THE TRUMAN MEMOIRS BITTER EXCHANGES OVER SATELLITES AT POTSDAM

Press, Volume XCII, Issue 27796, 22 October 1955, Page 8

THE TRUMAN MEMOIRS BITTER EXCHANGES OVER SATELLITES AT POTSDAM

[By

HARRY S. TRUMAN]

(XXIV)

At the eighth session of the heads of Government [at Potsdam] on July 24, 1945, we were again dealing with the question of peace treaties and interim arrangements with Italy and the other satellites. I had agreed to include the Eastern satellites in a redraft of my original proposal, and this new version was now placed before us by Secretary Byrnes. The most bitter debate of the conference now developed, the point at issue being that Stalin wanted us to recognise the puppet governments that he had installed in the satellite countries over-run by the Russian armies. Stalin said an abnormal distinction was being drawn between Italy and the other satellite States, as if Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland belonged in the category of leprous States. In such a distinction, he saw a danger that attempts would be made to discredit the Soviet Union, and asked whether the Italian Government was' any more democratic or responsible than the governments of the other countries. No democratic elections had been held in Italy, he said.

I replied that everybody had free access to Italy—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Upion, and other nations—but we had not been able to have free access to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and had not been able to get information concerning them. “Democracy” of Governments

When Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were set up on a basis to give us free access to them, I declared, then we would recognise them, but not sooner. I was asking for the reorganisation of the other satellite governments along democratic lines, as had been agreed upon at Yalta. Stalin objected to the words, “responsible and democratic governments” in the draft, saying that they should be deleted as they served to discredit these countries. I pointed out that this language was necessary to show that the only way in which they could obtain our support for entry into the United Nations organisation was for them to have democratic governments.

Stalin said that these were not Fascist governments. There was a <«far less democratic Government in Argentina, he pointed out, which in spite of this had been admitted to the United Nations. Churchill said he would like to put in a plea for Italy. He said he had considerable sympathy for Italy because there was no censorship there, there had been a considerable growth of freedom, and now the north was going to have democratic elections. He did not see why the “Big Three” should not discuss peace with them. With regard to Rumania, and particularly to Bulgaria, he added, the British knew nothing. Their mission in Bucharest, he asserted, had been penned up with a closeness approaching internment. Stalin broke in to ask if it were really possible for him to cite such facts that had not been verified. The “Iron Fence”

Churchill said that they knew this by their representatives there. Stalin would be very much astonished, he stated, to read a long catalogue of difficulties encountered by their mission there. An iron fence had come down around them.

Stalin interrupted to exclaim: “All fairy tales.” Churchill rejoined that statesmen could call one another’s statements fairy tales if they wished. He expressed complete confidence in his representatives in Bucharest; conditions in the British mission there had caused him the greatest distress. I stated that, in. the case of the United States, we had been much concerned by the many difficulties encountered by our missions in Rumania and Bulgaria. The exchange continued sharp and lengthy, and I suggested that the question again be referred to the Foreign Ministers for redrafting. Next on the agenda was a renewal of the discussion regarding the Black Sea Straits. I inquired if my paper on inland waterways had been considered.

Stalin remarked that this paper did not deal with the question of Turkey and the Straits, but dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. The Soviet delegation, he said, would like to receive a reply to their proposal of a Russo-Turkish treaty regarding the Black Sea Straits. I replied that it was my wish that the two questions be considered together. Stalin said he was afraid that we would not be able to reach an agreement in regard to the Straits, since our views differed so widely. He suggested that we postpone the question and take up the next one. Comparison With Suez

Churchill said he understood that it was agreed that freedom in the Black Sea Straits should be approved and guaranteed by the “Big Three” and other Powers. He observed that my proposal to join in an organisation to free the waterways of the world was, to his mind, a remarkable and important fact. I stated that the Prime Minister had clearly presented the position of the United States in this matter and agreed with him that this would be a big step. Churchill said he hoped that the guarantee proposed by the President would be considered by Stalin as more than a substitute for fortification of the Straits. Molotov asked if the Suez Canal were operated under such a principle. Churchill rejoined that it was open in war and in peace to all. Molotov asked whether the Suez Canal was under the same international control as was proposed for the Black Sea Straits. Churchill observed that this question had not been raised. Molotov retorted: “I’m raising it.” If it was such a good rule, why not apoly it to the Suez? Churchill explained that the British had an arrangement with which they were satisfied and under which they had operated for some 70 years without complaints. Molotov charged that there had been a lot of complaints. “You should ask Egypt,” he said. Eden intervened to point out that Egyot had signed the treaty with England. Molotov said that the British had asserted that international control was better. Molotov’s Influence Molotov did a lot of talking at Potsdam. He and Stalin, along with Trotsky and Lenin, were among the old Bolsheviki of the 1917 Revolution. Molotov would take the bit in his teeth and talk as if he were the Russian State, until Stalin would smile and say a few words to him in Russian, and he would change his tune.

I often felt that Molotov kept some facts from Stalin, or that he would not give him all the facts until he had to. It was always harder to get agreement out of him than out of Stalin. Where Stalin could smile and relax at times, Molotov always gave the impression that he was constantly pressing. Churchill said that the suggestion of international control of the inland waterways had been made to meet the Russian position that Russia should be able to move freely in and out of the Black Sea, and that his Government was prepared to join in a guarantee with other nations, and was prepared to press it on Turkey. Freedom of the seas could be attained in this way without trouble to Turkey, he said. He agreed that the question must be put off. but tie hoped that the “tremendous fact that they had heard at this meeting” would not be underestimated by their Russian friends.

