The Press TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1951. Japanese Peace Treaty

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26523, 11 September 1951, Page 6

The Press TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1951. Japanese Peace Treaty

[Like Clemenceau in Dyson’s famous cartoon, Mr Gromyko professes to hear the warning of another war as the ink dries on the Japanese Peace Treaty in San Francisco. Most people will believe that any danger of another war lies in the attitude of Russia and not in the clauses of this treaty, which the New Zealand delegate (Sir Carl Berendsen) aptly described as “a notable ex- “ periment in humanity ”, It restores Japanese sovereignty under conditions that are both generous and practicable, differing from the Treaty of Versailles in both respects. The world has learned since 1919 that the vanquished cannot be kept under perfnanent domination. Sooner or later, the victors must relax their grip, the only question being, when? Whatever their misgivings about the future direction of Japanese policy, the overwhelming majority of the countries that fought Japan have wisely agreed that they are more likely to influence Japan by the human justice and enlightenment of which General MacArthur has spoken than by restrictions that would become progressively more difficult to enforce. There need be little regret that Russia did not sign the treaty. After all, Russia was only a technical combatant in this war, and was richly rewarded, in the Kuriles and in Sakhalin, and by the looting of Manchuria, for less than a week’s fighting. It is to be regretted that China, India, and Burma did not sign. China is a special case, chiefly because massive Chinese intervention in Korea put even partial recognition of the Peking Government outside practical politics in the United States. As for India and China, the Pakistan delegate (Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan) has pointed out that India finds the treaty too restrictive and Burma finds it too liberal, which suggests that it may be somewhere near a happy mean. And no doubt India, because of the proximity of China, has special reasons for Caution. The absence of the great Asiatic Powers from the conference will, to some extent, prejudice the reception of the treaty by the common people of Asia* but other Asiatic nations (notably the Philippines and Indonesia) did sign; and in the choice between a treaty without India and China and no treaty the other signatories had to choose the treaty. • Whatever bilateral treaties are made later, they cannot undo what was done in San Francisco last week. A corollary to the treaty is the security pact between Japan and the United States. This is intended simply to protect the peace of the Pacific until the Japanese can defend themselves and are no longer easy prey for their enemies. The Russians have tried to represent this as an aggressive pact. They may have some success among those always ready to believe the Russians right and the Americans wrong. Anyone who remembers the history of the last six years will still be convinced that the security pact is a necessary part of the peace settlement, just as are the American guarantees to Australia and New Zealand. One of the best features of the settlement is that it has been reached by genuine negotiation without the time-consuming, irritating processes by which Russia has stultified so many poat-war meetings. The treaty is a genuine compromise, reached with good will, among most of the nations of the world. Their aim has been to make a peace that does not contain the seeds of its own destruction.