THE “GREAT MENTAL GULF” "EAST AND WEST “DO NOT SPEAK SAME LANGUAGE”

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27473, 6 October 1954, Page 10

THE “GREAT MENTAL GULF” "EAST AND WEST “DO NOT SPEAK SAME LANGUAGE”

IBP NEAL STANFORD in the “Christian Science Monitor”) (Reprinted by Arraneement)

Washington.—ln Clement Attlee s first article on his visit to Moscow and Peking appears this brief but Potent statement: “We do not speak the same was not referring to the obvious fact that the English language and the Russian and Chinese languages have little if anything in common. What he was stating simply and tactually was that Communists <narashell Communists as he . called them) and Westerners do not, m fact cannot, really understand each other because of the unbridgeable mental—or ideological—gulf between them. It was a costly lesson, for example, for the West to learn shortly after the war that when the Kremlin spoke ot “free elections” it meant rigged elections; when it spoke of “democracy it meant totalitarianism; when it praisea “co-existence” it meant only-until-we-can-destroy-you. What we call “black it calls “white.” Mr Attlee’s observation bears repeating at this time because the Kremlin is now engaged in a calculated campaign of kindness that could deceive the unwary. At the same time its armed forces are busy testing out Western resistance to further Communist expansion, busy probing for more weak spots in the free world s armour. Thinking and Acting His comment is timely because it is a reminder of another Communist quirk that it is important constantly to remember: a Communist and a Westerner do not think the same way, they do not reason the same way, they do not act the same way. One trouble Secretary Dulles and his aides constantly have in trying to fathom the intentions of the Soviets is that they cannot work on the premise that Messrs Malenkov, Molotov, and Khrushchev would do as they would if positions were reversed. They cannot argue that the West would act thus-and-so under certain circumstances; therefore the Communists will act thus-and-so. For that would assume that the West and the Communists thought the same way, reasoned the same way, speculated the same way, and would act the same way. They do not. They do not speak the same language. Neither do they reason alike—for the base from which each operates is an enigma to the other. As Mr Attlee put it in explaining his frustrations: “It soon became clear we

could not find common ground in discussions.” He could not find com mta ground because black can become white, democracy m.’’ totalitarianism, slavery become , synonym for freedom. The trouble that the Security c O . cil is having in trying to decide whl to do about Formosa. Quemoy fh, Pescadores, is in fathoming Com’mun ist intentions. Messrs Eisenhower Dulles, Wilson. Radford, and othem may be able to figure out what thev would do if they were sitting in Peking—and therefore what th. United States ought to do or t>e n r l pared for. But their reasoning will hi “Western” —it will be based on ce'. tain principles, assumptions, premises and moral values indigenous to their training and experience. A Different World What they have to try to do i, to sense how a communist would think—what would be his lines of reasoning—and that means leaving the world they know and living in a world they do not know. It is a difficult task, almost impossible. Yet if the United States is to anticipate Soviet or Communist moves it must not only cultivate an intelligence . service to keep tabs on the Soviets but it must become adept in fathoming and foreseeing probable Communist manoeuvres. Mr Attlee exposed a principal cause for the East-West cold war and the current world crises in observing that East and West “do not speak the sam, language.” He was describing something deeper than ordinary language difficulties. It is a conflict in thinking It is a difference in principles, ft is a contradiction in values. Mr Attlee observed how “shocked" his Soviet listeners were to hear him describe freedom as including individual liberty, and how they concluded he did not really mean'it but was only mouthing the West’s propaganda line. In all his conversations he was not able to get across to hi# listeners the basic values or premises governing Western thinking and action. This “great mental gulf,” as he calls it, is what confounds the diplomats and strategists of the West. But il it exists for the West, it also exists for the East as well. If the West cannot fathom the Kremlin, it is no more likely the Kremlin can fathom th» West or understand its principles or policies.