I said I wished to make clear my understanding of an international guarantee of the freedom of the Straits; it meant that any nation had free ingress for any purpose whatever. I did not contemplate any fortifications of any kind, I added.

[Mr Truman indicated at this point that the conference must wind up within a week or 10 days. When there was nothing more upon which they could agree, he was returning home. Sir Winston Churchill, who was about to leave for London the next day, together with Mr Attlee, to learn the election results, agreed that the conference must end by August 6, in time for the opening of the new Parliament. The President gave Sir Winston Churchill a copy of the draft ultimatum to Japan, which was to be signed by heads of the British, American and Chinese Governments. which he approved. Stalin, not yet at war with Japan, was merely “advised.”] Back to the Poles

July 25 was the day when Winston Churchill would have to leave the conference, and Stalin and I, to accommodate him, had agreed to meet in the morning. The session got under way with a discussion of the now familiar topic of Poland’s western frontier.

Churchill said that he had had a talk with President Bierut [of Poland] and that Mr Eden had seen the Polish delegation for two hours last evening. The Poles were all in agreement, he reported, that about 1,500,000 Germans were left in the area in the west w

hich was under discussion. I observed that this was true. I added that the Secretary of State, Mr Byrnes, had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks with them.

Churchill said he thought the question of transfer of populations from Germany and Czechoslovakia and Poland should be discussed. The Poles, he pointed out, were evacuating Germans from an occupational zone. This area was part of the Russian zone, and Poles were driving the Germans out.

He felt that this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparations, and other matters which had not yet been decided. The result was that the Poles had little food and fuel and that the British had a mass of population thrown on them. Stalin remarked that we should appreciate the position in which the Poles found themselves. They were taking revenge on the Germans for the injuries which the Germans had caused them in the course of centuries.

Churchill pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed.

I expressed full agreement with the Prime Minister that this should not be tolerated. If the Poles were to have a zone, I repeated, this matter should be considered very carefully. The occupying Powers of Germany were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States. If the Poles were in a zone, they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it. I stated that I wanted to be as helpful as I could, and the position I had taken was that the frontier should be fixed at the peace conference. [The President here took the opportunity of stating his constitutional position. Approval by the United States Senate was required to ratify any treaty. He himself would do his best to get this approval for any proposals e had supported at the conference. He might, nonetheless, have to return and report political sentiment in the United States adverse.] Stalin took the position that in the discussion of German supplies and production, coal and steel were much more important than food. He saw his opportunity here, I could see, to bargain for access to the resources of the Ruhr basin. And now he argued that the yield of this German industrial area should be made available to all of Germany, as Churchill argued that East German food supplies should be; Bartering Coal for Food? Churchill replied that the British themselves were short of coal, because they were exporting to Holland, France, and Belgium. They were denying themselves to supply these countries; the coming winter would be the most nearly fireless one of the war for the people of England. Stalin replied that the Russian situation was still worse than that of the British. They had lost more than 5.000,000 men in this war and were short of coal and other things. He was afraid, he said, that if he started describing the situation in Russia he would make Churchill burst into tears. Churchill insisted that he was still eager to barter coal from the Ruhr in exchange for food for the German population, and Stalin agreed that this question must be discussed. Churchill replied that he did not expect a decision today, but he hoped for one soon. . Furthermore, he aid not think we should consider that we had yet solved the major problems. So far as he was concerned, we had only exchanged views. A few more interchanges followed, and Churchill, referring to his departure the following day for the British elections, announced that he had finished. “What a pity,” Stalin quipped. “I hope to be back,” Churchill replied. Stalin remarked, in reply, that, judging from the expression on Mr Attlee’s face, he did not think Mr Attlee was looking forward to taking over Churchill’s authority.

Chiang Concurs At the time Churchill left for London we were still without an answer from Chiang Kai-shek. Ambassador Hurley radioed that the statement to the Japanese people had been delivered to Prime Minister Soong, but the Generalissimo was out of Chungking, in the mountains across the Yangtze river. He said the message would be translated and delivered to Chiang that night. Hurley then described the difficulties of reaching Chiang: “The translation was not finished until after midnight. We then had difficulty in procuring a ferry across the Yangtze. The Prime Minister declined to go out to Yellow Mountain with me in the night. This morning, K. C. Wu, Assistant Minister of Foreign Relations, accompanied me to the Generalissimos residence at Yellow Mountain. “The Generalissimo read the translation carefully, and then K.C. Wu interpreted my explanation oi the necessity for immediate concurrence. The Generalissimo was kindly and courteous throughout. After he had told me that he concurred in the proclamation. Dr. Wang, the Minister of Information, arrived at the conference. It became necessary to explain the whole situation again to Wang: “When Chiang Kai-shek had approved the message of concurrence, we found the telephone out of order It was necessary for me to return to Chungking.” Chiang Kai-shek had concurred with one reservation: he wanted us to change the order in which we listed the heads of the three sponsoring Governments so as to put him ahead of the British Prime Minister, because it would help him at home. The' proclamation was changed to accommodate Chiang Kai-shek. [Copyright 1955 by Time Inc. <LuJ> World serial rights outside the U.SA. and Canada in International cooperation Press Service Inc. Exclusive rights in New Zealand by New Zealand Associated Press. Reproduction in full or in part strictly prohibited.]