Disarmament Plans

Press, Volume XCIII, Issue 27924, 22 March 1956, Page 12

Disarmament Plans

The United Nations Sub-committee on Disarmament is now meeting in London with more hope of making some progress towards agreement, though recent experience (and experience after the First World War, too) counsels against pitening hopes too high. The prospects are a little better than they were, partly because recess diplomacy has narrowed the gap between the'plans of East and West till it is not now too great to be bridged and partly

because all countries are anxious to reduce the financial burden of their defence preparations. In brief, the sub-committee has two main plans to consider. The Russians propose an agreement on the level of armaments judged on manpower and some form of ground inspection. The Americans propose aerial inspection followed later by an agreement on limitations based on equipment, and are willing, also, to accept the prin-; ciple of ground inspection advocated by the Russians. On nuclear weapons, the Russians want an agreement on abolition and the Americans the “ freezing ” of atomic stockpiles at their present strength. The difference here is wider than it seems. The abolition of nuclear weapons, even supposing it could be enforced, would give the Russians military superiority because of their weight of numbers and conventional weapons. “ Freezing ” would give the Americans superiority because their stockpile is the bigger. The, temptation for each side in discussing nuclear weapons will be to seek propaganda successes; and the result will probably be disagreement on limitation. The best chance of a measure of disarmament lies in the category of conventional weapons, and less in any agreement on limitation than in mutual inspection arrangements. A combination of the American and Russian plans for aerial and ground inspection would greatly reduce the danger of a surprise attack by one country on another. This safeguard, in itself, would give every country a greater sense of security. And the feeling of insecurity has been the basic cause of the arms race. If rival nations thought they were fairly safe from an attack without warning they would feel less need for armaments. This would be a modest start, leaving much difficult negotiation to follow on successive reductions of defence establishments; but it would at least be a start. Now that the cold war is moving into the stage of cultural, diplomatic, and commercial tactics, money saved on weapons could be well used for other purposes. It is to be hoped that the sub-committee is able to agree on this limited achievement, and does not adjourn without result because of the almost insuperable problems of reaching a wider agreement. The propaganda successes to be won by debating points are not an adequate substitute for even a slight lifting of the fear that oppresses the whole world. At this meeting, both sides have the opportunity to show that they real!" do wish to turn their fm*n i the capacity to make war to the capacity to make peace. 1