POLITICAL PROBLEMS RISE AS ALLIED ARMIES MEET

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27212, 2 December 1953, Page 10

POLITICAL PROBLEMS RISE AS ALLIED ARMIES MEET

“TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY”

[Bl/

the Rt. Hon. Sir WINSTON CHURCHILL]

XXXIV

President Roosevelt died at a moment when political and military prizes of the highest consequence hung in the balance.

Hitler’s Western Front had collapsed; Eisenhower was across the Rhine and driving deep into Germany and Central Europe against an enemy who in places resisted fiercely but was quite unable to stem the onslaught of our triumphant armies; there seemed nothing to stop the Western Allies from taking Berlin.

The Russians were only 35 miles from the city, on the east, but they were not yet ready to attack. Between them and Berlin lay the Oder. The Germans were entrenched before the river, and hard fighting was to take place before the Red Army could force a crossing and begin their advance.

Vienna was another matter. Our chance of forestalling the Russians in this ancient capital by a thrust from Italy had been abandoned eight months before, % when Alexander s forces had been stripped for the sake of the landing in the South of France. Stalin had told Eisenhower that his main blow would be made in “approximately the second half of May, ’ but he was able to advance a whole month earlier. Perhaps the swift approach of the Western armies to the Elbe had something to do with it. The Russians, in great strength on the Oder, 35 miles from the capital, started their attack on April 16 on a 200-mile front, and surrounded Berlin on April 25. On the same day spearheads of the United States First Army from Leipzig met the Russians near Torgau, on the Elbe. Prague Urged as Western Objective Germany was cut in two, and the Ninth and First [U.S.] Armies remained halted facing the Russians on the Elbe and the Mulde. The German Army was disintegrating before our eyes.’ A , Over 1,000,000 prisoners were taken in the first three weeks of April, but Eisenhower believed that fanatical Nazis would attempt to establish themselves in the mountains of Bavaria and Western Austria, and he swung the Third U.S. Army southwards. Its right thrust down to Danube reached Linz on May 5, and later met the Russians coming up from Vienna. Its left penetrated into Czechoslovakia as far as Budejovice, Pilsen and Karlsbad. There was no agreement to debar him from occupying Prague it if were militarily feasible. I accordingly approached the President. Prime Minister to President Truman. 30 April, ’45. “There can be little doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much as possible of the territory of Western Czechoslovakia by your forces might make the whole difference to the postwar situation in Czechoslovakia, and might well influence that in nearby countries.

“On the other hand, if th® Western Allies play no significant part in Czechoslovakian liberation that country will go the way of Jugoslavia. “Of course, such a move by Eisenhower must not interfere with his main operations against the Germans, but I think the highly important political consideration mentioned above should be brought to his attention.” On May 1 President Truman told me that General Eisenhower’s immediate plan of operations in Czechoslovakia was expressed as follows: “The Soviet Staff now contemplates operations into the Vitava valley. My intention, as soon as current operations permit, is to proceed and destroy any remaining organised German forces. “If a move into Czechoslovakia is then desirable, and if conditions here permit, our logical initial move would be on Pilsen and Karlsbad. I shall not attempt any move which I deem militarily unwise.” Message to Eisenhower The President added: “This meets with my approval.” This seemed decisive. Nevertheless I returned to the question a week later. Prime Minister to General Eisenhower 7 May, *45. “I am hoping that your plan does not inhibit you to advance to Prague if you have the troops and do not meet the Russians earlier. I thought you did not mean to tie yourself down if you had the troops and the country was empty. Don’t bother to reply by wire, but tell me when we next nave a talk.”

Eisenhower’s plan was, however, to halt his advance generally on the west bank of the Elbe and along the 1937 boundary of Czechoslovakia. If the situation warranted, he would cross it to the general line, Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budejovice. The Russians agreed to this and the movement was made. But on May 4 the Russians reacted strongly to a fresn proposal to continue the advance of the Third United States Army to the River Vitava, which flows through Prague. This would not have suited them at all. So the Americans “halted while the Red Army cleared the east and west banks of the Moldau river and occupied Prague.” [Eisenhower, “Report to Combined Chiefs of Staff,” p. 140.] The city fell on May 9, two days after the general surrender was signed at Rheims. Zones of Occupation At this point a retrospect is necessary. The occupation of Germany by the principal Allies had long been studied. In the summer of 1943 a Cabinet Committee which I had set up under Mr Attlee, in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff, recommended that the whole country should be occupied if Germany was to be effectively disarmed, and that our forces should be disposed in three main zones of roughly equal size, the British in the northwest, the Americans in the south and south-west, and the Russians in an eastern zone. Berlin should be a separate joint zone, occupied by each of the three major Allies. These recommendations were approved and forwarded to the European Advisory Council, which then consisted of Mr Gousev, the Soviet Ambassador, Mr Winant, the American Ambassador, and Sir William Strang, of the Foreign Office. At this time the subject seemed to be purely theoretical. The proposals of tne European Advisory Council were not thought sufficiently pressing or practical to be brought before the War Cabinet. Like many praiseworthy efforts to make plans for the future, they lay upon the shelves while the war crashed on. In those days a common opinion about Russia was that she would not continue the war once she had regained her frontiers, and that when the time came the Western Allies might well have to try to persuade her not to relax her efforts. > The question of the Russian zone of occupation in Germany, therefore, did not bulk in our thoughts or in Anglo-American discussions: nor was it raised by any of the leaders at Teheran. When we met in Cairo on the way home in November. 1943, the United States Chiefs of Staff brought it forward, but not on account of any Russian request. The Russian zone of Germany remained an academic conception; if anything, too good to be true. Americans Ask for Change I was, however, told that President Roosevelt wished the British and American zones to be reversed. He wanted the lines of communication of any American force in Germany to rest directly on the sea and not to run through France. This issue involved a lot of detailed technical argument and had a bearing at many points upon the plans for Overlord. No decision was reached at Cairo, but later a considerable correspondence began between the President and myself. The British staffs

thought the original plan was better and also saw many inconveniences and complications in making the change, I had the impression that their American colleagues rather shared the view. At the Quebec Conference in September, 1944, we reached a firm agreement between us. The President, evidently convinced by the military view, had a large map unfolded on his knees. One afternoon most of the Combined Chiefs of Staff being present, he agreed verbally with me that the existing arrangements should stand, subject to the United States armies having a nearby direct outlet to the sea across the British zone. Bremen, and its subsidiary, Bremerhaven, seemed to meet the American needs, and their control over this zone was adopted.

