Mr Gomulka Comes to Heel

Press, Volume XCVII, Issue 28629, 4 July 1958, Page 8

Mr Gomulka Comes to Heel

Mr Gomulka’s speech attacking Jugoslavia and the executed Hungarian leader, Mr Nagy, was interesting more for its motives than for its content. Its general tenor was essentially the same as that of many other recent communist pronouncements: and Mr Gomulka was careful to emphasise that the sentence on Mr Nagy was a matter solely for Hungarian jurisdiction The speech is important primarily because it indicates that, in accord with Russian moves to strengthen and reconsolidate the Eastern bloc, Mr Gomulka has been forced into abandoning his friendship with Jugoslavia and aligning Poland less equivocally than hitherto with the other Warsaw Pact nations In yielding to Russian pressure. Mr Gomulka has been confronted with an inescapable choice' between seeing all Polish freedom irretrievably crushed and retaining, by the sacrifice of ideological independence, as many as possible of the internal gains that the Polish people have achieved since the political uprising of October, 1956 Obviously. Mr Gomulka has not made his choice lightly: and it is not difficult to speculate on the magnitude and ruthlessnes* of the forces that have influenced his decision. Mr Gomulka had shown himself extraordinarily adroit in maintaining a balance in his relations with the Soviet on the one hand and the West on the other: and in cultivating friendship with neighbouring Jugoslavia in spite of its worsening ideological dispute

with Moscow. Poland’s most pressing need has been, and still is, foreign aid for its gravely debilitated economy. Mr Gomulka has readily accepted United States assistance, and has asked for more. The Russian response to his appeals has been more generous; but it has resulted from conciliatory manoeuvres by Mr Gomulka, such as the reimposition of a rigorous press censorship measures against strikes and student demonstrations, and Polish support for Moscow at the November conference of Communist parties. When he first attained power, Mr Gomulka won enormous popular support within Poland by the introduction of such far-reach-ing reforms as the near-liquida-tion of the collective farm system, recognition of the great hold of the Roman Catholic Church upon the Polish people, and radical changes in the pattern of industrial develop ment. From the beginning, he was committed to govern by consent, to allow considerable freedom of speech and complete freedom of religion: but also to sustain a communist system in an anti-communist country and io keep Poland in alliance with Russia. By introducing a more humane form of communism, ho pleased his own people, but incensed Moscow; by abandoning some of his reforms, he has appeased the Russians and sacrificed the goodwill of many Poles. Continued economic difficulties have impeded national progress: Western aid has probably been too tardy and too

insubstantial; and Mr Gomulka has become increasingly at the mercy of the Russians, his only alternative source of adequate assistance.

In recent months, Russia has turned more to economics as a key to the firm integration of the Eastern bloc. Evidence of this was the summoning of a high-level conference in Moscow to renew the campaign initiated in 1949 for integrated economic planning throughout Russia and its satellites. There seems little doubt that Moscow has been troubled for a considerable time about Poland’s association with Jugoslavia. It has feared the possibility that other satellites might copy Jugoslavia’s example of intransigence if Poland’s acquiescence were not ended. To strengthen his own position. Mr Khrushchev needs to enforce unquestioning allegiance to Moscow doctrine. This need underlies Russia’s adoption of a firmer attitude towards the European satellites. A meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee in Moscow this month was expected to clarify questions of Soviet leadership and policy, especially on steps to counter Jugoslav “ revision- “ ism Among the East European leaders, Mr Gomulka occupied the most difficult position. The Central Committee appears to have eliminated any chance that he could continue to steer a middle course between Moscow and Belgrade. In his acceptance of the committee’s dictates, economic considerations may well have been as decisive as ideological pressure. Certainly Mr Gomulka’s delay in endorsing the execution of Mr Nagy lends substance to earlier reports of Polish disapproval.