SUCCESS OF LANDING

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26220, 18 September 1950, Page 7

SUCCESS OF LANDING

Many Problems For Navy

(Rec. 8 p.m.) TOKYO, Sept. 16. Ths amphibious landings on Wolmi island and Inchon were carefully planned for several weeks, and the naval ships involved actually started moving then for the target area, Rear-Admiral Arleigh Burke, Deputy-Chief of Staff and Commander of the United States Naval Forces in the Far East, said to-day.

He said that it must be considered the most difficult amphibious operation •mounted anywhere in the world so far, because of the extremely great natural hazards and the adverse geographical features of the area. The greatest difficulties came from the countless small islands blocking the access from the sea to the shallow waters washing the coast. In the Inchon sector approaching vessels had to navigate through channels and around mud flats, and most of the poor beaches prohibited landing except during the briefest period of exceptionally high tides. The ships had to come in, land their troops and get out during that brief period. That meant loss of one of the foremost assets usually associated with naval operations—mobility. Under those circumstances the operation required precise timing in all its elements—preparatory air attacks, bombardments ship movements and landings.

If any of those partial operations had been delayed or not fully successful they would have blocked the entire operation and “the whole thing would have folded,” he said.

The foremost necessity was to eliminate any possible Communist resistance in the immediate landing area which would have seriously endangered landing craft and other co-operat-ing naval units, because of their curtailed mobility. The whole area had to be “taken” before a landing could be undertaken. Perfect collaboration and timing between all the participating elements ensured success.

The losses sustained in the early stages were extremely light. Neither Communist aircraft nor submarines were encountered.

The date selected for landing was favourable, bringing exceptionally high tides. Similar conditions would not have returned until cround October 11, when, hefwever, the general climatic conditions would be much worse.

From now and through October storms in this area are bound to become frequent with low ceilings, frequent rains, and winds blowing up to gale force. All operational disadvantages encountered in any landing at Inchon were more than outweighed by the fact that it was strategically ideal for starting an offensive by ground lorces. It opens the way to Seoul, enables advancing ground units to cut off all traffic between the south and north passing through the Seoul area—and that is about 90 per cent, of all Korean traffic, Admiral Burke said.

He added that although the Communists could logically have anticiuated noth the time and the area of landing, the comparative weakness of the Communist defences seemed to indicate that it took them by surprise He said that a possible explanation might be that the Communists may have thought that geographical and other circumstantial difficulties would have constituted a sufficiently great hazard to deter the United Nations forces from undertaking the amphibious operation.

Another explanation might be that the Communists simply had no greater reserves to throw into the defence of Inchon.

There were sufficient indications that the North Koreans had “over-ex-tended themselves, and the best bet for them would be to surrender .now,” Admiral Burke said.