The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1950. The Hydrogen Bomb

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26030, 6 February 1950, Page 6

The Press MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1950. The Hydrogen Bomb

Though President Truman’s direction to the United States Atomic Energy Commission to “ continue its “work on hydrogen bombs and “ other atomic weapons ” has opened up wide areas of speculation about his objectives and intentions, there is not very much more to the decision than a continuation of American policy in self-defence. Senator McMahon, chairman of the joint United States Senate-House Atomic Committee, put the position bluntly and concisely when he issued the warning that “ the building of “ hydrogen bombs does not promise “ positive security for the United “ States ”, though not all will agree with him in the pessimistic view that “ it only promises the negative “ result of averting for a few “ months or years a well-nigh cer- “ tain catastrophe If we were compelled to believe that catastrophe is “ well-nigh certain ” there would be little point in continuing the development of new and more terrible ways of increasing its severity and extent. Mr Bernard Baruch spoke perhaps more wisely and thoughtfully when, in commending President Truman’s decision, he said that “ it emphasised anew the need “ for truly effective international “control of every form of atomic “ energy and mass destruction One of the most thoughtful and knowledgeable commentators on international affairs, Mr H. V. Hodson, assistant editor of the “ Sunday “ Times ”, discussing, in his most recent book, “ Twentieth Century “ Empire ”, the influence of the development of the atomic bomb on international politics, argues that the sort of sanction (that is, coercive action by and upon sovereign States) implied in the development of the atomic bomb is necessary to a system that is founded on the concept of possible wars. He holds that, until we have a constitutional union of States in a world commonwealth (the United Nations he contends is not a world society but a system of contract), war, and defence against it, will continue to be the final instruments of national policy. New methods and weapons of war, of which the atomic bomb is only the latest development, have revolutionised the concept -of possible wars, upon which the ideal of world peace rests. The bomb is not an isolated phenomenon, and can be used only in combination with the most advanced devices in other fields. “But it has exceptional im- “ portance, if only because of its “ impact on the minds of the masses “ who are the instrument and the “ objective of total warfare ”,

The atomic bomb and its companion weapons, Mr Hodson argues, are destined to revolutionise the political world. They have immensely increased the relative advantage in power politics of industrially advanced States; but whereas, before Hiroshima, “ a Great Power could “be defined as one which pos- “ sessed the* industrial equipment, “manpower and resources to main- “ tain' modern armed forces on a “ scale comparable with those of any “ potential enemy ”, the qualification to-day is even simpler; “it is “the possession of, or ability to “ manufacture atomic bombs ”. Since it is recognised that the secret of any weapon, including the hydrogen bomb, cannot for ever remain secret, a terrifying prospect faces the world. Has the wit of man devised a weapon that it is, under present conditions, impossible to control? Is it, as Mr Hodson suggests, logically futile to atfempt, as the United Nations has done, to devise means to ban the atom bomb from war? To do so is to presuppose that there will be wars from which to ban it.

If the United Nations cannot succeed in their major purpose of preventing war [writes Mr Hodson], how can they succeed in the minor purpose of regulating war? Again, to presuppose war presupposes either the total bankruptcy of the United Nations or the use of force by the Security Council against the war-makers. To ban the atomic bomb means that the Security Council itself could not use it; but the war-maker who defies the United Nations over the making of war is not likely to obey the United Nations over the manner of waging it —unless he fears instant retaliation for the second offence, far more devastating and decisive than the retort to the first offence. In other words, the use of the atomic (hydrogen?) bomb by individual nations can be prevented only by threatened use of the atomic bomb by the United Nations.

And that seems to be the logic of a situation that is full of dreadful possibilities. Mr Hodson’s ideal—i the creation of a world government, as the logical prerequisite not only of the outlawry of war but also of particular modes of waging it, seems lamentably far removed from practical politics in a world torn by violently conflicting theories of government. The outcome of the use of the hydrogen bomb in any circumstances is too dreadful to contemplate. Whether the threat implied in its manufacture can create any more than an uneasy peace is a question that the world’s statesmen have yet to answer. It is impossible to escape the logic jjf Mr Hodson’s final word: “All at- “ tempts to ban the atomic bomb “ will be but a facade until there “is at least a rudimentary system “of world government. . . . The “ fundamentals of the relations be- “ tween States will remain the “ same: no law, only mutual com“pact; no governmental order, “ only balances and hegemonies of “ power; no police, but only a sys- “ tern of mutual aid based on the “ concept of possible wars