RUSSIANS THREATEN TO BOYCOTT SAN FRANCISCO

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27204, 23 November 1953, Page 10

RUSSIANS THREATEN TO BOYCOTT SAN FRANCISCO

the Rt. Hon. Sir

“TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY”

[By

WINSTON CHURCHILL]

XXVI

Anglo-American tactics and procedure were at length agreed. Meanwhile, as we in London had foreseen, the deadlock in Moscow continued. The Soviet policy became daily more plain, as also did the use they were making of their unbridled and unobserved control of Poland. They asked that Poland should be represented at San Francisco only by the Lublin Government. When the Western Powers would not agree, the Soviets refused to let Molotov attend. This threatened to make all progress at San Francisco, and even the Conference itself, impossible. Molotov, in reply to an agreed communication from our Ambassadors on March 19, and in discussion on March 23, returned a series of flat negatives on every point he dealt with, and ignored others. It was as plain as a pikestaff. that his tactics were to drag the business out while the Lublin Committee consolidated their power. On March 27 I felt bound to renew the discussion. t Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. 27 Mar., ’45. “. . . As you know, if we fail altogether to get a satisfactory solution on Poland and are in fact defrauded by Russia, both Eden and I are pledged to report the fact openly to the House of Commons. „ ‘‘There I advised critics 6i the Yalta settlement to trust Stalin. If I have to make a statement of facts to the House the whole world will draw the deduction that such advice was wrong: all the more so that our failure in Poland will result in a setup there on the new Rumanian model. In other words, Eastern Europe will be shown to be excluded from the terms of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and you and we shall be excluded from any jot of influence in that area. “Russian Version of Democracy”

“Surely we must not be manoeuvred into becoming parties to imposing on Poland—and on how much more of Eastern Europe—the Russian version of democracy? . . . There seems to be only one possible alternative to confessing our total failure. That alternative .is to stand by our interpretation of the Yalta Declaration. But I am convinced it is no use trying to argue this any further with Molotov. “In view of this, is it not the moment now for a message from us both on Poland to Stalin? . . .

“I see nothing else likely to produce good results. If we are rebuffed it will be a very sinister sign, taken with the other Russian actions at variance with the spirit of Yalta—such as Molotov’s rude questioning of our word in the case of ‘Crossword’ [“Crossword” was the code name for the procedure to examine the credentials of a German General in Switzerland making approaches to the Allies!, the unsatisfactory proceedings over our liberated German prisoners, the coup d’etat in Rumania, the Russian refusal to allow the Declaration on Liberated Europe to operate, and the blocking of all progress in the European Advisory Commission by the Russians. ' “What also do you make of Molotov’s withdrawal from San Francisco? It leaves a bad impression on me. Does it mean that the Russians are going to run qtit or are they trying to blackmail us? “As we have both understood them, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which will form the basis of discussion at San Francisco, are based oh the conception of Great Power unity. If no such unity exists on Poland, which is, after all, a major problem of the post-war settlement—to say nothing of the other matters just mentioned—what, it will legitimately be asked, are the prospects of success of the new World Organisation? “And is it not indeed evident that, in the circumstances, we shall be building the whole structure of future world peace on foundations of sand? . . .” President Also Anxious The President replied that he also had been watching “with anxiety and concern the development of the Soviet attitude since the Crimea Conference.” He set forth his proposals for further negotiations by our Ambassadors, and then concluded: “I agree with you, howeyer, that the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference to Poland).” “I am glad," I telegraphed on March 30 to the President, “you agree that the time has come for us both to address Stalin directly. Your draft is a grave and weighty document, which, though it does not give full expression to our views, we will wholeheartedly accept. I will also endorse it in my parallel message to Stalin.” On April 1 I addressed Stalin myself. Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. 1 Apr. ’45. “You will by now, I hope, hjve received the message from the President of the United States, which he was good enough to show to me before he sent it. “It is now my duty on behalf of His Majesty’s Government to assure you that the War Cabinet desires me to express to you our whole-hearted endorsement of this message of the President’s, and that we associate ourselves with it in its entirety. “2. There are two or three points which I desire specially to emphasise. First, “that we do not consider we have retained in the Moscow discussions the spirit of Yalta, nor indeed, at points, the letter. . . . We certainly thought that a Polish Government, ‘new’ and ‘reorganised,’ would by now have been in existence, recognised by all the United Nations. This would have afforded a proof to the world of our capacity and resolve to work together for its future. It is still not too late to achieve this.

“3. However, even before forming such a new and reorganised Polish Government it was agreed by the Commission that representative Poles -should be summoned from inside Poland and from Poles abroad, not necessarily to take part in the Government, but merely for free and frank consultation.

