BRITAIN’S DEFENCE PLANNING ASSUMPTION OF NO EARLY MAJOR WAR

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27563, 21 January 1955, Page 10

BRITAIN’S DEFENCE PLANNING ASSUMPTION OF NO EARLY MAJOR WAR

[By the Defence Correspondent of the ••Manchester Guardian"] [Reprinted by Arrangement)

Next month the Government wiU issue its annual Statement on Defence. The contents are secret until it is published, but some of its basic assumptions are becoming evident. They are enough to imply that it should be a stirring document. Three assumptions may be mentioned. First, in the next four or five years a major war is unlikely, provided there is no splitting of the Atlantic alliance, and no slump to disturb Western Europe politically. Second, the prospects in the period from 1960, although also favourable, depend partly on progress with scientific research and its application to defence production. Finally, the advent of the hydrogen bomb means that if a major war were to come the first 20 or 30 hours would probably be decisive for Britain. A primary reason for the first assumption is America’s long lead in air power. It is considered a strong deterrent to war. American aircraft can reach any major target in the Soviet Union, and their home bases in Florida, Texas and Arizona are thought to be invulnerable. The Soviet Air Force cannot yet reach the main population centres of the United States (except on one-way missions, which would be a wide gamble), still less the southern bases. By 1959 or 1960, however, the Russian jet-bomber force will have grown to large numbers, and Russian anti-aircraft missiles may be guarding targets in the Soviet Union. The prospects then become harder to foresee — although there is a strong supposition that if the Western defence effort is maintained the West will remain well ahead in strategic power, thereby diminishing the risk of major war. What of the practical application for Britain? Again, some aspects of the defence programme are already evident. The reader should be warned, however, that this report is merely an amalgamation of items so far available. Whether the Statement on Defence will make these points specifically is not known. Guided Missiles Since they are unlikely to be needed for action in the next four years, research and operational trials of guided missiles are being carried further before production begins. In the interval some American weapons—the Corporal rocket and others of its generation—are being purchased. It is hoped that when the British weapons appear they will be better than anything yet developed anywhere else. Air-to-air weapons will be the first in service, perhaps towards the end of next year. Ground-to-air (anti-aircraft) missiles, air-to-ground and ground-to-ground wiU follow later. By 1960 all should be available. Bomber Aircraft The hydrogen bomb implies that for the British Isles the first 20 or 30 hours oj. » major war would be decisive. Either we must swiftly eliminate the Soviet bases from which an attack on Britain might be launched, or we might lose more than half the population. Therefore, great weight is given to the British V-bomber programme, since these are the bombers which would have to counter-attack Soviet bases. The Valiants are already c°mmg into service, and the Victors and Vulcans will arrive in the next two or three years. They will carry British-made atomic oombs (there is no mention yet of British hydrogen bombs, though they might be under development). These bombers will give the R.A.F. the capacity to neutralise Soviet bases in co-ordination with the U.S.A F or independently of it. The problem of locating the Soviet bases which might be in use is apparently not legarded as insuperable. Fighter Aircraft Fighter aircraft are important for =« all E S the ,_ flrst wav e of enemy attack, if one should ever come. It is accepted as fundamental to AngloAmerican planning that the first blow would come from the other side; only afterwards would our bombers go into ? ct ion. The nature of the first blow 18 th® hardest to predict, but it most probably would be directed agatart North America and against heavy lhSe e in Brita S in elSeWhere> inClUding •« To W j r 1 ° a first blow fighters are needed. Equipped with air-to-air missffes their lethal power would be thS’ is veT X doubtf ul whether they could prevent all of the first , enem A y aircraft from reaching Britain. Also, in the period between now and 1960, fighters are important lest through any miscalcu-

lation the Russians were to attack with their existing piston aircraft. During the next four or five years the Civil Defence organisation will have to be overhauled and radically strengthened. The possibility must be faced that the metropolitan area of one or more of our great cities might be destroyed, or that a devastating attack might be made in the vicinityof the air bases in East Anglia and the edge of the Cotswolds. Mobile relief columns would have to be ready to move from one area to the aid of another. Help for a devastated district —and, still more, for its fringes—will have to be on a large scale. The organisation will also have to take into account all that is knotfn of windborne radio-active particles. Part of the Territorial Army may eventually be turned over to Civil Defence, but apparently no decision has yet been taken. , The Army The gradual reduction in size of the active army will continue. The eight battalions to be disbanded will come, in effect, through savings in the Middle East and Far East. In Europe there will be no reduction: there the Allied force is small, and Britain has undertaken not to cut its contribution. Maintenance of the Allied force in Europe at about its present level is considered essential, since the Soviet Union might otherwise be tempted to seize Western Europe in a sudden land attack, especially if a political collapse of France were to strain the Atlantic alliance. The Allied force is needed also to cope with any minor incident which might occur (such as a sortie by the East German Bereitschaften or fighting on the Greek border); it would be important to prevent such minor incidents from getting out of hand and leading to a larger war. In Britain the strategic reserve will be built up; the 3rd Infantry Division is moving back from Egypt. No change in National Service is intended this year. The greatest uncertainty hangs over the Territorial Army. Anti-air-craft Command is being disbanded, but apparently the Government has decided to let that change be digested before making any more. The field divisions, such as the 42nd Lancastrian Division and the 51st Highland Division, have been written off by Supreme Headquarters, Europe, as unfit for emergency service on the Continent. The Government might, however, need a reserve which on mobilisation could be used for field service in the Middle East or elsewhere. That is bne reason for hesitation about changing the Territorials’ role. Research The strategic balance from 1959 or 1960 onwards will begin gradually to swing in favour of whichever side finds antidotes to the other’s scientific discovery. Thus the side with bombers equipped 4o defeat the other’s anti-aircraft missiles will have a vital advantage. Similarly the side which, makes the best progress with longrange rockets, fitted with atomic warheads, will gain an advantage—unless the other has meanwhile moved into a new . phase with the problem of radio control and redirection. Probably none of theie 'problems is quite so easy to solve or so near solution as popular imagination would have it, but British research is said to be making good progress. This year it is receiving £160,000,000 about one-tenth of the defence budget. In future it is likely to need more. There is also the problem of providing sufficient scientists. In the long run research is the most critical factor in defence planning. In the short terni, comparative bomber strengths are what matter most. By 1960 the Soviet Air Force is expected to have some hundreds of its new heavy bomber, with four jet engines and swept wings. But eVen if the new aircraft has a range comparable to that of the American B-52 it will not be able to reach the main U.S. bases in Florida, Texas and Arizona. It could probably carry fuel for not more than 12 hours’ flying, which at 600 m.p.h. gives a maximum radius of 3600 miles. Refuelling in flight might be practicable in the Polar area but would be too dangerous over the Atlantic or the Aleutians, so that in range the Soviet bomber could barely reach New York and Chicago. With large numbers available, one-way missions might become a slightly greater risk. Ultimately, of course, aircraft are bound to be developed with a range sufficient to reach anywhere in the world, but that seems not to have happened yet