The Press WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1956 U.N. POLICE FORCE

Press, Volume XCIV, Issue 28131, 21 November 1956, Page 14

The Press WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1956 U.N. POLICE FORCE

Though units from several nations contributing to the United Nations police force have arrived in Egypt, the constitution, role, and future of the force are far from clear. 1 The creation of the police force, to be drawn from the smaller nations, was authorised by an overi whelming majority of the General Assembly. The case for excluding the large nations was strong even before Russia’s threats of largescale intervention in the Middle East and its actual intervention in Hungary. But the capacity of the small Powers to raise a sufficiently strong force was open to question. However, the General Assembly’s sense of urgency seemed likely to surmount this obstacle, and some 20 nations offered forces. The early enthusiasm seems to have dimmed. Many Governments would naturally be reluctant to commit forces until the functions and responsibilities of the force were defined; and Mr Hammarskjold’s difficulties in Cairo have given them further reasons for caution. Statements in the Cairo press have insisted that the United Nations force would be permitted to enter Egypt only on Egypt’s terms. This interpretation of Egypt’s attitude is supported by the extraordinary story from Ottawa about a reversal of Canada’s plans to ship a battalion of infantry to participate in the force. Difficult problems for many governments are created by Egypt’s apparent determination to dictate terms, consent to which would vitiate the understanding that the force would be a United Nations force operating under the direction of the United Nations. The Divided West

President Nasser, it is clear, has swiftly recovered from the physical humiliation his forces suffered in the Sinai Peninsula. He is making the most of the sympathy Egypt gained in a large part of the world because of the British and French intervention; and he has Russia’s strong support. Russia is using the crisis to increase its influence with President Nasser and his followers in the other Arab States. Nasser has profited from the division in the Western world. Egypt went to the United Nations claiming to be a blameless and deeply injured party; and the United States must accept a heavy share of responsibility for the acceptance by the United Nations of this rather naive representation. Mr Walter Lippmann has said that when Israel attacked and the United States rightly decided to take the affair to the United (Nations, there were two ways of doing so—and the United States chose the wrong one. One way was to seize the whole border problem, tc recognise that it is a two-sided problem, and to call for measures to restrain the Egyptian raids as well as the Israeli reprisals. The other way, the one which the United States took, was to ignore the Egyptian raids, to treat Israel as the aggressor and Egypt as the innocent victim. This, Lippmann says, “ was a grave mistake of “ policy, indefensible in principle “ and in fact entirely unrealistic “ and impracticable ”. The American position, after the subsequent British and French action, became, Lippmann says, “ wiser than the first “ unbalanced reaction in Washing- “ ton ”. But there is little doubt that President Nasser feels, rightly or wrongly, that he can still derive advantage from the American attitude.

Purpose of the Force The usually well-informed chief of the Washington bureau of the “ New York Times ”, Mr James Reston, reported on Monday that the New Zealand and Australian External Affairs Ministers (Mr Macdonald and Mr Casey) were seeking enlightenment in Washington about American policy towards the United Nations police force. According to Reston, the New Zealand and Australian Ministers asked, specifically, if the United States is “ really “ trying to establish a United “ Nations force in Egypt for the “ purpose of maintaining peace and “ stability so that a general settle- “ ment can, at long last, be nego- “ tiated in the Middle East, or is it “ merely trying to get the British “ and French out of Egypt no matter “ what the cost? ” The two Ministers were arguing, Reston says, that the United States should “ really back up ” the United Nations Secretary-General and make it clear that he, rather than President Nasser, was calling the tune on the composition, location, and duration of stay of the United Nations force. Though no clear indication of the American attitude has yet been given, it is hopeful to notice Mr Dulles, in his first statement since his illness, taking the longer-term view and saying that “it would be a great mistake “to believe peace could be estab- “ lished permanently in the area “ merely by emergency measures to “ stop the fighting ”.

Whether it was wise, rash or timely to intervene in the Middle East, as Britain and France did, is

open to question; but there is no doubt that the outcome has provided the United Nations with both the opportunity and the responsibility to play a decisive role in restoring peace and order in the Middle East and in saving the Suez Canal from the capricious hands of an ambitious dictator for the benefit of legitimate world commerce. It would be disastrous for the United Nations and perhaps catastrophic for the world if the opportunity were lost and the responsibility shed. Noone can forget that eight years ago the then Secretary-General, Mr Trygve Lie, begged the governments he served to establish a force of between 5000 and 10,000 men to help stop the flow of blood in Palestine. Not even the murder of their own mediator, Count Bernadotte, moved the member nations to agree. The United Nations has not now the excuse that its members failed to agree. The organisation would fail far more lamentably than in 1948 if it allowed an arrogant dictator to thwart its efforts to establish a real international authority in a part of the world where international authority is demonstrably the only guarantee of peace.