Argentina

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27690, 21 June 1955, Page 12

Argentina

Because the press in Argentina is controlled and news from foreign observers censored, the story of the revolt which began last Thursday has not yet been fully told. The origins are not clear; nor is it known exactly who led and supported the revolt. Reports carry a general impression that the Argentine Navy and its air force were the spearhead of the revolutionaries’ armed strength; but whether there was civil support is not known. It has been denied that the reyolt was directly connected with President Peron’s quarrel with the Roman Catholic Church, which came to a head last week with the expulsion of two prelates. But that event may well have influenced the timing of a prepared revolt. On behalf of his rank-and-file supporters, ’ President Peron has disclaimed responsibility ■ for the sacking of. many churches and has attributed those actions to “ Communists It seems clear, however, r that the revolt has failed to upset the regime, though there are indications that the power of the Army may be greater now than before the revolt. There are reports that revolutionary activities persist , in some provincial cities; but in Argentina the capital is of overwhelming importance, particularly since the masses there have been organised into politically powerful trade unions. It is a paradox of Argentine 1 politics- that President Peron,' after years devoted to a policy of eliminating opposition to his regime, should in recent months deliberately stir up an active opposition by his quarrel with the Roman Catholic’ Church. This has been described as one of the most curious and inter- . esting phenomena .in contemporary 1 Latin-American history; it has puzzled the best-informed students of Argentine affairs. President Peron’s power at the beginning of the quarrel was such that few doubted his ability to carry through with relative ease his plans to separate Church and State, to give Argentina a divorce law, and to end the compulsory teaching of religion. Students of Argentine affairs believe that most Argentines would have accepted these measures philosophically or even welcomed them, for although the Argentines generally . have no deep convictions they • have a tradition of religious . freedom. But President Peron

thought it necessary to depict the ‘Church as the enemy of the people, to make virulent attacks against the Church and its ecclesiastical and lay officers, to dismiss teachers and close schools, and to arrest priests and churchmen. Whatever the true reasons for this campaign, it is indicative of President Peron’s confidence—some say megalomania—that he gratuitously embarked upon a campaign

that affronted the religious sensibilities of Argentines. His confidence that he would overcome any opposition was supported, of coprse, by knowledge' that the press and radio could present only the Peron point of view, and that, if an election on the disestablishment issue were held, the electoral machinery would be in the President’s hands. The end of President Peron’s quarrel with- the Church cannot be foreseen, because the Church will not give way on fundamental matters and it’ may find supporters whom President Peron cannot ' disregard. If President Peron’s position has been weakened by his quarrel with the Church, he may prove more vulnerable than hitherto to challenges from secular quarters. Those who led the opposition to the revolutionaries will be tempted to use their new power; and they may no longer be willing to let President Peron wield the total power of a dictator. Though the revolution has failed, it may lead to important changes at the seat of power in Argentina.