The Press TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1953. An Interesting Week At Panmunjon

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27037, 12 May 1953, Page 8

The Press TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1953. An Interesting Week At Panmunjon

Interesting and important moves in the Panmunjon truce talks were reported last week. At the beginning of the week the United Nations Command nominated Pakistan as neutral custodian for prisoners of war refusing repatriation under a Korean armistice. This corrected the inference, wrongly drawn from earlier remarks by the chief United Nations negotiator (LieutenantGeneral Harrison), that the United Nations ruled out Asian countries as “acceptable” neutral States. Pakistan was the third State nominated by the United Nations Command; the others were Switzerland and Sweden. The Communists had said earlier that they considered India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia to be suitable Asian neutrals, but had refused to make a nomination. The Communists neither rejected nor agreed to the nomination of Pakistan, but repeated their argument that the negotiators must first agree that prisoners not wanting repatriation should be sent to a neutral nation before it was decided which neutral nation should be chosen. The chief development at Tuesday’s meeting was General Harrison’s announcement that the United Nations would not agree to the transport of unrepatriated prisoners to a neutral country; and at both Tuesday’s and Wednesday’s meetings the Communists stood firm on the demand that prisoners refusing repatriation should be sent to a neutral State. On Thursday, however, they relented, one clause in an “eight-point plan” providing that an armistice commission (of five nations the Communists nominated) should take custody “at the “original place of detention” of prisoners unwilling to return home. But this major concession was hedged with provisos, some of which could nullify it. For instance, Point 6 of the Communists’ eightpoint plan could mean a threat of virtually unlimited detention for prisoners not agreeing to return home after they had been addressed over a period of four months by emissaries who would “ see the “ prisoners, eliminate apprehensions, “ and inform them on ■ matters “relating to their return to their “ homelands ”. After receiving the Communists’ plan, General Harrison very correctly said it was so important that any major decision “ must be made by the governments “ themselves ”. Presumably after receiving instructions, on Saturday General Harrison asked the Communists for much more detailed information about their proposals. A review of General Harrison’s queries shows them, for two chief reasons, to be pertinent and necessary. First, for even a single neutral nation to take control of the large number of prisoners would be a difficult operation technically, requiring elaborate civilian and military administration. Since the Communists propose a five-nation commission ("with the “ member nations each providing an “ equal number of armed troops to “ take custody ”) the difficulties would be much greater. The language difficulty, for one, would be multiplied; and questions of command would be most complicated. Second, the United Nations must be certain that the Communists’ proposals do not include devices to defeat the principle of no forcible repatriation, upon the integrity of which the United Nations has stood firmly at great cost in lives and

material. The Communists’ answers to General Harrison’s exploratory queries may make it clearer whether the United Nations can agree to the major Communist proposals, including the proposed membership of the armistice commission, and the eventual disposal by a “ political “conference” of prisoners who do not want to return home after they have spent a period in detention under an armistice commission. Because of the apparent concession by the Communists on a vital point, the week’s proceedings encourage hope. At least it is clear that the Communists want to keep alive the new series of talks, which they sought. The week’s proceedings strengthen the impression that the Communists entered the new series of talks with few clear ideas about details and with the intention of improvising as they went aldhg, trusting to find

grounds for agreement about an arnfastice (which they now seem to want) while saving as much “ face ” as possible in the process.