Veto on Consultation “Even this preliminary step cannot be taken because of the claim put forward to veto any invitation, of which the Soviet or the Lublin Government do not approve. We can never agree to such a veto by any one of us three-

“This veto reaches its supreme example in the case of M. Mikolajczyk, who is regarded throughout the British and American world as the outstanding Polish figure outside Poland. “4. We also have learned with surprise and regret that M. Molotov’s spontaneous offer to allow observers x>r missions to enter Poland has now been withdrawn. We are therefore deprived of all means of checking for ourselves the information, often of a most painful character, which is sent us almost daily by the Polish Government in London. “We do not understand why a veil of secrecy should thus be drawn over the Polish scene. We offer the fullest facilities to the Soviet Government to send missions or individuals to visit any of the territories in our military occupation. In several cases this offer has been accepted by the Soviets and visits have taken place to mutual satisfaction. ."We ask that the principle of reciprocity shall be observed in these matters, which would help to make so good a foundation for our enduring partnership. “5. The President has also shown me the messages which have passed between him and you about M. Molotov’s inability to be present at the conference at San Francisco. We had hoped the presence there of the three Foreign Ministers might have led to a clearance of many of the difficulties which have descended upon us in a storm since our happy and hopeful union at Yalta. “We do not, however, question in any way the weight of the public reasons which make it necessary for him to remain in Russia. ...”

A week later Stalin replied to ua both. Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister. 7 Apr. ’45 “In connexion with your message ©f April 1 I think it necessary to make the following observations on the question of Poland. ‘The Polish affair has in fact got into a blind alley. What is the reason** “The reason is that the Ambassadors of the U.S.A, and Great Britain in Moscow, who are members of the Moscow Commission, have departed from the presentation of the case by the Crimea Conference, and have introduced into the matter new elements which were not foreseen at the Crimea Conference. These are: “I. At the Crimea Conference we all three regarded the Provisional Polish Government as the Government at present functioning in Poland which, after undergoing reconstruction, should serve as the nucleus of the new -Government of National Unity. “Now the Ambassadors of the U.S.A. and Great Britain in Moscow abandon this presentation of the case, ignore the existence of the Provisional Polish Government, take no account of it, or Cat best equate single individuals from Poland and from London with the Provisional Government of Poland. "Moreover, they consider that the reconstruction of the Provisional Government must be understood as its liquidation and the establishment of a completely new Government. . . “2. At the Crimea Conference we all three took as our starting-point that some five persons should be summoned for consultation from Poland and some three from London but no more. “Now the Ambassadors of the U.S.A. and Great Britain in Moscow abandon this decision and demand that every member of the Moscow Commission should have the right to invite an unlimited number of persons from Poland and from London.

Rossini Conditions Defined “Naturally the Soviet Government could not agree to this since the summoning of persons should, in accordance with decisions of the Crimea Conference, be a matter not for individual members of the Commission, but for the Commission as a whole, as a Commission. And the demand that an unlimited number of persons should be summoned for consultation goes against what was intended at the Crimea Conference. “3. The Soviet Government takes as its starting-point that, in accordance with the sense of the decisions of the Crimea Conference, such Polish personalities should be invited for consultation as, in the first place, accept the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decisions of the Curzon Line, and in the second place genuinely aim at the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. . . “The Ambassadors of the U.S.A. and Great Britain in Moscow take no account of this fact, and aim at inviting Polish personalities for consultation ‘ without regard to their attitude towards the decisions of the Crimea Conference and towards the Soviet Union. . . “I think that if the above observations are taken into account an agreed decision on the Polish question could be arrived at in a short time.” Objection to Mikolajczyk Stalin also sens me a personal message. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister. 7 Apr. ’45. “The British and American /kmbassadors, who are members of the Moscow Commission, are unwilling to take account of the Provisional Polish Government, and insist on inviting Polish personalities for consultation without regard to their attitude to the decisions of the Crimea Conference bn Poland and to the Soviet Union. “They absolutely insist on summoning to Moscow for consultation for instance, Mikolajczyk, and this they do in the form of an ultimatum. In this they take no account of the fact that Mikolajczyk has come out openly against the decision of the Crimea j Conference on Poland. I “However, if you think it necessary, I should be ready to use my influence with the Provisional Polish Government to make them withdraw their objections to inviting Mikolajczyk, if f the latter would make a public statement accepting the decision of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question and declaring that he stands for the establishment of friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. “2. You wonder why the Polish theatre of military operations must be wrapped in mystery. In fact, there is no mystery here. “You ignore the fact that if British observers or other foreign observers were sent into Poland the Poles would regard this as an insult to their J national dignity, bearing in mind the fact, moreover, that the present attitude of the British Government to the Provisional Government is regarded as unfriendly by the latter. “So far as the Soviet Government is concerned, it cannot but take account of the negative attitude of the Provisional Government to the question of sending foreign observers into Poland. „ x xv “Further, you are aware that the Provisional Polish Government puts no obstacles in the way of entrance into Poland by representatives of other States which take up a different attitude towards it, and does not in any way obstruct them. This is the case, for instance, in regard to the representatives of the CzechoslovaK Government, the Yugoslav Government and others. . .” These carefully considered documents at least offered some hope ox progress. I began at once my painiui discussions with Mikolajczyk and other Polish representatives with the object of obtaining their unreserved affirmation of agreement with tne Yalta decisions. (To be continued) (Copyright, 1953, in U.S.A, by New York Times Company and Tune Inc. (publishers of Time and Lue), in the British Empire by the Dafly Telegraph, Ltd.; elsewhere by international Co-operation Press Service Inc. World right reserved. duction in whole, or in part, in any language strictly prohibited.)