SUPREME COURT Motorist Appeals Against Conviction For Parking

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27640, 22 April 1955, Page 9

SUPREME COURT Motorist Appeals Against Conviction For Parking

An appeal against the conviction of a motorist last year for parking in High street—a “no parking” area —was heard by Mr Justice McGregor in the Supreme Court yesterday. Decision was reserved. Alvan Samuel Hollander (Mr G. S. Brockett) appealed against his conviction by Mr Rex C. Abernethy, S.M., on a charge of parking in a prohibited area. Hollander was fined £l. Mr W. R. Lascelles appeared for the City Council in yesterday’s proceedings. The appellant parked his car on the east side of High street between Cashel street and Hereford street from 11.25 a.m. to 11.55 a.m. on March 26, last year, said Mr Lascelles. Near the Bank Corner was a pole with a no parking sign. There was another sign on the same side of the street within 100 yards. The relevant portion of the charge laid against Hollander read: “ . . . parked a vehicle in High street where a notice . . . . is maintained by

a controlled authority indicating that the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles is prohibited, contrary to the Traffic Regulations, 1936.” Mr Lascelles produced a copy of the sign at the corner of High street and Hereford street. The sign was worded: “NP 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. Friday to 9 p.m.,” and had an arrow below the lettering pointing down High street.

One of the approved signs illustrated in a schedule to a 1953 amendment to. the Traffic Sign Regulations was one showing “NP” and an arrow. The sign near the Bottleneck was attached to the south-east side of the pole, lying parallel to the footpath, said Mr Lascelles. The pole thus partially obscured the approaching motorist’s vision, but the council’s difficulty was to affix the sign in a manner which would make it visible to motorists approaching from all the nearby streets. Evidence similar to that heard in the lower court was called by 'Mr Lascelles. Mr Brockett called Patrick Francis Ford, a photographer, who produced photographs of High street and of th® “no parking” sign referred to. John Lewis Anderson, a law c]erk. said it was not easy to see the notice when one approached front the Bank Corner.

Contending that a “notice” within the meaning of the Traffic Regulations would have to carry the words “no parking,” Mr Brockett submitted that the symbol “NP” made this a traffic sign, within the meaning of the 1953 amendment. This “board”—to use a neutral term —did not comply with the regulations because it was placed parallel with the roadway, and hence failed to give persons approaching sufficient time for its warning or information to have full value.

By inserting the words “8 a.m. to 6 p.m. Friday to 9 p.m.” the council had made this board fail to comply with the 1953 amendment, Mr Brockett submitted. V If this was a traffic sign, said Mr Lascelles, he accepted the view that the council should comply with the requirements of the Traffic Sign Regulations. But the charge was laid under the Traffic Regulations, 1936. which provided that no “stopping, standing or parking” of vehicles was allowed “in any part of a roadway where a notice . . . indicated that the parking of vehicles is prohibited ” - The abbreviation “NP” had acquired a clear meaning, through usage, Mr Lascelles maintained.

an hour and he himself admitted to travelling at 30 miles an hour. From the marks on the road and from the evidence of another witness it seemed that Robinson had not applied his brakes, until he was past the point of impact. The lights of the vehicle were dipped. The Crown contended that Robinson was not keeping a proper lookout or was driving an excessive speed. Evidence along the lines of that in the lower court was given. Robinson, in evidence, said that from tests he had since made, it now appeared that he must have been much more than 15 feet away from Gallagher when he first saw his walking sticks. He now estimated the distance at 40 feet.

Reasonable Doubt” of Negligence Reviewing the evidence, Mr Buchanan submitted that the appellant’s revised estimate of the disbetween him and Gallagher should be accepted, rather than' his first hasty estimate of 15 feet. “A wet road on a dark night is no place for a cripple in a dark suit,” said Mr Buchanan. He submitted there was at least a reasonable doubt that the appellant was negligent. “It seems to me in the first place that the pedestrian must have been engaged for a considerable period of time in crossing the road,” said his Honour. “He was a cripple and had crossed some 30 feet of the road. He must have been on the road at least 20 seconds.”

Gallagher was dressed in dark clothes and he might have been negligent in crossing the road or even being out at that time of night. But his contributory negligence did not bear on the case.

“A motorist should drive with such care and attention and keeping sqch a look-out that he could see a pedestrian on the road at a greater distance than he did.

“If he saw the pedestrian at a distance of 40 feet he could have and probably would have taken more avoiding action than he did. I am disposed to think he was much closer than 40 feet away,” said his Honour. “J n those circumstances I feel that although this was not a case of gross negligence the appellant was still negligent,” said his Honour, in upholding the conviction.

Mr Buchanan said the Magistrate had said that by law he had no alternative but to disqualify Robinson. The Magistrate had later refused an appeal to suspend the disqualification pending the hearing of this case, said Mr Buchanan.

The disqualification of the driver in these cases was intended not entirely as a punishment to the unfortunate person involved, but as a deterrent to others, said his Honour. He could not see that the Magistrate erred in imposing that disqualification.