Indus Basin Waters

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27498, 4 November 1954, Page 12

Indus Basin Waters

It is satisfactory to notice that talks will reopen this month between India and Pakistan about the waters of the Indus basin. This is one of the greater disputes embittering relations between India and Pakistan. While it continues, millions of persons live under the threat of being deprived of the water which means life to them; and irrigation works which could turn desolate tracts into productive areas are held up. The magnificent system of irrigation in the Indus basin was one of the finest legacies of Britain to India and Pakistan. Millions were benefiting from a scheme built up over several generations, but uncompleted when the British left India. Partition divided between the two new nations a scheme designed for the whole Indus basin. Cpmmon sense demanded that the original irrigation scheme be carried out, even though under two flags. But political passions took no heed of ■common sense. The irrigation scheme was divided in conformity

with national boundaries; and, as a result, its fruits were unevenly divided. Pakistan was left -with the greater irrigated area, and India with control of the waters which served i*—and with some 35,000,000 acres of its own crying out for irrigation. Alarm was caused in the irrigation colonies in 1948 when some local Indian officials began cutting supplies to Pakistan. A crisis was averted only by an agreement by which India assured 'Pakistan that it did not intend to withhold water without giving Pakistan time to develop alternative sources, while Pakistan acknowledged India’s natural anxiety to have water for its own undeveloped areas. In 1951, Mr David Lilienthal, invited to report on the situation, and with the experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority . behind him, advised reversion to the British scheme. Unfortunately, it was found impossible to work out a plan, in which India and Pakistan would cooperate. The good offices of the World Bank were invoked, and, after two years of work, the bank’s engineers put forward a scheme reserving the entire flow of three rivers—the Indus, Jhelum, and

Chenab—for Pakistan, and assigning the entire flow, after five years, of the other three great rivers—the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej— to India, which would make a substantial contribution to the cost of canals which Pakistan would have to build to replace the water lost to India. Both India and Pakistan accepted this scheme as a basis for discussion, but after many months discussions broke down; and the break produced more recriminations and charges of bad faith. Pakistan

appeared to be hesitating because it feared there might not be enough water in its rivers to make good the loss when supplies from India ceased; a fear which found support from independent expert opinion. Pakistan therefore asked that the plan of the World Bank’s engineers should be re-examined. India interpreted this reply as a refusal of the

bank’s proposals and, saying that negotiations had broken down, began to divert the waters of the Sutlej river. India’s action was condemned by some observers because it appeared that India was relying on its advantageous position to enforce its will on Pakistan; others, thought that India was merely trying to force Pakistan to make up its mind; and yet others believed that India was using a pretext to return to its own., reading of the 1948 agreement because it was not anxious to continue supplying Pakistan for another five years (as the bank’s scheme would oblige it to do) if this meant holding up its own works. It is satisfactory that the unhappy affair is returning to the negotiating chamber, where the intentions of both claimants to the valuable wafers will be tested again. It must be hoped that this time progress will be made.