New Sidelights On Battle Of Atlantic

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27472, 5 October 1954, Page 16

New Sidelights On Battle Of Atlantic

(Special Correspondent NJSJPJL.)

xt .. October 4, New sidelights on the battle of the Xtlantic and on the character of Ad--rural Sir Max Horton, the man primarily responsible for its direction and success,- are given in a book, “Max Horton and the Western Approaches,” ; ust -published in London. Its author, Rear-Admiral W. S Chalmers, says that Max Horton, “an aloof and lonely figure,” brought an immense reputation to his appointment as Flag Officer, Submarines, and later as Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches. . He was hated and feared by the Germans, who remembered his exploits as a young submarine commanaer in World War I.

Horton saw from the outset that the '•olution of the U-boat menace lay in the development of highly trained support groups working with long-range aircraft. He believed that U-boats, if use ? J ruthlessly in large numbers, could bring trade to a standstill in the Atlantic, thus reducing the army and the air force to a state of impotence. ; ,He impressed his opinion on the | British Government that any future submarine threat to the ocean lines of communication could be beaten only by combined sea and air power. When it was proposed that Horton should take over the job of Admiral, Submarines, the then First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley. Pound, said to him that it was d post usually held by a flag officer one rank below Horton’s. Horton’s reply was: “I don’t care a damn about seniority so long as I have a free hand.” To which Pound replied: “I guarantee that you shall.” Offer of Command A year later, Admiral Horton was offered command of the Home Fleet, the Navy’s senior sea-going command. Acceptance would have meant for certain that he would have retired as Admiral of the Fleet, and it would have been almost as certain that he would have succeeded Pound as First Sea Lord. Replying to this offer, Admiral Horton wrote a letter expressing opinions which, according to the author of the book, “authority never fbrgave.” Wrote Horton to the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr A. V. Alexander), now Lord Alexander: “I have come to the conclusion that I cannot accept it. The chief reasons that have led me to this decision are the conditions under which the C.-in-C. Home Fleet has to carry out his heavy responsibilities. “I think it essential that the C.-in-C. Home Fleet should have directly under his orders adequate air forces— A, for reconnaissance; B, for sea bombing; C, for fighter protection.

To carry this into effect, heavy bomber squadrons would have to be placed under the C.-in-C. Home Fleet’s orders, not only for bombing enemy forces at sea but to supplement the equate reconnaissance machines Wnich is all that Coastal Command can supply. 4.1-* ‘Shore-based fighter protection for the Fleet is also necessary, and must be under the C.-in-C.’s orders in certain areas. New Sidelights These forces should work and tram together and with the fleet continuously, and the personnel should not be subject to constant changes. Only if the above measures are put into force do I see a chance of the Home Fleet successfully fulfilling its functions. *T also have formed the opinion that the C.-in-C. should be shore-based, and that Admirals of individual squadrons (sea) should be considerably younger. “Last, I formed the opinion that the C.-in-C. Home Fleet did not enjoy that degree of independent judgment and action which seemed to me to be essential to the full discharge of the responsibilities of this command. . . . Realising that there is little hope of the principal requisite changes being made in the near future, I could not undertake with any confidence the C.-in-C. Home Fleet’s onerous responsibilities to the board and to the country.” “Lack of Co-operation” In the early stages of the war Horton was appalled at the lack of cooperation between the Navy and the three R.A.F. commands. On July 3, 1940, he wrote: «“At this morning’s Admiralty • conference, called by C.-in-C. Nore, representatives of Bomber, Fighter, and Coastal Air Commands were present . . . C.-in-C. Nore said that invasion was drawing near—yet none of the senior officers present had ever met in conference until today. “Fighter Command said their role was defence of Britain, not defence of our ships—This remark shows the total lack of co-operation. Once again I say the Air are fighting a war of their own. Logically, the Air must take over both Navy and Army and control the battle as C.-in-C. Combined Forces. (There is serious talk today of a C.-in-C. for Britain’s Commined Armed Forces.) “C.-in-C. Nore said in a pleading voice: ‘Do you think it would be possible for me to meet C.-in-C. Fighter Command? I have never met him.’ ” Horton concludes: “What a system. What a disgrace that such things can be when we are engaged in a death struggle.”