The Press FRIDAY, JULY 5, 1957. Changes in Russia

Press, Volume XCVI, Issue 28321, 5 July 1957, Page 10

The Press FRIDAY, JULY 5, 1957. Changes in Russia

The latest changes in the hierarchy of the Kremlin made by the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party, provide another of the riddles which Moscow has posed to the world quite frequently since the death of Stalin four years ago. Four men who were at the summit of Russia’s Government have not only been dismissed but have had levelled against them a long catalogue of charges which include political and ideological as well as administrative misdemeanours. Some of these charges refer to matters of long standing. Mr Molotov is accused of “raising " obstacles ” to the conclusion of a State treaty with Austria, which came into force in July, 1955. The Western nations had good cause to complain about Mr Molotov’s obstructive tactics in Austria; it is surprising to learn that their impatience was shared by the inner councils of the Communist Party. In this particular and in others, the bill of indictment shows the central committee of the party to be objecting now to matters upon which it made no effective protest and, by its silence, assented —at the time. In Western eyes this belated indignation by its-'f would cast suspicion on the genuineness of the whole indictment. The indictment, clearly, has been drawn up specifically to discredit the four men; and it discredits them comprehensively. But if the process by which the dismissals have been made is obscured and confused by these customary Russian methods, reasonably firm conclusions can be drawn about the result. Messrs Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and ShepUov have lost in the struggle for power that has been waged, bitterly and ceaselessly, since the death of Stalin brought an end to the era of monolithic State control and centralised economic direction. Mr Molotov and Mr Kaganovich were closely identified with the Stalin regime; both were old and trusted associates of Stalin. Mr Malenkov was an executive who was high in Stalin’s favour. Many thought he had been chosen by Stalin to be his successor; and Mr Malenkov did, indeed, become first among the triumvirate which ruled immediately after Stalin’s death. Mr Shepilov has not hitherto been closely identified with Stalin; and it is rather surprising to find him in this company.

What will happen to these men now is not known. But in one respect, at least, political practices in Russia seem to have improved since Stalin; the struggle for survival at the summit of the Soviet system is not now, as it was then, literally a struggle to the death. The world will naturally be less interested in their fate than in the changes that their fall may portend in the international policies of Russia. Mr Khrushchev appears now to have established his personal dominance beyond challenge. He has recovered from the slight setback to his career and reputation that followed his criticism of Stalin during the secret session of the twentieth Party Congress; but after Poland and Hungary it is very doubtful whether Mr Khrushchev will again risk putting to any severe test the devotion of the satellites to Russia. He has been at particular pains recently to present himself to the world as a Russian leader who believes in the possibility of peaceful co-existence between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Many believe him to be sincerely anxious to improve relations. For instance, Mr George F. Kennan, a former United States Ambassador to Russia and the man who is credited with drafting the policy of “ containing ” Communist aggression, said he thought that due importance should be given to those passages in Mr Khrushchev’s recent interview on the American television system that pointed to serious and hopeful possibilities; Mr Kennan thought that Mr Khrushchev’s statement should be examined soberly and intently, without illusion, but also without prejudice and timidity. There is certainly a good deal of evidence to suggest that Russia wants to make a composition with the West that would ensure peace for some years at least. Indeed, Mr Khrushchev’s “ grand design ” for a revolutionary change in the Russian economy (which was announced last April) calls for such a period of assured peace. While the plan is being carried into effect, the additional strain of dangerous adventures in the foreign field might threaten the whole structure of government and economic administration in Russia. Altogether, there is some reason for the Western world to hope that the changes in Russia will improve the prospects for world peace.