BRITISH WAR HISTORIES

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27307, 25 March 1954, Page 6

BRITISH WAR HISTORIES

The Mediterranean Campaign WORK OF NEW ZEALAND RAILWAY UNITS (N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) LONDON, March 22. A tribute to the New Zealand 10th Railway Construction Company and the New Zealand 16th Railway Operating Company is paid in the first \olume of the British military history of World War 11, “The Mediterranean and the Middle East.” The first volume by Major-General I. Playfair, Commander G. M. S. Stitt, R.N., Brigadier C. J. C. Molony, and Air Vice Marshal S. E. Toomer, relates events from the outbreak of the war until the arrival of Rommel's Afrika Korps in 1941. The authors say that the presence of the New Zealand Railways units in Egypt at a comparatively early date, was “invaluable.” Erom the New Zealand point of view this first volume is chiefly interesting for an account of the steps leading to the decision to send the troops to Greece and the influence of Sir Winston Churchill on that decision. The volume refers to the general directive sent to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East from Sir Winston Churchill and states: “It’s main interest in retrospect lies in the fact that it is the first of a long and remarkable series of telegrams from the Prime Minister to one or other of the commanders-in-chief in the Middle East. “Some of these telegrams were exploratory, some advisory; some were drawn in bold sweeps, some in great detail; some expressed generous praise; Some were frankly admonitory. Some must have been more welcome than others. Almost all required answers. They Could have left no doubt that there was, indeed, a central direction of the war and a vigorous one. There had been nothing like it since the time of the Elder Pitt?’ Italian Fleet In Action There is what is described as a dryly humorous note in the volume in the description of the engagement off Calabria in July, 1940, between the British and Italian fleets. There was intervention by Italian shore-based bombers “during which the Italian air crews distributed a large number of bombs on their own fleet. “Signals were overheard indicating the fury of Admiral Campioni, who stated in his report that his ships had frequently to react with gunfire, but that none of the bombs hit them. The episode showed clearly that co-opera-tion between the fleet and shore-based bombers was very far from perfect.” About the Italians, the authors say: “It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that with better leadership they would have been able to achieve much more than they did. Perhaps the most generous and not the least accurate view of the attitude of most Italian junior leaders and soldiers is that they had no heart for this particular war.”