CONTROL OF ATOMIC POWER

Press, Volume XCIII, Issue 27873, 23 January 1956, Page 6

CONTROL OF ATOMIC POWER

HARRY S. TRUMAN]

[By

Responsibility Unprecedented In History

This is the first of a series of articles derived from the second volume of the memoirs of Mr Harry S. Truman, covering the period in which he was President of the United States of America.

Within the first few months I discovered that being a President is like a man riding a tiger. He has to keep on riding or be swallowed. The fantastically crowded nine months of 1945 taught me that a President either is constantly on top of events or, if he hesitates, events will soon be on top of him. I felt that I could not let up for a single moment. No-one who has not had the responsibility can really understand what it is like to be President, not even his closest aides or members of his immediate family. There is no end to the chain of responsibility that binds him; and he is never allowed to forget he is President.

What kept me going in 1945 was my belief that there is far more good than evil in men, and that it is the business of government to make the good prevail.

By nature not given to making snap judgments or easy decisions, I required all available facts and information before coming to a decision. But once a decision was made, I did not worry about it afterwards.

I had trained myself to look bgck into history for precedents, because instinctively I sought perspective in the span of history for the decisions I had to make. That is why I read and reread history. Most of the problems a President has to face have their roots in the past.

Two cruel wars were behind us, in which we had seen totalitarian aggressors beaten into unconditional surrender. We had sponsored and helped to establish the United Nations organisation, hoping to prevent again the too often recurring plague of humanity—war. I had met Churchill and Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam, trying to achieve closer co-operation among the three leading Powers. But in spite of these efforts, relations with Russia had become difficult.

Victory had turned a difficult ally in war into an even more troublesome peace-time partner. Russia seemed bent upon taking advantage of warshattered neighbours for imperialistic ends. The whole balance of power in the Far East had shifted. Most of the countries in Europe were bankrupt, and millions of people were homeless and starving, and we were the only nation that could come to their help. The economic and financial burdens now confronting us were staggering. A Portentous Event But one event occurred in 1945 of such magnitude that it was to revolutionise our relations with the world and usher in, a new era for humanity, the fruits and goals and problems of which we cannot even now fully grasp. It was the atom bomb. With it came the secret of how to harness nuclear energy.

I now had a responsibility without precedent in history. The decisions I had to make and the policies I would recommend to Congress on the use and control of atomic energy could well influence the future course of civilisation. This was to be the beginning of the period of hope and many trials.

A bill for the control of atomic energy was before Congress. This bill was the May-Johnson bill, which had been drawn up in the early days after V-J Day. Its aim was to set up a kind of permanent “Manhattan District” under military control. I felt that atomic energy should not be controlled by the military.

The legislative dispute was finally resolved when the Senate set up a Special Committee on Atomic Energy. The chairman of this committee was Senator Brien McMahon, of Connecticut, a devoted and talented public servant who deserves a great deal of credit for his legislative leadership in the shaping of the atomic programme. On November 30, 1945, I sent a memorandum to certain officials on the handling of the atomic programme, saying that I thought the May-Johnson bill should be amended to provide for civilian supremacy; and at the same time raised with Senator McMahon the necessity for establishing civilian control. The Senator agreed to seek amendment of the bill. Within a few days, however, he requested an appointment, suggesting that the Secretaries of War and of the Navy also be present. The military services felt very strongly that the control of atomic development should be under their auspices, if not under their immediate jurisdiction, and that they

were making strong representations to that effect to Congress. The meeting took place in my office on December 4. In addition to Patterson (Secretary of War), Forrestal (Secretary of the Navy) and Senator McMahon, General Groves was present, with Dr. Edward U. Condon, the Director of the Bureau of Standards, and James R. Newman, counsel of the Atomic Energy Committee. Civilian Control

I asked each member of the group to state his position. Then .1 stated mine that the entire programme and operation should be under civilian control and that the Government should have a monopoly of materials, facilities and processes. Civilian control of atomic energy faced many obstacles. Advocates of military control had many friends in Congress, and Senator McMahon had a difficult time gathering support for his measure. On February 1, 1946, he spent nearly two hours with me at the White House discussing his difficulties. The formulation of a plan for the international control of atomic energy had in the meantime been referred to a special governmental committee which Secretary of State Byrnes had appointed. The Under-Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was designated chairman.

Working with and for the committee was a board of consultants whose job was to analyse and appraise all facts pertinent to the problem of international control and to formulate proposals. David E. Lilienthal, the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was the chairman of this group. This board did an outstanding job. Its report was unanimously endorsed by the parent committee. It is usually referred to as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, and is a great State paper. On March 8 Senator McMahon came to the White House to report that new difficulties were in the offing for the atomic energy bill that he had introduced. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan was sponsoring an amendment to the bill that would set up a Military Liaison Board which, in effect, would duplicate the proposed Atomic Energy Commission. This amendment would have had the effect of defeating the principle of civilian supremacy, and under it the commission’s work would have been subject to the veto of the military.

The argument for this military veto was based on the premise that the preservation of the national security is primarily the responsibility of the armed forces. But this is a wrong assumption. The preservation of the nation’s safety and defence is an organic and a sweeping responsibility which extends to all branches and departments of the government; and only one of its many phases is assigned to the military departments. I put it in these words to a press conference on March 14: “I don’t think there is a clear understanding by the public, or even in Congress, of what is meant by civilian control of that board. . . . The idea is that the military, of coufse, has an important part to play and should be consulted, but it is a mistake to believe that only the military can guard the national security. The full responsibility for a balanced and forceful development of atomic energy looking toward the national economic good, national security and a firm, clear position toward other nations and world peace, should rest with the civilian group directly responsible to the President. Now the President is the Commander-in-Chief of -the Armed Forces of the United States in the first place; and the civilian board under him would in no wav hampet the military in their proper function.” The International Angle On March 16 I conferred with Secretary Byrnes on the possibility that Congress might pass an atomic energy law that would undercut our efforts to bring about international co-opera-tion in the field of atomic power. We had to be in a position where we could put our plan for international control before the United Nations without being handicapped by a domestic law that would have made it impossible for us to take part.

