U.S. VIEW OF TREATY

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26451, 19 June 1951, Page 7

U.S. VIEW OF TREATY

Phase Of Power Struggle (Special Correspondent N.Z.P.A.) NEW YORK. June 17. Japan's role in a turbulent, tense world after the signing of the peace treatv has been the subject of much discussion and speculation in the United States in recent weeks. Agreement on the treaty is considered nearly attained among 11 of the 13 nations which fought Japan, and it is certain now ths.t they will go ahead without the other two—the Soviet Union ana China. The target date set by the United States for peace with Japan is the end of 1951. Now the completion of the tortuous tr'aty-mal-'inc is in sight—speeded up h” the Korean war neceijsitatjng a positive programme of action —many Americans are seeing the peace-making eg a phas- of the power 3tru i '“le between the United States and the Soviet Union. This view was expressed by Mr Charles Buss, who is Professor of History at Stanford University, California, and who hes served the United States Government in various capacities in China. Jaran. rn'd the Philippines. Mr Russ, writin” in the "Far Eastern Survey.” a periodical published by the American Institute of Pacific Halations. states: “Japan is an important defence anchor in the island rim of the Western Pacific and a bastion of democracy in Eastern Asia. It is only m’nutes away from bomber bases in Fiberia. The urgency for peace between Janan and the United States, with implied mutual understanding and fr'endshin, is primarily due to the necessity of keeping Japan out of the Russian orbit." There is little doubt that the United States realises the risks involved in certain parts of the peace-making programme with a country which was a ferocious enemy less than six yeara aco. It is a gamble fraught with danger, not only for the United States, but also for the United States' 10 peace-making partners. Pacific Fact Proposal The denunciations bv N°w Zealand and Australia of even limited rearmament have been softened by guarded United States assurances of a Pacific Pact, but others of Japan’s former enemies also have had to soften the conditions they wished to imnose. Rrj. tain, for example, has withdrawn her pnrpsition to -the freein” of the shlphuildin" and textile industries; the Philippines on reparations demands: India, Pakistan, and Indonesia have reduced, though not withdrawn, provisions aimed at preventing Japan again becoming Asia’s workshop: and Indonesia is sticking to her reparations conditionThe United States hope is that Japan, to pain ths Goodwill of the war-dam-aged • countries, might voluntarily offer some gesture toward paying at least token reparations. Indeed an analysis shows that the United States attitude includes many hopes. Among these are: (1) Jaoan has committed herself irrevocably on the free world's side. (2) She will conform to internationally accepted standards of commercial practice. (3) She will be satisfied to limit her sovereignty to the four home and minor adjacent islands. (4) She will be content always with self-defence arrangements. Lon’-term Prospect However, another American in the "Far East Survey," Mr Edwin Seidensticker, Questions whether the longranae orosnect is as happy as the immediate one. He defined these things as what the Japanese really want: (1) The restoration of national sovereignty. (2) Friendshio with countries on each side of the ideological fence. (3) The end of the occupation. (4) The return of Islands such as the Ryukyus, which, under the treaty, will be assigned elsewhere. . Mr Seidensticker concluded: “Clearly it would not be wis? to deny that there are causes for concern or to rely on the current lack of active antagonism toward the United States as a solution of every problem.”