INDIA’S PROBLEM

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27273, 13 February 1954, Page 9

INDIA’S PROBLEM

Population v. Production

SOMBRE BACKGROUND FOR FIVE-YEAR PLAN

[.Specially Written tor "The Press")

[By :

S. M. COOK]

Since the end of World War II the M,. r* faced with two major problems those of Government has been tation. The former has been solved? bv ?he Pel ? dencc . and rehabiliin 1947. and the solution qf the latter '"dependence approach to her many social and tco e nomic b dMtifs ht by * long ' arm The collection of information and <st a fto+™ c has been difficult. Most of the population for pla ?™ ng P ur Poses many of which are inaccessible except in'thl e ln f*? 16 600 > 000 villages, to rural areas the people are w ? ather - to co-operate, which has added considerable’ t °f ten reluctant an adequate survey of the of the op le Qifficulty ° f making

In spite of these difficulties, th<=» Indian Government was able to make a more comprehensive survey than ever before. The results merely confirmed what was already feared. Population was fast outstripping the available food supply. Food grain production for 1947-48 was 48.4 million tons, compared with an average annual yield of 50.000,000 tons in 193639—a decrease of 3 per cent. On the other hand, population has increased steadily. In 1941 the population within the present area of the republic (excluding Kashmir)' was under 315,000,000; in 1951 it was nearly 357,000,000 —an increase of 13 per cent Translated into individual terms the picture is depressing. Before the war grain production overaged 16oz a person, but by 1951 the urban millions were reduced to a 9oz ration, with 13oz for heavy manual workers. The present position, 1952-53, is a little better because of bumper harvests; and current output if rationed out, amounts to 14oz each. Even this, according to the British Medical Research Council, is merely an “emergency relief ration” which should not, in the interests of public health, be maintained too long. In 1951, 70 per cent, of the population were directly dependent on agriculture. therefore land and water are the main resources of the country. The cultivated area is enormous, nearly 320,000.000 acres, most of which can be double cropped. Indian holdings are usually small and average about one acre. These tend to become smaller by the system of subdivision among heirs. In many instances this fragmented land has become uneconomic to work, and has gone out of production. Low Productivity

Productivity is very low, mainly because of the lack of fertilisers and modern techniques. India’s rice production averages 9501 b an acre, compared with Japan’s 22501 b an acre. In spite of the big difference in size, Japan uses five times more fertilisers than India does. Continuous poor yields have impoverished the farmer, ind he can do very little to improve tne quality of his land or to introduce new methods. Apart from iron ores and coal deposits, which are claimed to be adequate, India is not really rich in minerals, having regard to the numbers of the people. In the industrial field, India ranks about sixth in the world. This is in terms of the total employed; actually output a head is low. There has been some development in the production of consumer goods since the end of the war, but generally India is industrially retarded. It is against this sombre background that India’s plans for development must be examined. Post-war reconstructioh began in Indian in 1945 under the Bombay Plan, but very little was done because of inadequate finance. Yet it served to emphasise India’s needs. With the attainment of independence, plans were again prepared for nearly 60 development projects, a comprehensive overhaul of tanks and wells, and the erection of hydro-electric stations. Unfortunately there appears to have been little or no co-ordination, no survey to ascertain actual requirements. To end the chaos, the Government set up a Planning Commission m 1350. but it was not until 1953, that the plan was made public. A Modified Plan The new plan is much more modest than any of its predecessors, and is, according to experts, within the bounds of possibility. The new proposals are to take five years to . ac-

eish? I ’^itul^ S now P i ? nned to irrigate nulllon acres, in addition to mmt= S t Ven ! n ,'. llion acres of improveTTndll o, exlst 'ng tanks and wells, were to hA PreV a OU3 . plan attempts be made to provide 22.5 aSw ?? < ? I f v new irrigation alone. Another 5.5 million are to be cleared filu^ e h d nd l R feStatlO ? ; P revious ly the bee ? 8et T . at 90 millions of tS nh? e ast jL ls estimated that add ab out 10 per cent, a area ’ com P a red with RnS G w f 209 P e r cent, under the £°™ bdy Plan L addition, plans have imSlrtE r 2 pare< j for soil conservation, improved seeds and fertilisers, and niiV facilities. These obvious needs will be augmented by education aimed at the development of a c°™?? unity approach to the most pressing problems. Much will, therescope and quality o? local leadership. The agricultural 7 r n I.® expected to yield an additional tons of food grains (rice, uheat, and pulse) annually by 1955-56.

t Secondary Industries in the secondary industries the Commission’s main efforts will be directed to improving such basic industries as iron and steel, shipouiiamg, and locomotives. Encouragement is also given to private enterprise to increase output by the introduction of modern machinery and the more effective use of existing capacities. Under this section of the plan, a “empts will be made to increase tertiliser production by 545 per cent., cement 224 per cent., and heavy chemicals, such as sulphuric acid, caustic soda, and soda ash by 95 per cent. Increased production has also been planned for pig iron, steel, textiles. and building materials. With these developments goes much activity in railway construction and road building. The programme for the latter is probably inadequate, as ol roads in the past has been one of the main causes in the failure to relieve famine in time to prevent excessive deaths from starvation. Pernaps the most important development, with the possible exception of agriculture, is the project to increase hydroelectric power by more than 1,000,000 killowatts in the next five years. The Damodar Valley scheme, the biggest planned to date, near Calcutta, has as its main objectives flood control, power production, and irrigation, the last by means of a barrage which should irrigate some 500,000 acres of West Bengal by 1955-56, and increase rice output by 200,000 tons annually. Great and Complex Task Indians as a whole do not expect much beyond rehabilitation to pre-war levels. They regard the first five-year plan as a tooling-up process, and claim that real progress will be accomplished under the second five-year plan. This modesty seems realistic in view of the magnitude and complexity of the task.

The most serious criticism of the plan to date is that the targets are too low and that the plan does not rise to the measure of the needs of India. Much of this criticism is of recent origin, and stems from the extremely buovant economic position of India today. For 1952-53 sterling balances increased, which enabled the plan to be implemented without resource to extensive overseas borrowing or additional taxation. The plan is estimated to cost about £1,500,000,000 in New Zealand currency. All appears to be going well, and most of the output targets seem to be within reach. By 1955-56 India will merely bring consumption to pre-war level—some 20 per cent, below actual needs. It is not a grand vision, but more likely of attainment than the grandiose visions India has had in the past.