JAPANESE ATTACK MALAY PENINSULA

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26094, 22 April 1950, Page 6

JAPANESE ATTACK MALAY PENINSULA

“ THE GRAND ALLIANCE"

[By

the Rt. Hon. WINSTON CHURCHILL]

LIV

’ Another set of disasters loomed upon us in Malaya. The Japanese landings on the peninsula on December 8 were accompanied by damaging raids on our airfields, which seriously crippled our already weak air forces and soon made the northerly aerodromes unusable. At Kota Bharu, where the beach defences were manned by an infantry brigade extended over a front of 30 miles, the 1 Japanese succeeded in landing the I greater part of a division, though not ■ without heavy casualties inflicted both I by our troops on shore and from the ! air. After three days of stiff fighting the enemy were» firmly established on land, the nearby airfields were in their hands, and the brigade, which had lost heavily, was ordered to withdraw southwards. Farther north on that same December 8 the Japanese had made unopEosed landings at Patani and Singora. tutch submarines, boldly handled, sank several of their ships. There was no serious fighting until December 12, when the enemy, with one of the finest divisions, made a successful attack on the 11th Indian Division north of Alor Star, inflicting severe losses. A grave strategic choice was involved in the tactical defence of the Malay Peninsula. I had clear convictions which I regret it was not in my power to enforce from mid-ocean. Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. 15 Dec., ’4l. Beware lest [that] troops required for ultimate defence Singapore Island and fortress are not used up or cut off in Malay peninsula. Nothing compares in importance with the fortress. Are you sure we shall have enough troops for prolonged defence? Consider with Auchinleck and Commonwealth Government moving Ist Australian Division from Palestine to Singapore. Report action. I was glad to find that our Minister of State, Mr Duff Cooper, had independently reached the same conclusion.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, C.O.S. Committee. 19 Dec., ’4l. Duff Cooper expresses the same anxieties. Duff Cooper’s proposal to concentrate on defence of Johore for the purpose of holding Singapore conforms exactly to view taken by Dill here. 2. After naval disasters to British and Anjerican sea power in Pacific and Indian Oceans we have no means of preventing continuous landings by Japanese in great strength in Siam and the Malay peninsula. It is, therefore, impossible to defend, other than by demolitions and delaying action, anything north of the defensive line in Johore, and this line itself chn only be defended as part of the final defence of Singapore Island fortress and the. naval base. 3. The Commander-in-Chief should now be told to confine hinjself to defence of Johore and Singapore, and that nothing must compete with maximum defence of Singapore. This should not preclude his employing delaying tactics and demolitions on the way south and making an orderly retreat. 4. You do not say who is now Commander-in-Chief Far East. Has Pownall got there? If not, where is he? He should fly there at earliest moment. 5. It was always intended that all reinforcements diverted from the Cape to India should be used by Wavell for the defence of Burma or sent forward to Far East Command as situation requires. Your action in diverting the anti-aircraft guns and fighter squadrons is fully approved. 6. 18th Division can similarly be used by Wavell either for his own needs or to help Far East Command. But why stop there? If 18th Division is sent eastward it would seem wise to get at least one Australian division moving into India to replace it. 7. Please say what you are doing and how you propose to overcome the growing difficulties of sending reinforcements into Singapore. • Also what has been done about reducing number of useless mouth® in. Singapore Island? What was the reply about supplies? Delaying Actions in Malaya

It is not possible to pursue the story to its conclusion in this volume. The tragedy of Singapore must ’presently unfold itself. Suffice it here to say that during the rest of the month the Indian Division fought .a series 4)f delaying actions against the enemy’s main thrust down the west coast of the peninsula. On December 17 the enemy invaded Penang, ' where, despite demolitions, a considerable number of small craft were seized intact. These later enabled him to mount repeated flank attacks made by small amphibious, forces. By the end of the month our troops, several times heavily engaged, were in action near Ipoh. a full 150 miles from the position they

, had first held; and by then the Japan- ; ese had landed on the peninsula at < least three full divisions, including their Imperial Guard. In the air, to? the enemy had greatly increased his superiority. The quality of his aircraft which he had speedily deployed on captured airfields, had exceeded all expectations. We had been thrown on to the defensive, and our losses were severe. On December 16 the northern part of Borneo also was invaded, and soon overrun, but not before we had succeeded in demolishing the immense and valuable oil installations. In all this Dutch submarines took toll of the enemy ships. Auchinleck’s Offensive While we sailed the seas General Auchinleck’s battle in the Desert went well. The Axis army, skilfully evading various encircling manoeuvres, made good its retreat to a rearward line running southward from Gazala. On December 13 the attack on this position was launched by the Eighth Army. This now comprised the 7th Armoured Division, with the 4th Armoured Division and Support Group, the 4th British Indian Division, the Guards’ Brigade (motorised), the sth New Zealand Brigade, the Polish Brigade Group, and the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. All these troops passed under the command of the XlHth Corpg headquarters. The XXXth Corps had to deal with the enemy garrisons cut off and abandoned at Solium, Halfaya, and Bardia, which were fighting stubbornly. The enemy fought well at Gazala, but their desert flank was .turned by our armour, and Rommel began his withdrawal through Derna to Agedabia and Agheila. They were followed all the way by all the troopi we could keep in motion and supplied over these large distances. With the first week in December came a marked increase in the hortilt air-power. The Ist German Air Corpg was withdrawn from the Russian theatre and arrived in the Mediterranean. Considerations for Future Everyone in our party worked incessantly while the Duke of York plodded westwards, and all our thoughts were focused on the new and vast.problems we had to solve. We knew before we left that the outrage of Pearl Harbour bad stirred the people of the United States to their depths. We feared that there would be a long interval before American forces came into action on a great scale, and that during this period of preparation we should necessarily be greatly straitened. This would happen at a time when we ourselves had to face a new and terrible antagonist in Malaya, the Indian Ocean, Burma, and India. Evidently the partition of supplier would require profound attention, and would be fraught with many difficulties and delicate aspects. Already we had been notified that all the schedules of deliveries under Lend-Lease had been stopped pending readjustment. Happily the output of the British munitions and aircraft factories was now acquiring scope and momentum, and would soon be very large indeed. But a long array of “bottlenecks” and possible denials of key items, which would affect the whole range of our production, loomed before our eyits as the Duke of York drove on through the incessant gales. Beaverbrook was, as usual in tim6a of trouble, optimistic. He declared that the resources of the United States had so far not even been scratched; that they were immeasurable, and that once the whole force of the American people was diverted to the struggle results would be achieved far beyond anything that had been projected or imagined. Moreover, he thouglit the Americans did not yet realise their strength in the production field. All the present statistics would be surpassed and swept away by the American effort. There would be enough for all. In this his judgment was right. All these considerations paled before the main strategic is-sue: Should we be able to persuade the President and the American Service chiefs that the defeat of Japan would not spell the defeat of Hitler, but that the defeat of Hitler made the finishing off of Japan merely a matter of time and trouble? Many long hours did we spend revolving this grave issue. The two Chiefs of Staff and General Dill, with Hollis and his officers, prepared several papers dealing with the whole subject and emphasising the view that the war was all one. As will be seen, these labours and fears both proved needless. (To be continued.) [Copyright 1950 in U.S.A, by the New York Times Company and Time, Inc. (publisher of Time and Life); in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph, Ltd.; elsewhere by International Co-operation Press Service Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in part in any language strictly prohibited.]