RETURN FROM POTSDAM TO ELECTORAL DEFEAT

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27226, 18 December 1953, Page 10

RETURN FROM POTSDAM TO ELECTORAL DEFEAT

the Rt. Ron.

"TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY"

[By

Sir WINSTON CHURCHILL]

XLVIII

Frustration was the fate of this final conference of “the Three. 1 have not attempted to describe all the questions which were raised though not settled at our various m i et content myself with telling the tale, so far as I was then aware of it of the atomic bomb and outlining the terrible issue of the GermanPolish frontiers. These events dwell with us today. It remains for me only to mention some of the social and personal contacts which relieved our sombre debates. Each of the three great delegations entertained the other two. First was the United States. When it came to my turn I proposed the toast of “The Leader of the Opposition,” adding “whoever he may be. Mr Attlee, and indeed the company, were much amused by this. The Soviet’s dinner was equally agreeable, and a very fine concert, at which leading Russian artistes performed, carried the proceedings so late that I slipped away. ‘ It fell to me to give the final banquet on the night of the [July] 23 [19451. I planned this on a laj-ge scale, inviting the chief commandefs as well as the delegates. I placed the President on my right and Stalin on my left. There were many speeches, Stalin, without even ensuring that all the waiters and orderlies had left the room, proposed that our next meeting should be in Tokyo. There was no doubt that the Russian declaration of war upon Japan would come at any moment, and already their large armies were massed upon the frontier ready to over-run the much weaker Japanese front line in Manchuria. Stalin: Autograph Collector To lighten the proceedings we changed places from time to time, and the President sat opposite me. I had another very friendly talk with Stalin, who was in the best of tempers and seemed to have no inkling of the momentous information about the new bomb the President had given me. He spoke with enthusiasm about the Russia intervention against Japan, and seemed to expect a good many months of war which Russia would wage on an ever-increasing scale, governed only by the Trans-Siberian railway. Then a very odd thing happened. My formidable guest got up from his seat with the bill-of-fare card in his hand and went round the table collecting the signatures of many of those who were present. I never thought to see him as an autograph hunter! When he . came back to me I wrote my name as he desired, apd we both looked at each other and laughed. Stalin’s eyes twinkled with rfcirth and good humour. I have mentioned before how the toasts of these banquets were drunk by the Sovifet representatives out of tiny glasses, and Stalin had never varied from this practice. But now I thought I would take him on a step. So I filled a small-sized claret glass with brandy for him and another for myself. I looked at him significantly. We both drained our glasses at a stroke and gazed approvingly at one another. After, a pause Stalin said, “If you find ft impossible to give us a fortified position in the Marmora, could, we not have a base at Dedeagatch?” I contented myself with saying, “I will always support Russia in her claim to the freedom of the seas all the year around.” On the morning of the 25th, the conference met again. This was the last meeting I attended. Disagreements Piled Up I take no responsibility beyond what is here set forth for any of the conclusions reached at Potsdam. During the course of the conference I allowed differences that could not be adjusted either round the table or by the Foreign Ministers at their daily meetings to stand over. A formidable body of questions on which there was disagreement was in consequence piled up on the shelves. I intended, if I were returned by the electorate, as was generally expected, to come to grips with the Soviet Government on this catalogue of decisions. For instance, neither I nor Mr Eden would ever have agreed to the Western Neisse being the frontier line. The line of the Oder and the Eastern Neisse had already been recognised as the Polish compensation for retiring to the Curzon Line, but the oyer-running by the Russian armies of the territory up to and even beyond the Western Neisse was never and would never have been agreed to by any Government of which I was the head. Here was no point of principle only, but rather an enormous matter of fact affecting about three additional millions of displaced people. There were many other matters on which it was desirable to confront the Soviet Government, and also the Poles, who had obviously become their ardent puppets. Time for Show-Down All this negotiation was cut in twain and brought to an untimely conclusion by the result of the General Election T o say this is not to blame the

Ministers of the new Government, wh n were forced to go over without af lV serious preparation, and who natural)? were unacquainted with the ideas and plans I had in view, namely, to a “show-down” at the end of th. conference, and, if necessary, to hav» a public break rather than allow any. thing beyond the Oder and the Easte* Neisse to be ceded to Poland. However, the real time to deal with these issues was. as has been explains in earlier chapters, when the froiS of the mighty Allies faced each othe in the field, and before the Americans and to a lesser extent the British made their vast retirement on a 40o’ mile front to a depth in some plact? of 120 miles, thus giving the heart and mass of Germany over to the Russians. I flew home with Mary on the afternoon of July 25. My wife met me at Northolt, and we all dined quietly together. Excellent arrangements had been made by Captain Pirn and the staff the Map Room to present a continuous tale of election results as they came in the next day. The latest view of the Conservative Central Office was that we should retain a substantial majority. I had not burdened myself unduly with the subject while occupied with the grave business of the conference. On the whole I accepted the of the party manager, and went to bed in the belief that the British people would wish me to continue my work. My hope was that it would be possible to reconstitute the National Coalition Government in the propertions of the new House, of Commons Thus slumber. Conviction of Defeat However, just before dawn I woke suddenly with a sharp stab of almost physical pain. A hitherto sub-conscious conviction that we were beaten broke forth and dominated my mind. All the pressure of great events, on and against which I had mentally so long maintained my “flying speed,” would cease and I should fall. The power to shape the future would be denied me. The knowledge and experience I had gathered, the authority and goodwill I had gained in so many countries, would vanish. I was discontented at the prospect and turned over at once to sleep again. ’ I did not wake till 9 o’clock, and when I went into the Map Room the first results had begun to come in. They were, as I now expected, unfavourable.’ By noon -it was clear that the Socialists would have a majority. At luncheon my wife said to me, “It may well be a blessing in disguise.”

I replied, “At the moment it seems quite effectively disguised.” In ordinary circumstances I should have felt free to take a few days to wind up the affairs of the Government in the usual manner. Constitutionally, I could have awaited the meeting of Parliament in a few days’ time,- and taken my dismissal from the House of Commons. This would have enabled me to present before resignation the unconditional surrender of Japan to the nation. Resignation The need for Britain being immediately represented with- proper authority at the conference, where all the great issues we had discussed were now to come to a head, made all delay contrary to the public interest. Moreover, the verdict of the electors had been so overwhelmingly expressed that I ,did not wish to remain even for an hour responsible for their affairs. At 7 o’clock, therefore, having asked for an audience, I drove to the Palace, tendered my resignation to the King, and advised His Majesty to send for Mr Attlee. I issued to the nation the following message, with which this account may close: 26 July 1 , ’45. “The decision of the British people has been recorded in the votes counted today. I have therefore laid down the charge which was placed upon me in darker times. I regret that I have not been permitted to finish the work against Japan. For this, however, all plans and preparations have been made, and the results may come much quicker than we have hitherto been entitled to expect. Immense responsibilities abroad and at home fall upon the new Government, and we must all hope that they will be successful in bearing them. “It only remains for me to express to the British people, for whom I have acted in these perilous years, my profound gratitude for the unflinching, unswerving support which they have given me during my task, and for the many expressions of kindness which they have shown towards their servant.” (Concluded) (Copyright 1953 in U.S.A, by the New York Times Company and Time Inc. (publishers of Time and Life); in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph Ltd.; elsewhere by International Co-operation Press Service Inc. World right reserved. Reproduction in whole, or in part, in any language strictly prohibited).