The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1955. Russia and Formosa

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27583, 14 February 1955, Page 10

The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1955. Russia and Formosa

The evacuation of the Tachen Islands under the protection of the United States 7th Fleet and the absence of attempts by the Chinese Communists to interfere with the operation have, it appears, bridged the immediate crisis in the Formosa Strait. In the West there have been hopes that if the tension born of this crisis could be eased, a temperate approach to the grave and perplexing problem of Formosa might become possible. This seemed tc explain the reported inclination of the Western Powers to drop discussion following Communist China’s blunt refusal to attend the Security Council—of the New Zealand resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait. After all, history is not without lessons of the wisdom of postponing or even evading direct efforts to settle disputes. An outstanding example was the recurrent crisis over access to Berlin; by expedients (such as the historic air lift) the issue was evaded until it was no longer a threat to peace. Trieste is another example of the diplomatic invocation of the healing hand of time.

Given time, the Peking regime might have reflected that its blunt refusal even-to discuss Formosa in the Security Council was quite incompatible both with its protestations that it earnestly desires peaceful stability in Asia and with its wishes to be a member of the -United Nations. But Russia has stepped in with a proposal for.an “ international ” conference on Formosa to be held this month. The nature of this proposal suggests very strongly that Russia’s objective is to sustain, and if possible to heighten, the atmosphere of crisis. Russia provocatively excludes Nationalist China from the list of invitations to the proposed conference; it includes a number of Asian nations, but not all; and it adds the United States, at the same time charging that nation with “ new aggressive “ actions ” in the Formosa area. A more unpropitious setting for a peace conference could hardly be imagined. However, the Russian proposal is not without adroitness. It purports to show Russia sharing the deep concern Britain has expressed over the situation in the Formosa Strait. By inviting India, with Russia and Britain, to sponsor the proposed conference, the Russian proposal pays further deference to India, which a few days ago Mr Molotov described as “an important new

“ sister in the strengthening of “peace”. But unpromising as the Russian approach is, it is nevertheless one that must be tested. The British reply gives assurances that

the proposal has been given “ serious ' “ examination It “ observes ” that without Nationalist China a conference on Formosa “ could not have a “ useful result ”, and that a meeting ] to discuss • the coastal islands and j Formosa should be “ organised in a < “form acceptable to the United [ “Nations”. Russia’s reply to these “observations ’’ will be awaited with interest, especially for signs that will ■ confirm or deny the appearance that Russia hopes to keep the Formosa [ issue on the boil. It will be interest- . ing also to see whether Peking is . s content in this matter to see the 1 initiative pass to Moscow, where an , j international issue might be welcomed by the regime as a distracting element at a time of violent disturbl ance in its domestic politics.