TO-MORROW’S N.A.T.O. MEETING PLACE OF GERMANY IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Press, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 26659, 19 February 1952, Page 6

TO-MORROW’S N.A.T.O. MEETING PLACE OF GERMANY IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

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"SCRUTATOR”

in the "Sunday Times") ... \

(Reprinted by Arrangement.)

Franco-German difference# have . ® long history: and perhaps we iihouid not be unduly surprised if, the Sort# to transcend them made in the Schuman Plan and the Pj®n tor J European army, they nevertiieless keep coming to the. surface. Yet the present is a peculiarly inopportune moment. On February 20, the Council of N.A.T.O, is to meet at Lisbon, ana it will be preceded by conversations between. Mr Eden, Mr Acheson and Mr Schuman with, it is much to be hoped, Dr. Adenauer making a fourth. On the outcome of the, Councils meeting and the conversations preceding it must depend very largely the safety of Western Europe through this dangerous year. Our defences still exist only on paper, and we have but a few months in which to make them actual. Two Points of Contention The bones of immediate contention between France and Germany are two —the question of the Saar and the question whether Germany should be admitted a full member of NA.T.O. The first will always create friction so long as a doubt remains about the ultimate destiny of the territory. Germany would be on weak ground if she contested the economic side of the present arrangement. By bringing the Saar inside France’s economic frontier and earmarking the Saar coal for French industry, the balance between the heavy industries of the two countries is made appreciably less unequal. That result is in itself a good thing; though the method, one would have thought, might eventually dome to be superseded by the working of the Scnuman Plan. But the difficulty is on the political side. The Saar at present is "autonomous”—.neither under Paris nor under Bonn.. But it is inside the French economic system, and everybody knows how often in the past an economic unity has grown into a Solitical unity. The French hope and le Germans fear that that may happen; and as long as those hopes and fears are in conflict, the two nations cannot move really in harmony. More; it is obvious that even if the French hope were realised and a free Saar voted itself voluntarily into political as well as economic union with France, Germany would never reconcile herself to such an- outcome. This, though the area and population involved are comparatively small. The Saar Germany’s Saar sensitivities were sharply wounded the other/day by the French Government’s giving “Ambassadorial rank” to its chief representative to the Saar—a course which seemed to imply that the Saar’s severance from Germany was permanent. Paris had a formally valid answer to the German outcry: a representative with Ambassadorial rank is not the same thing as an Ambassador; the step had been promised in a treaty made public two years ago; it had not been

carried out till now only because it involved a vote of money by th# French Parliament, for whfrh weak French Governments had feared to ask. Accepting all that, the serious stricture will remain, that to take such an irritant step just now, when Franco? German co-operation is needed for the most far-reaching ends, was a piece of thoroughly bad timing. The question of admitting Germany to full membership of N.A.T.O. is k more complicated one. Here again France is Germany's foremost op. ponent, but she can expect a more spontaneous #upport from the other Western Powers than is forthcoming. Probably, in the dispute over the Saar 'or all three Powers recognise the danger of restoring Germany as yet to the full position of a Great Power wielding a formidable army; and feat is where her admission to N.A.TO might seem to lead. On the other hand it is hard to gainsay the force of fee German argument, that, if the Federal Republic supplies 400,000 or 500,000 soldiers to Western defence, it must have representation on the body which determines whether and when and how they are to be used. A “Community” Solation? The plan for a “European army” j n . volves the creation of a “European Defence Community” corresponding to it, which would be composed of the six nations (France, Italy, Western Germany and Benelux) /contributing forces to the army. Within the “Community” there must be equal status’ but how can there be, if five of iu members are members of N.A.T.O. and the sixth is barred from membership’ The suggestion has been made that none of them should be represented at N.A.T.O. but instead' the European Defence Community as a whole should be represented there. There are obvious obstacles to this—notably that it would seem to give France a lower N.A.T.O. status than the United States and Great Britain. Nevertheless it would be premature to exclude a “community” solution : either for the N.A.T.O. problem or for' the Saar. None of us can like rearming Germany. The process is so much easier to start than stop. Democratic leaders in Germany, both Christian Democrats' and Socialists, recognise that But what is now the alternative? Had France adapted a two-years’ service! / when we did, she would to-day have had, despite Indo-Chlna, a powerful - army. The weakness of her successive Governments has left her without one. The United States in Korea and Great' Britain in Malaya and Egypt have each to divert large forces. Thus German participation in Germany’s defence' has become indispensable, and the urgency extreme. Can we at this late hour afford to boggle over N.AT.O. membership? Can we now hope to gain anything by delaying s concession which must eventually have to be made?