SOUTH-EAST ASIA AUSTRALIA MAY BE “MISSING THE BUS”

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27641, 23 April 1955, Page 6

SOUTH-EAST ASIA AUSTRALIA MAY BE “MISSING THE BUS”

. (BV

GUY HARRIOTT]

The dapper little man in the grey European suit, with a shock of black hair and deep-set eyes in a flat, intelligent face, strode up and down in front of a wall-map of Asia and the Pacific. “I tell you,” he said animatedly, 1 tell you as a friend—yes, as a friend to your country—that Australia is in danger of missing the bus in Asia.” The speaker was Indonesia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Sunario, but I have had much the same thing said to me in a dozen different accents in every other part of South-east Asia I visited. . _ What is more, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these Asian critics are right, and that Australia is, in fact, muffing a great opportunity that will not come again. The opportunity is, m fact, a remarkable one. It is the opportunity to become a “favoured partner” of the South-east Asian nations, the accepted premier representative in South-east Asia of the Western way of life, and the country to which Asians will primarily look for help and advice — the acknowledged link, in short, between South-east Asia and the West. It has risen for various reasons. First and foremost, of course, Australia’s geographic position as a kind of extension of Asia gives her a special position in Asian eyes. Asians can readily accept the reality and sincerity of Australia’s interest in South-east Asia’s problems as a natural outcome of her geography, whereas they tend to be deeply suspicious of the motives of other nonAsian Powers. Such suspicion attaches today m varying degrees to both Britain and the United,States— to Britain, because she has a' history of colonialism in Asia, and colonialism is as much anathema to an Asian leader as Communism is to his Western counterpart; to America, because Asians fear that she wishes to use her economic position to influence Asian national policies, because her own policies are not trusted in Asia, and, again, simply because Americans have made themselves disliked in most of South-east Asia by a kind of unconscious arrogance. No Mistrust Australia is happily free of such mistrust. She has no history of colonialism Asia, and she is not powerful enough, economically or otherwise, for Asians to fear an attempt at domination. Moreover—and this is a highly important consideration—Australians as individuals generally get on with Asians very well without any sense of strain or inferiority on either side. • Unfortunately tagged "White Australia” policy is, curiously enough, no barrier to goodwill and close relations. The Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indians have seen to that. States which are suffering the effects of unrestricted Chinese and Indian immigration are well able to comprehend a restrictive migration policy—now that it is no. longer interpreted in the provocative terms favoured by Mr Calwell.

The flow of Asian students to Australia has done much to create better understanding. The Minister of External Affairs, Mr R. G. Casey, has proved an excellent ambassador for Australia in Asia. The Asian leaders who have come in contact with him have been deeply Impressed by his evident sincerity .and sympathy and readiness to listen to their points of view.

The net result of these and other less tangible factors has been a marked turning towards Australia by a number of South-East Asian countries. They recognise their need for a Western partner with access to Western technology and resources, a partner especially with whom they feel they can deal on terms of equality, and a partner who, by force of geography, ,is better able than others to understand their attitudes and regional problems.

Thus, Malayan leaders of both the Malay and Chinese communities have indicated to me in private conversation that, when Malaya gets its independence, they will be readier to discuss mutual defence arrangements with Australia than with Britain, because, so they said, “Australia is substantially an Asian State.” ’ Relations with China

In Rangoon, Burmese Ministers spoke of their desire for closer relations with Australia, for more trade links, a greater exchange of personnel and information. Our ties, they said, should be with a developing country not far removed from the problems of industrialisation and so on that we are now facing—not with great industrialised countries who have left them far behind.

In Indo-China, Vietnamese Minister* and* officials expressed a keen interest in Australia, and said that they were anxious for greater and more direct contact with her. In Indonesia, emphasis on the pari Australia could play in the country's development, and the readiness et Indonesians to treat Australia ag a close and friendly neighbour, waa constant and quite remarkable. “We look naturally towards Australia,” one senior Minister said. “Yo U are our natural door to the West It is surely in the interests of both our countries that a real working partnership, should develop.” In a long conversation, a distinguished Indian diplomat urged repeatedly that Australia should “make the most ’of her great advantages in Asia.’’ “Australia,” he said, “should not try to be a “Western Power divorced from Asia, but an Asian Power with Western traditions, ties and advantages. There are immense opportunities awaiting Australia in Asia—opportunities for leadership, for opening up markets, for spreading technical knowledge. Australia has the knowledge and the skill that Asia needs, and Asia is ready to welcome them.” Reasons for “Missing the Bus’* Why, then, do many Asians feel that Australia is “missing the bus?" The main Asian criticism is that Australia’s foreign policy in Asia is conducted on a “ad hoc” basis. Australia, these critics say, has never set out to formulate a clear general policy on Asia—such an Australian policy obviously does not exist. Instead, Australia has simply dealt with situations in Asia as they arise, not necessarily even consistently, and has forgotten or shut its eyes to the wider picture. It is time (they say) that Australia really took thought, decided what she wanted her relations with Asia to be, and pursued a consistent foreign policy * towards that end. That policy, Asians feel, should be marked by a greater awareness of Australia’s special and privileged position- in Asia. Another criticism (and this not only, and not even mainly, from Asian sources) relates to the inadequacies associated with Australian representation in Asia. These inadequacies are not in the quality of the’ diplomats representing Australia, which is generally excellent They are in the facilities these men are giveh to do their jobs. An absurdly penny-pinchin® Treasury policy, meanly and stupidly administered. is going far towards hamstringing the Government's avowed policy of building up our diplomatic front in Asia. It is humiliating for an Australiah to visit country’s Embassies apg Legations in the South-east Asian areS and gee Ambassadors and Ministers attempting to do an exacting and vitally important work without adequate assistance, without proper . clerical staff, without public relatital facilities, without sufficient transport without proper housing for themselvei and their staffs. The very biiildings over which tM Australian flag flies are grossly unsuitable. • ....1 The Australian Embassy in Djakarta and our Legations in Bangkok and Rangoon, with their miserable furnishings and their peeling paint, are nothing less than disgraces to Australia. Nor is it a very amusing joke for an Australian to hear his Commissioner in Singapore referred to as “the poor man’s Malcolm MacDonald.”* If the funds and personnel to run them properly are not available for all Australia’s diplomatic posts in South-east Asia, then it would be better for Australia’s good frame if some of them were closed down. Australia “Losing Face” As it is, Australia is “losing face” fast in Asia, despite the loyal and devoted work of the men who serve her there. , ? • It is a poor thing for Australia when “Her Majestry’s Australian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister tentiary” has to borrow the moo ordinary necessities of diplomatic lift from the British Embassy—or do without. If the Australian Government and the Ministry of External Affairs reelly regard South-east Asian representation as important—and they most certainly should do so—then consideration might be given to reducing Australia’s diplomatic commitment* elsewhere in the world and using what is thus made available for South-east Asia. Do we need representation in South America and Israel? Can all our posts in Europe be justified? If Australia is so poor that she has to make a choice, then surely Southeast Asia should have first priority.