PEACE TREATY FOR JAPAN

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26122, 26 May 1950, Page 7

PEACE TREATY FOR JAPAN

ATTEMPT TO DEFINE U.S. ATTITUDE

REPORTED OBJECTIVE OF MISSION TO TOKYO (Rec. 9 p.m.) NEW YORK, May 24. “Conflicting reports of General MacArthur's views on the Japanese peace treaty are the main reason why the United States Secretary of Defence <Mr Louis Johnson) and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Omar Bradley) are going to Tokyo.' says the Washington correspondent of the “Christian Science Monitor.” “It seems incredible, but the fact is that two high officials who have visited General MacArthur to discuss the treaty with him have returned with diametrically conflicting reports of what he actually wants. Mr Tracy Voorhees, a former Under-Secretary cf the Army, returned saying that General MacArthur believed in continued occupation and no peace treaty. Mr R. Walton Butterworth, a former As-sistant-Secretary of State, came back reporting that General MacArthur thought it was high time to end the occupation, and give back sovereignty to the Japanese. “Both the State and Defence Departments want to make sure that Japan will remain aligned with the West in a conflict with Russia, but there are conflicting views how best this can be achieved. “The State Department considers that the time is fast approaching, if it is not already here, when a continuation of the occupation will begin to alienate the Japanese peoole and make them more susceptible to the blandishments of Moscow. The Defence Department is inclined to the view that the only sure way to keep Japan safely away from Russian influence is to retain American command in Japan. Bases in Japan “One thing is agreed upon: the United States will retain military bases in Japan, whatever happens. Just how to do it, if there is a peace treaty, is a bit difficult to figure out, but it could be done. “One solution under consideration would be to arrange a separate treaty with Japan, providing for American ‘protection’ after the peace. The bases to be retained would not he stipulated in the peace treaty itself, but in a separate instrument to after the peace treaty. “While the State Department believes that the United States should begin making friends and allies of the Japanese, instead of continuing the occupation. the Defence Department seems to think that if the United States just kept the power of command in Japan, it need not worry too much about the future or the inclinations of the Japanese people. “Everyone concerned agrees that, sooner or later, the Japanese will decide our position there on their own terms. If they want us out. they will be able to force us out, peace treaty or no peace treaty. “The immediate question at issue is really whether we should start to negotiate with the Japanese now, while they are relatively amenable, or risk by protracting the occupation the necessity of negotiating at a later time when we may not be able to get what we want. If General MacArthur would state his position clearly and put it in writing at least it would no longer be possible for two opposing schools of thought in Washington to quote him against each other.”