The Press FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1951. Climax in Persia

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26538, 28 September 1951, Page 6

The Press FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1951. Climax in Persia

Affairs in Persia are now rapidly moving to a climax. After months of unavailing efforts to bring under the control of reason a situation in which fantasy has elbowed out good sense, the British Government is faced with hard decisions. In the face of Dr. Mussadiq’s expulsion order the British Government must 'decide whether to withdraw the remaining British employees at Abadan, or provide force to protect them. The British Government must also decide whether the great British-owned refinery installations at Abadan are to be abandoned to the present Persian authorities or withheld from them by the use of force. The decisions to be taken are grave, and are the more serious because they cannot be isolated from strategic,, political and economic considerations of first-rank importance. These considerations have always been inhibiting factors in Britain’s handling of the oil dispute with the Persian Government and, conversely, have been encouraging to the intransigent attitude of Dr. Mussadiq and his backers and followers. Both sides have been fully aware that the economic loss to Britain of Persia’s oil is only one part of the conflict with British interests; other, and perhaps greater, parts exist in political and strategic changes that could follow social disintegration as a sequel to collapse of Persia’s economy. As a result, the British Government has gone far indeed to reason with the unreasonable and to appease the unappeasable. An unavoidable effect of this has been ter strengthen Dr. Mussadiq’s hand in Persian politics. Many among the Persian intelligentsia have interpreted the course of events to mean that Britain would not risk the consequences of pushing Dr. Mussadiq too hard. Earlier this month, however, it became evident that the British Government no longer hoped for any satisfactory agreement with Dr. Mussadiq. By withdrawing financial and other privileges enjoyed by Persia from Britain, the British Government clearly asserted an intention to resist the continued denial of British rights. As expected, there were protests in Persia against what was interpreted as foreign pressure, but there was noticeable almost at once a discernible hardening of opposition to Dr. Mussadiq in Persian politics. A hitherto thoroughly obedient Majlis several times denied him a quorum. A marked increase occurred in the number of voices criticising Dr. Mussadiq for his worst failing—a total lack of constructive domestic policy. In the Majlis, while emotional exhibitions showed deputies’ fears of the fanatical assassination groups that back—and perhaps intimidate—Dr. Mussadiq, influential deputies found courage to condemn publicly the condition to which Dr. Mussadiq bad led Persia. In brief, there can be little doubt that Dr. Mussadiq’s position has weakened. His threat to force out the remaining technicians from Abadan is probably rightly interpreted as a method by which Jie hopes to win a success that will restore his position. If a way out of the present impasse is to be found in Persian politics—and it has always appeared the only way out—nothing would block it more effectively at this juncture than to bend to Dr. Mussadiq’s threat. Mounting opposition in Teheran would at once lose the heart it has found. The risks are great and grave in any action the British Government chooses to take. The British Government will remain ready, at the slightest response from Persia’s rulers, to begin again the search for a solution which is fair to all lawful claims but, for several reasons—and the delicately balanced position in Persian politics is not the least of them—it is impossible, as “ The Times ” says, to see how the action threatened by Dr. Mussadiq can be met otherwise than by “ forcible resistance ”.