FRANCE, REBORN, SIGNS PACT WITH RUSSIA

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27192, 9 November 1953, Page 8

FRANCE, REBORN, SIGNS PACT WITH RUSSIA

“TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY”

[By the Rt. Hon. Sir WINSTON CHURCHILL] XIV

As our armies moved eastwards and southwards it became increasingly urgent to set up a unified and broadly representative Administration .in France. We were anxious not to impose a ready-made committee from abroad, and we tried first to gaugfe the feelings of the people themselves as the liberation progressed. We watched the rallying of the Maquis and of public opinion to General de Gaulle’s National Committee. Hitherto, by force of cpcumstances. it could not be' a body representative of France as a whole, but by the end of September [1944] progress had been made. The welcome which the Maquis gave to the committee seemed to me to be a decisive 'point in favour of its more formal recognition. I therefore telegraphed to the President. The President replied: President Roosevelt to Prime Minister. 20 Oct. ’44. “I think until the French Set up a real zone of interior that we should make no moye towards recognising them as a Provisional Government. The enlargement of the Consultative Assembly, which has already been extended and made more representative, is almost as important, and I should be inclined to hang recognition on the effective completion of both these acts. “I would not be satisfied with de Gaulle merely saying that he was going to do it.” French Government Recognised

Our discussions proceeded on these lines. The French Assembly was strengthened and enlarged by members of the Resistance organisations and thg old Parliamentary group. On October 20 it was announced that, with the agreement of the Allied High Command, an interior zone comprising the larger part of France, including Paris, had been set up. The Committee of National Liberation was thus finally transformed into a Provisional Government of France. I was prepared to recommend, in concert with our Allies, the official acceptance of this body as the Government of Liberated France. After last-minute 'hesitations by the State Department, the public announcement was made during my visit to Moscow, where I ’ discussed the final stages of formal recognition with the Russians. It was thought fitting that my first visit to Paris should be on Armistice Day, and this was publicly announced There were many reports that collaborators would make attempts on my life and extreme precautions were taken. On the afternoon of November 10 I landed at Orly • airfield, where de Gaulle received hie with a guard of honour, and we drove together through the outskirts of Paris and. into th* city itself until We reached the Quai d’Orsay, where my wife and. Mary and I were entertained £n state.

Enthusiasm in Paris The building : t had long beeji occupied- by the Germans, and I was assured 1, should sleep in the same bed and use the safne bathroom as had Goering. Everything was mounted and serviced magnificently, and inside the palace it was difficult to believe that my last meeting there, described in a previous volume, with Reynaud’s Government and General G&melin in May, 1940, was anything blit a bad dream. At eleven o’clock on the morning of November 11 de Gaulle conducted me in an open car across the Seine and through the Place de la Concorde, with a splendid escort of Gardes Republicans in full uniform with all their breastplates. They were several hundred strong, and provided a brilliant spectacle, on Which the sun shone brightly.

The whole of the famous avenue of the Champs-Elysees was crowded with Parisians and lined' with troops. Every, window was filled with spectators and decorated with flags. We proceeded through wildly cheering multitudes to the Arc de Triomphe, where we both laid wreaths upon the tomb of the Unknown Warrior. After this ceremony was over the General and I walked together, followed by a concourse of the leading figures of French public life, for hali a mile down the highway I knew so well. We then took our places on a dais, and there was a splendid march past of French and British troops. Our Guards detachment was magnificent. When this was-over I laid* a wreath beneath the statue of Clemenceau, who was much in my thoughts on this moving occasion. De Gaulle entertained me at a large luncheon at the Ministry of War, and made a most flattering speech about my war services. But many problems had still to be settled. France’s Part in War

Four days later I sent the President la lengthy telegram. A copy was also I passed to Stalin. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. J. 5 N0v.,,’44.

“ ... I sympathise with French wish to take over more of the line, to have the best share they can in the'fighting or what is left of it —and there may be plenty—and not to have to go into Germany as a so-called conqueror who has not fought.

“I-‘ remarked that this was a sentimental point which ought nevertheless to receive consideration. The important thing for France was. to have an Army prepared for the task which it would actually have to discharge, namely, their obligation first to maintain a peaceful and orderly country behind the front of our armies and second to assist in the holding down of parts of Germany later on. “On this second point the French pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany, not merely as sub-participation under British or American command, but .as a French command. "I expressed my sympathy with this, knowing well that there will be a time not many years distant when the Americafi armies will go home and when the British will have great difficulty in maintaining large forces overseas, so contrary to our mode of

life and disproportionate to o® sources. ...” On TJovember 20 Stalin sent friendly reply to my telegram J November 15.

