The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1955. Straits of Formosa

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27603, 9 March 1955, Page 12

The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1955. Straits of Formosa

The stake in the Straits of Formosa is more than the future of Quemoy and the Matsu islands. It is nothing less than the future of the Western alliance. If the United States can be separated from the rest of the democratic world, which depends so greatly on American strength, the Communists will have won their greatest victory. They might be able to achieve it if the Chinese could force the United States into fighting in defence of the off-shore islands, probably alone and possibly against the wishes of its allies. Everything suggests that• the United States is trying to avoid this possibility; but it has had to maintain some freedom of action in case I the threat to Quemoy and the Matsus is part of a bigger plan. If the Chinese moved against Quemoy and the Matsus in a way that did not threaten vital American interests elsewhere, the United States would possibly use its influence to get the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate the islands. If, however, an attack on the islands was clearly in preparation for an attack against Formosa, or part of renewed fighting in Korea, the Americans would probably help Chiang Kai-shek hold Quemoy and the Matsus. Should the Chinese show clearly that they are not interested in a cease fire in the Straits of Formosa, and intend to go to war anyway, the Americans would probably be justified in thinking that they might as well hold on to these strategic outposts. Also, American public opinion, or rather the opinion of such key politicians as Senator Knowland, would have to be conditioned to accepting some sort of tacit agreement under which China, in return for the off-shore islands, would leave Formosa alone. That is the reasoning, which should be well understood in Peking and Moscow, for the apparently cryptic warning not to assume that the United States will not retaliate if Quemoy and the Matsus are invaded. While the present breathing space continues, the Americans are making it fairly plain that in the right atmosphere they are prepared to persuade Chiang to let the offshore islands go, and are continuing their efforts to ease tension in the area.

Once the future of the off-shore islands is determined, the United States and its allies should be able to reconcile their policies on Formosa itself. All the Western Powers share the American interest, if in somewhat less degree, in preventing Formosa from becoming a Com-munist-controlled stronghold, for the sake of the inhabitants and as part of the defence of Japan and the Philippines. Now that the threat of an attack by the Chinese Nationalists has been lifted, all that really divides the Western allies is a possible difference of opinion on Quemoy and the Matsus; and here the difference is more apparent than real These islands will not remain an issue unless- the Chinese are prepared to precipitate a war for Formosa, which they know they cannot win against American air and sea supremacy in the straits. Although the Chinese Government seems prepared to start this war, its real intentions may be different. The United States Government does not expect a war; and there is good reason to suppose that Russia, on which China must rely for heavy equipment, does not intend to allow its ally to get into a war with the United States in which Russia might be involved. What all the parties seem to be looking for is some way of saving face in a stalemate in the Straits of Formosa. Neither side can hope for anything much better. The Communists would have to put up with the existence of Formosa as a potential centre of Asian democracy. The West would have to put up with the immobilisation of strong American forces to keep Formosa secure. Both East and West would probably prefer these difficulties to actual warfare on a large scale.