The Press WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1954. AGREEMENT ON EUROPE

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27473, 6 October 1954, Page 10

The Press WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1954. AGREEMENT ON EUROPE

jAn undertone of deep relief is (apparent in the statements by the (leaders of the respective delegations at the end of the nine-Power London conference on European affairs, i When the French Assembly rejected the European Defence Community scheme on August 30—after Mr | Mendes-France had tried earlier to i persuade the Benelux countries, Italy, and Western Germany to ag J. e ® tO a plan ’ the vagueness of winch aroused suspicions instead of inducing confidence—nothing less than tne disintegration of the whole Western partnership threatened. There was a grave danger that, in oespair of ever achieving unity, the , Western European nations would go | their several ways, and the equally (grave danger that irritation in America at Western Europe’s failure to approach the federation that is so dear to Americans’ hearts would strengthen the hands of the considerable section of Americans who want to loosen United States ties with Europe. Uncomfortable Situations i Because their long-standing poli- | cies were in danger of being | undermined, several statesmen were I placed in uncomfortable positions in | their own countries. Dr. Adenauer camji increasingly under attack in Western Germany; Mr Dulles represents a party that must soon counter criticism of its administration of American foreign policy on the hustings; and even Mr Eden was conscious of a dangerous volume of opposition in Britain to German rearmament. But among the statesmen, most concern was aroused about the position of Mr MendesFrance, not merely because of his precarious authority in the present Assembly, but chiefly because no-one could feel certain about the objective towards which Mr MendesFrance was steering his country; his | reliability as a statesman with

‘ European ” ideas was deeply sus!pect. In brief, after the French | rejection of E.D.C. it was apparent i that if rifts—not one but several—(were to be avoided, most strenuous' (efforts would have to be made to reach agreement about Europe, and before Russia could throw more spanners into the machinery for the defence of Western Europe. The London conference, arranged after visits to European capitals by Mr Eden and Mr Dulles, was the Western statesmen’s commendably swift response to the threat. The real triumph of the conference is that it has dispelled much of the atmosphere of disunity that prevailed up to the eve of the j meeting. Serious difficulties remain to be overcome; but it can be said jthat through the work of the conj ference the “ European ” approach to Western Europe’s problems has been restored and that much that was valuable in E.D.C. has been preserved. It was vital that the signatories to the London agree-

ment should include the French Prime Minister. His support of the agreement was encouraged by Britain’s offer to commit itself firmly to Western Europe’s defence by providing four divisions of troops and a tactical air force for the rest of the century, and by a compromise that went some way towards meeting the French proposals for the control of (German rearmament.

A Crucial Decision

The decision of the French Assemjbly is still crucial. It remains to be seen whether in the new Brussels Treaty structure, by which the degree of German rearmament will be controlled, the Assembly will still find the supranational characteris-

tics that it found intolerable in E.D.C. Further, the French Assembly is still pledged to oppose the admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of any State with territorial claims. The proposals to admit Western Germany to N.A.T.O. (with whose forces German forces will be integrated) will raise in the French Assembly the exceedingly thorny problem of Germany’s claims to the Saar. However, with Mr Mendes-France committed as far as he is, the new agreement will have a better chance in the French Assembly than the E.D.C. treaty, upon which the Prime Minister’s attitude was equivocal. If Mr Mendes-France makes the London agreement an issue of confidence, more than the London agreement will be involved in the Assembly’s decision, because the success of France’s new economic policy is bound up with the Government of Mr Mendes-France. The Assembly may hesitate to risk

bringing the Government down when it knows that this would mean starting all over again on French internal problems. The ratification of the texts and conventions (yet to be formulated) that will tie the nations firmly to the principles enunciated in the London agreement may not be secured quickly or easily—at least in France—but the outcome of the London conference at least envisages the hope that the sense of urgency shown by the Western statesmen in face of the danger to the Western partnership may be communicated in sufficient measure to their respective legislatures and peoples.