Peace Decision Seen Inx Hands Of China

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27628, 7 April 1955, Page 11

Peace Decision Seen In x Hands Of China

[Specially written for the N.Z.P.A. by FRANK OLIVER] (Rec. 8 p.m.) WASHINGTON, April 5. It is astounding how deeply two postage stamp pieces of real estate on the China coast have penetrated into the American consciousness. People who a few years ago could not have said where Formosa was now argue heatedly about two specks on the map called Quemoy and Matsu, and the noise that arises on all sides amounts to a national soliloquy—to defend or not defend, that is the question?

The answer to that question must come from the President, Congress having laid that burden squarely on his shoulders.

And the President is receiving more advice on the subject than he can possibly listen to or read. The matter is argued in public places, in Congress, and a spate of letters pours into most newspaper offices. If public opinion were to dictate policy, then the islands would not be defended, for the vast majority appears to be strongly against involvement over these two islands.

It must quickly be added that this does not mean that insistence upon the defence of Fornjosa is in any way weakening. It is hard to find anyone who questions the wisdom or necessity of that.

There is no unanimity of reason for not defending Quemoy and Matsu. Some believe the cost of defending them successfully would be prodigious in lives, money and material, and far beyond their strategic and political value.

Others, while detesting the Peking regime, recognise that it is in power and cannot be overturned by Chiang Kai-shek, and that the islands are an integral part of China proper. Yet others feel Marshal Chiang is a

dangerous man whose ambitions may drag America into an unwanted war, and that his claims to the inlands arc preposterous. But in the end. it all adds up to the fact that the majority of those who are vocal are against defending the islands with American manpower and materials.

Supporters of Islands’ Defence Those who are against that position, although in a minority, make up for their lack of numbers by noise, and the violence of their phrases. Much is heard of “these free islands,” of ‘‘the moral position,” and the shame of handing over the islands to ‘‘those who hold the world’s record on human liquidation.” Many who make such arguments are among the few who still regard Marshal Chiang as a demigod and a potential saviour of Asia, wherefore he Should be given all the assistance he needs for the defence of the islands.

Chinese spokesmen in the United States declare that free Chinese all over the world insist that the islands must be held, and therefore that Marshal Chiang has no option but to defend, unless' he is willing to face a lack of revenue from overseas Chinese. These people also slide easily into the argument that, therefore, America should defend the islands.

Amid this public clamour none knows whether or not the President has made any decision concerning the islands. Maybe the Administration hopes he will not have to make a decision. The one certainty is that the issue of war in the Formosa Straits is in the hands of Peking, not of Washington. Some here regard the refusal to make a commitment about the islands as a warning to Peking that it may have to fight American forces. Others, regard it as a “dare” which Peking,

in its bellicose mood, can scarcely be expected to stomach.

Meanwhile evidence accumulates that the Administration, whether it carries a big stick or a small one, is speaking with a soft voice. *The Administration frowns on all talik of probable war in the Straits, ana it has now cleared up the miserable business of the detention of the 76 Chinese students wishing to return to Communist China.

These students are to be given exit permits, and this must be regarded as the conciliatory gesture extraordinary.

They were held because the knowledge they gained in American universities might be of use to the potential enemy and, not surprisingly, Peking responded by trying and imprisoning a number of captured American airmen on charges of espionage. It is assumed here that the American gesture is to indicate to Peking that this country wants peace rather than war, and peaceful coexistence. Whether Peking will respond with a similar gesture of conciliation by releasing the American airmen is everyone’s guess, but at least it is likely to smoke out Peking’s intentions about a possible war. / If the American gesture is reciprocated, then many here feel the ugly spectre of war will have been pushed back over the horizon.