DEFENCE IS IMPORTANT REASON FOR OCCUPATION

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26121, 25 May 1950, Page 4

DEFENCE IS IMPORTANT REASON FOR OCCUPATION

GERMANY

(81/ 1

W. N. EWER]

London, May 21.—The declaration on Germany issued by Mr Acheson, Mr Bevin, and Mr Schuman at the end of their London meeting is a more important document than its carefully-guarded language at first suggests. That is no criticism of the drafting. Words have to be carefully chosen on such an occasion; and it is wiser to say too little than too | much. This is a statement of policy. The three Ministers declare their intentions. But they wisely do not bind themselves in any way. Policy may have to be changed or at least adapted since circumstances may change. And in this particular case there is the additional factor that the new policy can only be carried out with the cooperation of the German Government and the German people themselves, as the declaration itself is careful to But the intention is plain enough. It can unfortunately only be applied in practice to Western Germany, since in the words of the declaration the people of the Eastern zone are still forbidden by the Soviet Government to “rejoin their fellow-countrymen in a democratic and united Germany." But for West Germans the prospect is now opened by the “restoration of the sovereignty of their country.” The aim was laid down last year in the Washington Agreement, and repeated in the Petersberg Protocol. It is that Germany, provided that she remains democratic and peacefully minded, “re-enters progressively the community of free peoples of Europe.” Now there is an addition. “The Western Powers desire to see the pace of progress towards this end as rapid as possible.” Military Occupation The change is important. But more important still is the change which is suggested in the character of the Allied military occupation. “The ‘Occupation Regime’ is to continue. The intention is that the German people shall have sovereignty to the maximum extent compatible with the basis of the “Occupation Regime.” That regime they must continue to accept. Lut they are told the new reason lor its continuance. It is "imposed on Germans and the Allies by consequence of the division of Germany and of the international situation.’’ That is fundamental. The Western armies are no longer to be regarded as being in Germany to hold Germany in subjection, but because “the international situation’’ makes it essential that they shall be there. And that is an inescapable fact. West German rearmament is excluded at any rate fur the present; and in any case it would take some time. And meanwhile it is out of the question that Western Germany should be left defenceless; for the East German Communists hardly trouble to conceal the fact that they would, if opportunity served, try to conquer the West by force. Already they have in the Eereitschaftcn the nucleus of a military force, organised, trained and equipped by the Russians. A defenceless" Western Germany would be a temptation to the Soviet Government to an adventure which would almost certainly start a new war.

Therefore, for the sake of the general peace, the “occupation regime” must continue. But if the .Western Germans accept that fact ana its implications, if they continue to develop a really democraiic system* and “a desire for peace and friendly association” with the free democracies, then there is no reason why they should not very rapidly secure full sovereign self-government, subject only to such restrictions as are necessary by the fact of the presence of the Allied troops. It is a bold and imaginative programme. Whether it can be carri?d into effect must, as the declaration says, “depend only upon the effort of the German people themselves and of their Government.” The Schuman Plan The other outstanding event which immediately concerns Germany and her neighbours is, of course, the production of the “Schuman Plan.” It is a scheme upon which it is so far difficult to pronounce even provisional judgment. The objectives, as Mr Attlee. Mr Bevin and Mr Acheson at once recognised, are admirable. But the outline of the plan itself, contained in Mr Schuman’s statement to his news conference on May 9. is only a bare outline; and no more is yet available. One unfortunate feature of the first public comments is a tendency in some quarters to call for immediate and enthusiastic approval and to condemn as obstructive any suggestion that careful study and close examination must precede even the tentative acceptance of the plan itself. The British Government, in particular, has been sharply criticised for its alleged lack of enthusiasm for the plan. Now that is absurd. This is no matter for enthusiastic approval or unconsidered emotional judgments. The subject is a complex one and the possible economic consequences tremendous. Hasty judgment or heavy commitments would be utterly irresponsible. j Nor was the British Government in i the least slow in practical response. Within a few hours. Mr Attlee had ’ asked the Treasury, the Foreign Office | and the Ministry of Defence for their I preliminary observations. Mr Monnet, ! French Commissioner for Planning. | who is understood to be the real I author of the scheme, was invited to ' London to discuss it with the Chancel- ' lor of the Exchequer and with high i British experts. There has been, and there will be, no lack cither of energy or of seriousness in the work of examination. There may be—in fact there are—other ideas for achieving similar purposes. They, too. have to be compared with and considered in relation to the French plan. And onlv then will it be possible for responsible men to pass judgment.

The very magnitude and importance of the French proposal make care imperative. And any responsible Government whose country’s vital interests arc so deeply involved would bo guilty of criminal rashness if it wore to do anything but reserve judgment upon a proposal of which even the most essential features are still not fully known.