower had approved. At last we could get on with our work, with a firm plan

Having been woken up and given the signal. I went to sleep again feeling that fighting the Germans was easy compared with fighting for the vital issues on which everything depended. I wondered if the Germans went on like this in planning their operations.

All resistance in North Africa ended on May 12.

Field-Marshal Messe, the Italian C.-in-C. who succeeded Rommel in the over-all command, surrendered to the Eighth Army next day. He had dinner with me that night, before going off to his prison camp, and we discussed various aspects of the battles we had fought against each other.

I decided then that I would go to England for a short holiday before the Sicily campaign began. I also wanted to see the Ist Canadian Division, which was to land direct on the Sicily beaches from the United Kingdom. We should not see them until we were fighting alongside them. This obviously needed buttoningup beforehand.

One thing connected with the visit made me feel lonely. A Thanksgiving Service for the end of the war in Africa was hold in St. Paul’s Cathedral on May 19; I was in London but was not asked to attend. It was explained to me after the service that it was desired to keep my presence in England a secret Yet, to my delighted surprise, wherever I went I was followed by crowds. The incident made me realise that if I was pretty popular with a lot of people I was not too popular in some circles. Perhaps the one explained the other Need For Master Plan I returned to the Eighth Army via Algiers, and met the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Brooke) there on June 2. The impression I gained was that the Prime Minister and the C.I.G.S. had come on to Algiers from Washington in order to ensure that the capture of Sicily should be pushed hard and exploited to the utmost; to do this was somewhat at variance with the decisions taken in Washington, and therefore they had persuaded General Marshall to come with them.

The Prime Minister, who was determined to knock Italy out of the war, cross-examined me a good deal about the plan for Sicily. I expressed confidence in it and in our ability to carry it out. This was only natural, since it was my plan! I also emphasised the need for a master plan which would ensure that, once ashore, the operations would be developed in the right way.

The desert which we knew so well, and had conquered, was to be left behind. We all knew that the Second Front in Europe and the invasion across the Channel were looming ahead Possibly Sicily was to be, in a sense, a rehearsal for the more serious operation which would come in 1944.

Even so, I was determined to ensure that the Eighth Army was never launched into battle with a bad plan and that the lives of officers and men were not thrown away in unsound ventures. Before we went to Sicily I would have to visit all my divisions and tell the soldiers that I was confident of success there. I knew that there had already been seven plans for the assault on Sicily.

Plan No. 1. which was produced by the Joint Planning Staff in London in January, 1943, split the assaulting force up into a large number of landings between Catania on the east coast, southwards round the Pachino peninsula, and thence to a point far away at the western end of the island. To such a dispersal of effort we should never have agreed, but at that time we were fighting our way to Tripoli—and I doubt if I even knew that Sicily was to be the next objective. This plan was apparently accepted in principle by Alexander’s

headquarters in Tunisia in April, and his own staff produced Plan No. 2. This was a detailed plan which involved landings between Catania and Palermo, from DDay to D plus 5. It was the basis of the plan which, with some modifications, was eventually submitted by General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington in April. 1943, and which I shall call Plan No. 3 since it was the third plan that I knew about. So far I had not been consulted in any way, although the Eighth Army was to play a major part in the operations. Further detailed ways of invading Sicily were produced by various planning experts, some of whom came to see me, making, as I say. a total of seven plans by the middle of April. This didn’t look to me a good way of going about the operation—time was getting short and a firm plan was essential, and quickly. As I flew towards Cairo I began to see the future more clearly. Rocks Ahead Obviously there were rocks ahead, and we would have to walk delicately and not force our desert ways down the throats of all and sundry. Also we must try to preserve our sense of humour and—very important—we must not get a name for non-co-operation. We mustn’t “bellyache.” But I was determined on one thing: I would never agree to compromise over vital issues. De Guingand met me at Cairo, and the next day I was given a presentation of the plan for the invasion of Sicily as finally proposed by Alexander’s headquarters. This could be called Plan No. 8. The naval commander responsible for landing the Eighth Army in Sicily was Admiral Ramsay, known as Bertie Ramsay. He was a grand person: I had known him when he was Flag Officer, Dover, and I had been commanding the South-Eastern Army! Later we worked together on the Normandy landings. It was a real tragedy for us all, and to me a great personal loss, when he was killed in an air crash in France early in 1945. I listened to the presentation, quickly decided that it would not do. and had a good talk about it with Bertie Ramsay, and also with Leese and Dempsey, who were to be my Corps Commanders for the campaign in Sicily. I decided to send a signal to Alexander saying I could not accept the proposed plan for the Eighth Army, and to put forward instead a new plan.

This was Plan No. 9 and was called by my staff the “Easter plan,” it having been made during the Easter week-end. It was the one finally agreed for the Eighth Army. I sent the following signal to Alexander, who was in Algiers, on April 24: Planning to date has been on the assumption that resistance will be slight and Sicily will be captured easily. Never was there a greater error. Germans and Italians are fighting well in Tunisia and will repeat the process in Sicily. If we work on the assumption of little resistance and disperse our effort as is being done in all planning to date we shall merely have a disaster. . . I am prepared to carry the war into Sicily with the Eighth Army, but must really ask to be allowed to make my own Army Plan. My Army must operate so concentratedly that Corps and Divisions can co-operate. The whole initial . effort of the Eighth Army should be made in the area between Syracuse and the Pachino peninsula. Subsequent operations will be developed so as to secure airfields and ports. The first thing to do is to secure a lodgement in a suitable area and then operate from that firm base. Time is pressing. If we delay while the toss is being argued in London and Washington the operation will never be launched in July. All planning is suffering because everyone is trying to make something of a plan which they know can never succeed. I have given orders that as far as the Eighth Army is concerned all planning and work will proceed on the lines outlined above. Admiral Ramsay is in complete agreement with me, and together we are prepared to launch the operation and win. . . . A Proper “Stinker” I expected my signal to produce. immediate repercussions in Algiers, and it did! The next day Ramsay received a proper “stinker” from Admiral Cunningham, the Naval C.-in-C. working with Alexander. Ramsay was rather upset. But we had a good laugh over it and he agreed that I should send the following signal to Alexander: — I hear that Cunningham and Tedder have told you they disagree completely with our proposed plan for the Eighth Army assault on Sicily. I wish to state emphatically that if we carry out the suggested existing plan it will fall. I state on whatever reputation I may have that the plan put forward by me and Ramsay will succeed. Would you like us both to come over and explain our

plan? Meanwhile work is continuing on our plan as time is short. Honoured By The King While in England I had been told that the King was going to visit the Forces in North Africa. He arrived in Africa on June 13 and came to Tripoli on the 17th to see the Eighth Army, or as much of it as was there. He stayed with us in our camp on the seashore some miles outside Tripoli, and I think he enjoyed the visit. We certainly enjoyed having him with us; he put us all at our ease and was in splendid form. At one time I was anxious for his safety, as enemy parachutists were still at large and Tripoli was full of Italians. When the King was actually in that town I confined all civilians to their houses; and one day fire was opened on suspicious elements trying to break out. On the day he arrived he gave me the accolade of knighthood in the lunch marquee near the airfield. I Copyright—Bernard Law, Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, 1958. The extracts are from his Memoirs, published by Collins of London.] I The next instalment will be printed on Thursday.]