We all felt it was too early as yet to provide for a French zone in Germany. and no-one so much as mentioned Russia.

At Yalta in February, 1945, the Quebec Plan was accepted without further consideration as the working basis for the inconclusive discussions about the future eastern frontier of Germany. This was reserved for the Peace Treaty.

The Soviet armies were at this very moment swarming over the pre-war frontiers, and we wished them all success. We proposed an agreement about the zones of occupation in Austria. Stalin, after some persuasion, agreed to my strong appeal that the French should be allotted part of the American and British zones and given a seat on the Allied Control Commission. It was well understood by everyone that the agreed occupational zones must not hamper the operational movements of the armies. Berlin, Prague, and Vienna could be taken by whoever got there first. New Perils Loom The two months that had passed since then had seen tremendoui changes, cutting to the very roots of thought. Hitler’s Germany was doomed and he himself about to perish. The Russians were fighting in Berlin. Vienna and most of Austria was in their hands. The whole relationship of Russia with the Western Allies was in flux. Every question about the future w» unsettled between us. The agreements and understandings of Yalta, such as they were, had already been broken or brushed aside by fhe triumphant Kremlin. New perils, perhaps as terrible as those we had surmounted, loomed and glared upon the tom ana harassed world. My concern at these ominous developments was apparent even before the President’s death. He himself, as we have seen, was also anxious and disturbed. His anger at Molotov’s accusations over the Berne affair has been recorded. In spite of the victorious advance of Eisenhower’s armies. President Truman found himself faced in the last half of April with a formidable crisis.

I had for some time past tried my utmost to impress the United State Government with the vast changes which were taking place both in the military and political spheres. Our Western armies would soon be carried well beyond the boundaries of our occupation zones, as both the Western and Eastern Allied fronts approached one another, penning the Germans between them. I became convinced that before we halted, or, still more, withdrew our troops, we ought to geek a meeting with Stalin face to face and make sure that an agreement was reached about the whole front. It would indeed be a disaster if we kept all our agreements in strict good faith while the Soviets laid their hands upon all they could get without the slightest regard for the obligations into which they had entered. Roosevelt Warned Early As early as April 5 I had sent a serious warning to Roosevelt. . . There is very little doubt in m'y mind that the Soviet leaders, whoever they may be, are surprised and disconcerted at the rapid advance of the Allied armies in the West and the almost total defeat of the enemy on our front, especially as they say they are themselves in no position to deliver a decisive attack before the middle of May. “All this makes it the more important that we should join hands with the Russian armies as far to the east as possible, and, if circumstances allow, enter Berlin.

“I may remind you that we proposed and thought we had arranged six weeks ago provisional zones of occupation in Austria, but that sir's Yalta the Russians have sent no confirmation of these zones.

“Now that they are on the eve of taking Vienna and very likely will occupy the whole of Austria, it may well be prudent for us to hold as much as possible in the north. “We must always be anxious lest the brutality of the Russian messages does not foreshadow some deep change of policy for which they are preparing. On the whole I am inclined to think it is no more than their natural expression when vexed or jealous. “For that very reason I deem it of the highest importance that a firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture bv our two countries in order that the air may be cleared and they realise that there is a point beyond which we will not tolerate insult. “I believe this is the best chance of saving the future. If they are ever convinced that we are afraid of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed I should despair of our future relations with them and much else.” Procedure on Meeting of Armies General Eisenhower had proposed that while the armies in the west and east should advance irrespective or demarcation lines, in any area where the armies had made contact either side should, be free to suggest thgt the other should withdraw behind boundaries of their occupation TotW Discretion to request and to orciej such withdrawals would rest witta Army group commanders. Subject to the dictates of operational necessity, the retirement would then take place, I considered that this proposal was premature and that it exceeded the immediate military needs. I therefore sent the Chiefs of Staff the following minute for their guidance in discussing General Eisenhower’s proposal with their American counterparts. Prime Minister to General Isnwj for C.O.S. Committee. 7 April, «• “When the forces arrive in contact, and after the preliminary salutations have been exchanged, they shouw rest opposite each other in those positions, except in so far as actual neighbouring military operations require concerted action. . , “Thus,' if we crossed the Elbe an a advanced to Berlin, or on a line between Berlin and the Baltic, which J® all well within the Russian zone, w® should not give this up as a military matter.

“It is a matter of State to be con sidered between the three Governments, and in relation to what tn Russians do in the south, where tney will soon have occupied not oni. Vienna but all Austria. There be such a hurry about our wjthdrawing from a place we have gained tn® the few days necessary for consulting the Governments in Washington an London cannot be found. .. “I attach great importance to tm ■ and could not agree to proposals this kind (being decided) on a level. They must be referred to tn President and me. ... , , “I am very glad to see the delav»j action proposed in our Chiefs of »ta message. It is entirely in accordant with my thought.” Action was taken accordingly. (To be continued)

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