POOR PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 26987, 12 March 1953, Page 8

POOR PROSPECTS FOR CHINESE NATIONALISTS

INVASION FROM FORMOSA

tB V

HOMER BIGART

in the "New York Herald TrlbuM-J

(Reprinted by Arrangement.)

TAIPEH, Formosa, February 25. Attempting a reconquest ot China from Formosa is a project as impertinent as trying to overrun the whole United States from Staten Island. Barring upheavals inside that Com-munist-held sub-continent, Chiang Kai-shek’s 400,000 Nationalist troops would not stand much chance against Mao Tse-tung’s 3,000,000 regulars, of whom only 750,000 are engaged in In any event the Nationalists are in no position to invade the mainland this year. Chiang Kai-shek’s troops .are still under-equipped—some divisions even lack standardisation m small arms, being supplied partly with old Japanese and Czech rifles or 30-calibre rifles made in Formosa arsen--3 All 21 regular divisions now have some artillery, but are so badly off for vehicles that heavy mortars are hauled about in man-drawn rubbertired carts. A few tanks are coming in. But the army has immediate needs for 10,000 pack animals. Except for a few hundred old nags, 12 or 13 years old, belonging to the horse cavalry, there is not another horse or mule on Formosa. Pack animals would be far more important than vehicles or armour if the Nationalists were to attempt an invasion of Fukien Province, which lies directly opposite Formosa and is the most likely site for an amphibious dS One t ' of the most inaccessible of China’s coastal provinces, mountainous Fukien has few roads and railroads and is exceedingly difficult to Penetrate. A 6000-foot mountain wall along the western frontier would make any break-out into the rich populous hinterland exceedingly difficult . Thus Fukien has slight strategic importance, for the main routes of north-south communication bypass the province. Fukien s liberation, however, might have great repercussions elsewhere in China and touch off popular uprisings. No Easy Invasion Route

Fukien offers no easy invasion route to inner China. But the mountains might give the Nationalists an initial advantage by making the province difficult for the Communists to reinforce. The nationalists could stage an invasion from a chain of small islands two to 30 miles off the Fukien coast There are few beaches. Very shallow waters cover the continental shelf, making the approaches hazardous except for the smallest craft. The-Formosa strait is nasty water at any season. Typhoons can strike from late July to mid-November. Then strong prevailing north-east winds lash the strait until April, often blowing at 45 knots for Jays on end. Thus the “invasion season” runs from April to July, when the channel is comparatively quiet. . But the invasion remains a distant dream. Americans, exasperated by the long stalemate in Korea, should develop no illusions over the Nationalist capabilities. Under the most advantageous conditions it would take at least a year of intense preparation before this force can mount a major operation. The Nationalist Navy is too week to convoy assault troops. The air force has little more than 100 obsolete fighters. Naval and air support would have to be supplied by the United States. On paper the Nationalist Air Force la one of the largest in the world, with 80,000 men, 6f whom more than 1600 are trained pilots. But the fighter planes are obsolescent wartime F-47s and F-51s. There are about 48 aging medium bombers and 64 light No jets have arrived, although three fields are now serviceable for jets, and 35 officers are receiving jet instruction in the United States. Even-

tually the plan is to train jet pilots here.

The Navy is in an even sorrier state The 43,000-man Navy, including Marirte:, sails one destroyer, six destroyer escorts, 12 L.S.T.’s, 16 minesweepers, eight L.S.M.’s, six LCL’s and one gunboat. That explains why pinprick assaults on the mainland are about all the Na tionalists can manage in the foreseeable future. Even when the Annv w adequately equipped, there will Have to be built up immense reserves for the invasion forces as well as great stockpiles of food, clothing and medicine for the liberated populations When Formosa begins to look'for. midable. the danger of Red air attacks will increase. So far not only Formosa but even the Nationalist-held archigelago just off the mainland coast have een spared bombings. Currently the Reds’ four airfields in Fukien serviceable for jets are empty. There has been no enemy air build-up opposite Formosa. While strengthened in recent months Formosa’s air-raid defences are sUH far from adequate. Old Japanese radar is still in use, although the Nationalists have just bought some United States equipment. Most ack-ack guns are ancient German, Italian. Russian and Japanese pieces. Despite all these weaknesses, the Nationalists look to their goal with stubborn single-mindedness. Th G y seem convinced the United States is now committed to their restoration on the continent. They will not send troops to Korea unless assured the United States will underwrite their liberation of China. When asked to explain how Red China can be defeated without first smashing the enormous Communist armies in titanic battles, the Nationalists say it can be done by promoting internal revolts. “As soon as we get to the mainland and give the Commies a good beating the people will flock to us.” predicted Army Commander General Sun Li-jen “After all. the Reds started with a handful of men and snowballed into a huge army. Defectives from the Red forces will pour in if we again initial success.” Guerrillas in China

General Cheng Kai-min, chief of mainland operations, asserts there are 650,000 guerrillas operating on the mainland against the Reds, but he admits scant contact with most of the bands. He also says there are 800,000 farmers ready to take up arms. Of course there is no way of evaluating these figures.

General Cheng says there are four categories of guerrillas: First, 100,000 guerrillas operating on the near mainland or from Nationalist-held islands. Second. 240,000 guerrillas operating from permanent interior bases.

These are in Inner Mongolia (the Tachin Mountain area). Tsinghai Province. Szechwan Province, Kwangsi Province and Yunan Province, where General Mi Li has 10.000 regulars, remnants of the Bth and 26th Annies, which fled into Burma when China fell.

General Li Mi. whose presence has been protested by Burma, still holds the title of Governor of Yunan. He has an airfield and has been getting clandestine support. Fighting with him. according to General Cheng, are 20,000 guerrillas and 5000 Yi aborigines. General Cheng’s third category consists. he said, of 90,000 underground operatives living in cities. Finally, there are small mobile guerrilla bands totalling 200,000 operating south of the Yellow river.

He said no big towns are held by the guerrillas, and added that they are constantly harassed. Last year sharp casualties cut the guerrilla forces by more than 200.000, but there were very few defections, he said. At present there is no new recruiting. Qualified observers call these figures | “generous,” but emphasise that the | guerrilla activity is really considerable and that- the total force could exceed 1500,000.