Marshal Stalin to Prime Minton 20 Nov ‘u “Thank you for your informatioi about your conversatioas with d* Gaulle. I have acquainted your communication with interest ** “General de Gaulle expressed rL‘ cently his wish to come to Moscow establish contact with the leaders 2 the Soviet Government. We reoliM agreeing to this. The French are » pected* to arrive in Moscow towa-£ thfe end of this month. ...” ** The New Strategy in Europe This raised the whole issue of future organisation of Europe. There had been ffiany rumours in the press and elsewhere about forming a Western bloc When the war was over. On. Nov ember 25 I minuted, to Mr Eden* “Until a really strong French Arm? is again in being, which may well hi more than five years away, or even 10, there is nothing in these countrS but hopeless weakness. The BelgiaS are extremely weak. The Dutch fougS only* for a few days. Denmark is helm less and defenceless, and Norway practically so. a ** “That England should ’undertake tn defend these countries, together with any help they may afford, before th* French have the second army in Europe seems to me contrary to aS wisdom, and even common prudence "It may well be that the Continent will be ablp, to fire at us and we '2 the Continent, and that our island position is damaged to that extent But with a strong Air Force and ads quate naval power the Channel is * tremendous obstacle to invasion by armies and tanks. . . .

“The situation would,change if tl French became notably friendly to i and prepared to act as a barri against the only other Power whit after the Extirpation of Gernu military strength can threaten Wesfei Europe, namely, Russia, and if at tl same time they built up an army cor parable to that of 1914. But a secor condition would also be necessary,; the French quite possibly may deci< td work with Russia. This condition the building up of the World Organic tion. I have accepted your expressk ‘mainstay’ only for the moment, as consider it must be an overall shie and qgnopy. ” De Gaulle Goes to Moscow General de Gaulle had meanwhi arrived in Moscow and conversatioi with the Russians had begun. Stal lost no time in informing me of tl general points. t Marshal Stalin to Prime Ministi 3 Dec. , "The meeting with General de Gaul has provided an opportunity for friendly exchange of views on que tions of Franco-Soviet relations. “During the conversations Gener de Gaulle persisted, as I had expecte with two main questions: the fronti of France on the Rhine and the coi elusion of a Franco-Soviet Pact Mutual Assistance of the type of tl Anglo-Soviet Treaty. ... x "In sending you this* information shall be grateful for a reply from y< and for your comments on these que tions "I have conveyed the same messai to the .President. "I send you my best wishes.” ■ Prime Minister to Marshy Stall V 5 Dec. I "Your telegram about de Gaulh visit and the two questions he w raise. ( “We have no objection whatever a Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual A sistance similar to the Anglo-Sovi Pact. On the contrary, His Majest] Government consider it desirable a an additional Uink between us all. I deed, it also occurs to us that it mig be best of all if we were to conclui a tripartite treaty between the thr of us which would embody our exis ing Anglo-Soviet Treaty, with any ii provements. "In this way the obligations of ea one of us would be identical ai linked together. Please let me 1 km if this idea appeals to you, as I hoj it may. We should both of course the United States. “2. The question of changing fl eastern frontier of France to the le bank of the Rhine, or alternatively forming a. Rhenish-Westphalian pr vince under international contn together with other alternatives, oug to await settlement at the peace tabl "There is. however, no reason Hi when three heads ®f Governments me we should not come much closer conclusions about all this than 1 have done so far. ...” U.S. Doubts of Tripartite Pad Mr Roosevelt also kept in eta touch with me. President Roosevelt to Prta Minister. 6 Dec. "... I fully appreciate the advantajj which you see in a possible triparti Anglo-Franco-Soviet Pact. I am son What dubious; however, as to the effe of such an arrangement on the que tion of an international Security 0 ganisation, to which, as you know, attach the very highest importance “I fear that a tripartite pact siig be interpreted by public opinion he as a competitor to . a fqture Wot Organisation, whereas a bilater arrangement between FranCfe and fl Soviet Union similar to the Sovh British Pact would be more unde standable. I realise however that tl is a subject which is of primary co cem to the three countries involvec The French were determined I domestic reasons to come away fro Moscow with a strictly Franco-Sovi pact. This was signed on December J (to be continued) (Copyright 1953 in U.S;A. by fl New York Times Company and Tit Inc. (publishers of Time and Lu« in the British Empire by the Dal Telegraph, Ltd.; elsewhere by mu national Co-operation Press Servi Inc. World right reserved. Repr duction in whole, or in part, in 81 language strictly prohibited.) «