SITUATION IN SUEZ DANGER EXISTS IN A DRIFTING SITUATION

Press, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 26628, 14 January 1952, Page 6

SITUATION IN SUEZ DANGER EXISTS IN A DRIFTING SITUATION

[By a /Special Correspondent in tHe “Sydney Morning Herald"] (ttiprinied by Arrangement)

The “dfifting situation” in the Suez Canal Zotib, as thri British cbmrtihftder, Lieutenaht-General Sir George Erskine, terms it, must soon force Britain to take more drastic security measures, unless there is a radical change in Egyptian Government policy. , , Terrorist attacks' are increasing in number and violence; the Government has promised to arm the irregular “liberatidtt battalions”; and, mbst serious Of alii tbe Egyptian police in the zone, at first reasonably to-bper.ative with the British authorities, Srri now actively aiding and abetting the Orders from London to the British garrison at jjresfent, restrict it to a policy of “self-containment, which amounts tq .limitma the use o£ force to self-protection when attacked. To many British officers these enforced half-measures are beginning to seem disagreeably renuniscent of tne situation in Palestine just before the British withdrew. Pressure of events may well compel the British Government to sanction a Wider and more determined tiie oi military power to stamp out terrorism, dnd preserve security m the zone. Th t I. dll but “essential travellers is a Sign ° f Thbrfe r< is "now P a°hiple fof-eri available to General Erskine to expel the Egyptian polite arid impbse martial law throughout the canal area. That would be the most direct arid effective way of checking a guerrilla warfare that, if allowed to develop, could cost many British lives, (fed, perhaps, fatally prejudice any chance of an ultimate settlement with Egypt. „ t. , . But such a cbtirSe has Its disadvantages, Apart from ..tying dodmi an even larger proportton of the garrison than at present would make the British Command responsible fot the administration (Which Port Said, and the Canal Zone. There is another card in General Erskinfe’s hand should NahMs Pasha oblige Britain to “play rough. Egypt’s oil suppnes must pass Sh the area controlled by the . And oil is life to Egypt. Egypt has no coal, and fab wood. Her economy runs on oil. Industry is dependent on it; so are the is essential for cobking, heating, lightbll comes frbtn wells airing .the Gulf of Suez, and has to be refined in SU Fram Suez a piPriDhfa carrfes petrol paraffin, rind kerbsenfe ip Cairo. Friel either tb reduce this flow, or io ciit It off altogether. Co-bperation WiWted That would be disastrous tb Egypt. It mightT even be sufficient id bring he ßii° H wmdTcertalnly not enlist het willing co-operation, and Britain hris by rio ifaeanS abandoned hope that Egypt, in the long run, will come to see the advantages of the partnership offered lifer iti me Middle East CommFor’ the West needs Egyptian cooperation. •The maintenance bf a base in the Canal Zone is regarded as esBritish and American experts are agreed that there is ho Satisfactory alternative. . . . . One big reasqfa is that, thri Canal Zone can be Sfapplied arid reinforced by the two sea approaches. If the Mediterranean litfe. were cut. the southern routfe by the Cape and the Red Sea would still be open—as it was in the last war. It is necessary to realise, also, that the strategic purpose of the Canal base is not simply tb protect an important comrrtlinicatfoft link. It is designed as a gre£t fortress area, from .Which military powrir crin bri brought to bear dn all parts df thri Eastern Mediterranean or Asia Minor —again, just as it was in the last war. It is, in fact, an “offensive-defensive” base.

But it cannot fulfil this function properly as a semi-besieged garrison in a hostile country. British troops COUM mairitoin th&thselves there indefinitely, whatever the attitude of the Egyptians, t But provision of the labout- forefe arid toe various services necessary to the running of a great base is andthet- matter.

Use of Lotal ReSoUrces, In the conception arid dfavriloptodftt of the Suez base, great reliance was placed on local resources—Of labour, food, and communications. The Egyptian Government Struck a damaging blow when it ordered the withdrawal of all labour and services from the British troops, arid cut off the supply of fresh food from the Delta.