Byrnes advised me that the committee was ready to report any day. He suggested that we appoint a spokesman who would command respect both at home and abroad. Bernard M. Baruch seemed to me to be the logical man, and for several reasons. Not the least important of these was that Earuch enjoyed considerable esteem in the Senate. His association with the Administration’s plan for the control of atomic energy might help to remove some of the opposition to the McMahon bill in Congress. Baruch had also succeeded, over the years, in forming many friendships abroad, including that of Winston Churchill, and during a long life he had acquired the prestige of an “elder statesman.” I called on him in the expectation that he would also add weight to the proposal we were about to put before the world. The Baruch 'orintment was announced on March 18, and was received very favourably by the press.

When Byrnes brought me a final draft of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, I sat down at once to study it. By some unauthorised means, however this report fell into the hands of the press. This upset Baruch, and he asked to see me. When he came he handed me a letter: „ March 26. 1946. Mr dear Mr President: I was, of course, very much gratified that you should have expressed such great confidence in me as to appoint me the United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. I do not underestimate either the honour or the responsibility, but. as I have become more familiar with the situation, there are certain elements of it which are causing me concern, and which I. therefore, want to discuss with you As I understand my duties and authority, they consist presently solely of the obligation of representing United States policy on atomic energy, as communicated to me by you directly or through the Secretary of State, before the United Nations. I see .nowhere any duty or responsibility on me to partake in the formation of that policy. This situation has been brought very forcibly to my attention by the press announcements of the report rendered by Mr Acheson’s Committee. I do not underestimate the effect of this publication in the United States or in the world at large, and, while I have not had an opportunity to examine the report with care and cannot state my own definite views with respect to it, the letter from Secretary Byrnes to me transmitting the report states that it was unanimously recommended by a committee headed by the Under-Secretary of State. This brings the report pretty close to the category of the United States Government policy. I have no doubt that the public feels that I am going to have an important relation to the determination of our atomic energy policy. There is no legal basis for this view and now that the Under-Secretary of State’s Committee Report has been published, the determination of policy will be greatly affected by the contents of this report. Even the superficial and incomplete examination of the subject that I have been able to make in the last few days convinces me that this report is likely to be the subject of considerable and rather violent differences of opinion. Its publication. which I understand to have been unauthorised, does not render the situation any less difficult. These are the things that have been bothering me, and I wanted to talk them over with you before coming to a final conclusion myself as to whether, in the

circumstances, I can be useful to you. As it presently stands, I think that embarrassment all around would be avoided if you would ask Chairman Connally of the Foreign Relations Committee to postpone any action on confirmation of my appointment until I have had a little more time to think things over. Respectfully your, BERNARD M. BARUCH. A “Working Paper” I explained to Mr Baruch that, in the first place, the Acheson report was very plainly marked as a working paper and not as an approved policy document. I also informed him that whatever policy he would be asked to represent before the United Nations would have to be a policy approved by me. I pointed out that, under the law, all representatives of the United States at the United Nations were under the supervision of the Secretary of State. Of course, I told him, the Secretary of State would probably request his aid in the preparation of a policy proposal for my approval, but I had no intention of placing him in a role different from other delegates to the United Nations.

Baruch, who is usually referred to as an “adviser to Presidents,” had, of course, full knowledge of the President’s responsibility for national policy. His concern, in my opinion, was really whether he would receive public recognition. He had always seen to it that his suggestions and recommendations, not always requested by the President, would be given publicity. Most Presidents have received more advice than they can possibly use. But Baruch is the only man to my knowledge who has built a reputation on a self-assumed unofficial status as “adviser.”

I had asked him in a very polite way to help his Government, and so did Byrnes. Mr Baruch’s principal’ contribution to the atomic energy programme was that he transformed the AchesonLilienthal Report from a working paper into a formal, systematic proposal and that he added a section that called for sanctions, against any nation violating the rules. The Soviet Plan The American plan was put before the United Nations Commission by Baruch on June 14. Within a matter of hours, it became evident that the Soviet had a proposal of its own, and one that was sharply in conflict with the American /suggestion. In the month that followed, Baruch and his associates presented details of the American proposals to the several committees set up by the United Nations Commission. Russian and Polish opposition was evident. In substance, what the Russians wanted was a plan that would provide for an agreement not to use atomic weapons, for the cessation of bomb production and for the destruction of all stockpiles. This amounted to a demand that we destroy our atom bombs and, if we agreed to all this, then the Russians would be willing to discuss arrangements for the exchange of scientific information and the formation of international controls. Our plan provided for- the setting up of immediate controls over raw materials out of which fissionable materials could be made. Only when such controls were established would we consider disposing of our stockpile of bombs. If we accepted the Russian position, we would be deprived of everything except their promise to agree to controls. Then, if the Russians should launch an atomic armament race, our present advantage and security, gained by our discovery and initiative, would be wiped out. As I wrote to Baruch on July 10, “We should not in any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure the rest of the world can’t arm against us.” The United Nations Commission eventually adopted, over the objections of Poland and Russia, what was substantially the American plan. The commission’s report was sent to the Security Council. There, backed by the use of the veto, Russia was able to block all further action. (To be continued)

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