The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1953. Russia, China, And The West

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27213, 3 December 1953, Page 10

The Press THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1953. Russia, China, And The West

There is no quick or easy way to ’end the cold war. The rather more (promising tone of the new Russian ; i proposals for a Four-Power meeting ■and the prospect of a compromise 1 lon the Korean peace conference are 1 not likely, therefore, to be over- 1 valued; nor should they be under- 1 valued. Where only limited advances towards international stability are possible, limited advances become important. Although ; the final gesture was made by the ’[United States, the nearness of ’agreement on the Korean conference has the intrinsic merit of showing that the methods of negotiation are still possible. American acceptance of the presence of neutral “ observers ” at the conference has probably been made easier by the reverse the Communists have suffered in their attempts to persuade) j prisoners-of-war to be repatriated. | A successful conclusion to the i

Korean discussions would have a wider value in meeting one of the essential conditions for consideration of the Russian proposal to hold eventually a meeting of the • Big Four Powers and China. The Russian Note making new

suggestions for a Four-Power con-, ference was, no doubt, carefully timed to delay still further French ratification of the European Defence Community Treaty, and may have had no other purpose; which naturally caused some irritation in Washington. American interest in the treaty is primarily that its conclusion would bring nearer the time when American forces could t leave Europe. At the same time 5 the Russian Note may not have

substantially affected the actions of the French, who have always been deeply divided on what is actually a French proposal. It may be that there is now an opportunity for some progress towards a German settlement. The Russians have certainly shown a genuine fear of driving Germany too enthusiastically into the Western camp, and have also shown interest in various “ Locarno ” and security proposals (including Mr van Zeeland’s suggestion of a demilitarised zone in Germany and Poland), which suggests more room for negotiation than there was when the Foreign Ministers last met in 1949. Both East and West have had setbacks since then. In Western

Europe the determination to prepare to resist Russian expansion has weakened since the death of Mr Stalin, although there is no evidence that Mr Malenkov is likely to be more accommodating, , but only more realistic in seeking support for his regime in both Russia and the satellites. For their part, the Russians must have seen in Dr. Adenauer’s striking electoral success the probable end of any likelihood of the establishment of an all-German Government favourable to Russia. If Russia ever did contemplate using the lost provinces east of the Oder-Neisse Line to buy German friendship (and it was always doubtful whether the Krem-

; lin could risk the anger this would cause in Eastern Europe), the time for such a manoeuvre has passed! The Russians might be prepared now to give up the idea of dominating Germany, provided an acceptable security agreement, including a guarantee of the Oder-Neisse Line, could be arranged. The Russians would also want the withdrawal of American and British forces from the Continent. Such an arrangement would not only undermine the whole North Atlantic Treaty plan for the defence of Western Europe, but would also leave Eastern , Europe firmly in the Russian grip. This would be distasteful to the democratic Powers and would require German resignation to the loss of the eastern provinces. Though the West could not afford 5 to make all these concessions, it , must be recognised that no agree- ‘ ment on Germany completely satis- ■ factory to the West is possible until ; there is a better general relation- ) ship with the Communists; and that, ; in turn, depends on some agree- ? ment on Germany. The projected j conference of Foreign Ministers may : not get within some distance of an - understanding. But it offers at least • the hope of finding just how wide . the gap is.