A labour force of about 70,000 has melted away, some of them by choice, but mostly under the difect intimidation of the Egyptian police and the “liberation thugs.

Resolute action by Grineral Ewki„. has cuSftipned the effect of the for the tiine bfeing. .Eighierin pioneer companies f rom Mauritius and the SeychfeUes haw been takeri off guard duties arid ttibuteU as military labour, a lir.' Cypribt labour contingent has brought in. I * en Labour battalions ate being friiteH in tfae African colonies, Which whSZ they arrive Will relieve the very substantially. General Ersk'me believe?, ihdried, that with their a S sU‘ ghee Egyptian labour can be dispensed with almost ehtirfely. p ssd Even should this be so. hoWfever ih. strain of operating for it longed period On an emergency bliii would be Vfery considerable * Meanwhile, the shortage of has already made Itself felt in hJn directions. “ First, maintenance and upkeen important military installations h». suffered, and the huge quantity* S military strifes in the base depots are not receiving thri attention theV ~ quire. J ** Second, welfare and recreating.! facilities have had to be severely?? stricted tot- British soldiers, and armv rations can nb longer be supplement by fresh food, This imposes a stram bn morale, uhdrir Which thri National Servicemen are certahSv standing up very well, but which nt have Utihapfay rrisdlts later v In the broader view, also, Egyptian co-operation in the Middle East’ Com mand is obviously highly desirable. Egypt can make a useful contribiitiS in right, and her example would be readily followed by the othS Arab governments. v Moderating Influences Although recent events do km suggest any weakening in the official Cairo attitude, there are three tn flberices working In favout- of fa Afaglb-Egy Dtian reconciliation th. Kiflg of Egypt, the Egyptian Army and leaders of certain other Afiih States. 0 > King Farouk is far from being the fool he is usually paintfad. He is a shrewd and hardheaded politicHh who hris been playing the Egyptian political game since he was a boy It is knbwn that he is fully ailve aggf-eSston, and the danger that the pobtoar feeling Invoked against the British will bppmerafag pn the Governmeht ahd the Monarchy. In his owh ihterests and the interests of Egypt hri is anxipug to repair the British contiexien. and, to bring Egypt irito the Middle East Comtnafta. Hri is an Inveterate enemy of Nahas Pasha, and would be pleased for many reasons to see him out of bower It was, irideed, to forestall a Palate manoeuvre against the Government (invOlvihg an unsavoury land scandal) that Nahas.Pasha moved., iri Parliament to brfeak thri . had the effort he obviouifr griped it .would of diverting puHHc attehtibh from Government Corruption , Popular, sentiment Was so oHfwheiirtiingiy in, favour of denouncing the treaty that the King waa forced Unwillingly to acquiesce. .. WaHHhg to Mafias But the appointment to the Royal connexion was a pretty plain warning td Nahas that the King Was preparing to intervene attain. King FaroUk has to weigh two rtsks. The one is that nationalist feeling has beeh whipped up to sUch a ppintthirt a reversal of the artti-Britlsh policy might mean revolution. The other is that, if this policy h allowed to run its course, it will mSW internal revolution and national disaster anyway. J® < If he does decide to inwmtt against Nahas. he can count oh the support of a seetidn of the Government and, more important. On Ine backing of the Ariny. Military leaders in all the Arab States are strongly in favour 0| association with the Middle East Command, which they realise will mean a substantial strengthening of theii military resources. In all the othfar Arab States, also there are influential sections of conservative pblitibat opinion which favour a firm Western alliarice. Th< Premier of Trftq. in particular, is be lieved to be Working to this ehd. , Against this musi be sei the rising tide of a nationalist and ISiafoic revival, which is bteing exploited with the utmost skill by Russia. Ih Nbrth Africa ahd Asia Minor extreme nationalists find Mosleir fanatics alike see their fitst task a! What toe Sririrritary-Gtenfetril of th< Ai-ab League termed “the struggli against Western imperialism" , . The general political atmosphen tht-oiighotit the Mosleih Worifl coulc hot be less propitious for the formation of a Middle East Command. But thri closing Of this yawning gas in the democratic defences has become an imperative necessity.