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The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1955. The China Coast Islands

It is expected that President Eisen- > hower’s message to Congress, giving ; his policy for the defence of ; Formosa, will clarify the American attitude about protection of the vulnerable offshore islands held by the Nationalists along the south-east coast of China. The published terms of the recently negotiated defence treaty between the United States and the Nationalist Chinese left this question cloudy. The treaty provided for United States assistance for the defence of Formosa itself, and for the Pescadores Islands, which are in the Strait of Formosa and nearer to Formosa than to the mainland. No mention was made of United States protection for the offshore island groups; the official American attitude towards these was that a decision to intervene in* their defence would -depend upon the estimate of the United States military leaders of the importance of the threatened islands in the defence of Formosa. The need to clarify ‘the American attitude has been precipitated by an attach by the Chinese Communists last week on Yikianshan, a small “ outpost ” island some eight miles from the main islands of the Tachen group. The Tachen group is one of three island groups close to the mainland held by the Nationalists. The Tachens are about 15 miles off the coast of Chekiang Province, about 200 miles south of Shanghai and an equal distance north of Formosa. The Quemoy group lies west of Formosa, off the coast of Fukien; this group is within artillery range of the city of Amoy. A third group, the Matsu islands, is half-way between the Tachens and the Quemoys, at the mouth of the Min river off the Fukien coast and the city of Foochow. Strategically, these island groups constitute part of the information and warning system for the defence of Formosa, and the Quemoys and the Matsus have been used by Nationalist warships when engaged on forays against shipping en route to Communist ports. However, there has recently been a tendency in the United States to avoid exaggeration of the importance of the offshore island groups. The attack on Yikianshan provoked no reaction by United States armed forces, and Mr Dulles said that the island was “of no particular importance ” f o the defence of Formosa. Mr Dulles added that he “ did not attach great “ strategic importance ” to the main Tachen islands either. Thus, if the attack on Yikianshan was intended, as some believe, to test American reactions, Mr Dulles has given a fairly clear answer not only for Yikianshan, but for the Tachen islands as well. President Eisenhower is expected to make the position clear about all the offshore islands. There is little doubt that the Administration’s policy will be designed to avoid being drawn into dangerous fighting to hold islands having little strategic worth. But this involves issues of great delicacy. A good deal of equipment and considerable Chinese Nationalist forces have been committed to the defence of these offshore islands. American policy, it has been suggested, might involve

an offer to evacuate men and equipment under naval and air cover. It is by no means certain, however, that the Nationalist Chinese Government would agree to evacuation. The Chinese Communists’ reactions to an evacuation project are even more unpredictable; during an evacuation they might feel themselves free to attack American

sea and air power. Such action would have obvious potentialities of grave danger. The Communists’ attitude could well be governed by considerations of political advantage. For months they have been telling

the defenders of the offshore islands by radio and leaflet that the Americans are not to be depended upon; an American decision that appeared to confirm this might encourage the Communists to believe that they might, in a short time, obtain possession of the islands through defection of the defenders. American policy must be concerned with the risk that mistrust of American intentions might spread to the Chinese troops in Formosa and the Pescadores. In a delicate and potentially dangerous situation, which involves risks and the taking of calculated risks, President Eisenhower’s clarification of United States policy will be awaited with keen interest throughout the world.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19550124.2.54

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27565, 24 January 1955, Page 8

Word Count
691

The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1955. The China Coast Islands Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27565, 24 January 1955, Page 8

The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1955. The China Coast Islands Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27565, 24 January 1955, Page 8

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