The Press TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1957. Security Council and The Canal

Press, Volume XCV, Issue 28264, 30 April 1957, Page 12

The Press TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1957. Security Council and The Canal

The Security Council has not finished yet with Egypt’s plan to operate the Suez Canal An all-day debate last Friday was adjourned at Britain’s request for a few days to allow consultations with user governments not represented on the Security Council. But it would be idle to interpret the council’s proceedings on Friday as pointing to any other outcome than acceptance of the Egyptian declaration and terms. In contrast to its attitude last October when it was unanimous in adopting six principles for negotiating a settlement, the Security Council last Friday was sharply divided. Three attitudes towards the Egyptian declaration were shown. Two members were satisfied; three members thought the Egyptian plan should be tried; six members thought the unilateral Egyptian declaration should be replaced by an international agreement. Members of the Council knew, of course, all about the long talks in Cairo between President Nasser and his Foreign Minister, Dr. Fawzi, on one side, and the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr Hammarskjold, and Mr Hare, the American Ambassador, on the other. They knew that the Secretary-General and the Ambassador had tried to dovetail President Nasser’s ideas into the Security Council's proposals; and they knew that the discussions had been fruitless. It. was not surprising last Friday that no-one thought it worth while to try to get the Council to reassert its six principles. The Egyptian declaration sets out terms for running the Suez Canal which have an appearance of reasonableness. Observance of the 1888 Convention is pledged, and undertakings about tolls, royalties, and the setting aside of funds for improvements and meeting obligations are given. But these pledges and undertakings are less satisfactory than they seem because their effectiveness depends entirely on the will of a man who has not hesitated to break pledges in the past, who has won his way so far by extremist and highly nationalist policies, and who may be expected to continue to follow the same methods—using the Suez Canal to help him. Noone except President Nasser and his supporters can be happy at

the thought of the Security Council by-passing the chief of the six requirements it made in October—that the canal be insulated from the politics of any country—and agreeing to terms which would leave this vital waterway in hands that have proved unworthy of being entrusted with high responsibilities. Indeed, the fact that the Western nations seem un-

likely firmly to resist this outcome measures their despair of finding a practical alternative to composition on President Nasser’s terms. There has been some talk of boycott; but boycott would be useless unless the maritime nations were unanimous. There was no unanimity during the period between the seizure of the canal and the British-French intervention; and there would be less chance of it now. In a partial boycott shipowners not using the canal would be at a great commercial disadvantage. It seems likely, therefore, that the maritime nations will agree to use the canal. But they cannot be content to let the matter rest there. They must endeavour to reduce their

dependence on the canal and must still endeavour to reach a negotiated settlement which will safeguard vital international interests. Such interests do not stpp at guarantees of transit at reasonable cost through the Suez Canal President Nasser is treating great nations cavalierly, and there can be no doubt that he is doing it for a purpose. Circumstances have placed him in a position to corqpete with the world’s greatest and wealthiest nation for power in the Middle East. The United States, which led the movement in the Security Council for giving President Nasser’s plan a trial, may have ideas about moulding the situation as it develops. It must be hoped that its ideas will prove better and more effective than most of those that have inspired American policy since the offer and withdrawal of funds for the High Dam at Aswan, for, as the American observer, Walter Lippmann, has said, “if Nasser “is not effectively checked, it “ will be idle to suppose that “ American influence can be “maintained by the Elsenhower “ doctrine, by acts, by arms “deliveries, by some economic “ aid, and by resounding de- “ clarations against the menace “ of communism ”,