A SAFETY VALVE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS?

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26018, 23 January 1950, Page 6

A SAFETY VALVE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS?

JOEL BROOKS

[Bv

the veto

in the “Christian Science Monitor”]

(Reprinted by Arrangement)

When the U.S.S.R. exercised its fortieth and forty-first vetoes in the United Nations Security Council recently, there were grumbles of dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction was twofold; it involved the veto Power itself and the prolific use of the veto by Russia. There are many ceptions concerning both; it is time they were remedied. , It should be made clear at the start that the Russians didnot invent veto. The United Nations voting tor mula was worked. ° u t®t Yalta > Roosevelt. Stalin, and Churchill. The veto power was thought J 1 ®®® 58 all the great nations, and the United States was more insistent than were the rest. The official American view was contained in the report to the President on the San Francisco Conference: “The maintenance of peace, and not merely its restoration, depends primarily upon the unity of the Great Powers.” . . Since these Great Powers insist on playing the dangerous game of power politics, the veto presents a necessary safety valve, and will remain as such until the U.S.S.R. and the United States surrender some of their own precious sovereignty in the name of the U.N. Both Russians and Ameri; cans realise this fact. Andrei Vyshinsky, Russia’s Foreign Minister, says that the U.N. could not survive “one day” without the veto; Warren Austin. America’s leading delegate, also recognises the necessity of the veto at this time. Alexandre Parqdi, former delegate of France, recognises that the veto balances the small power votes in the General Assembly in matters involving security and the maintenance of peace. What is the Veto? Before analysing the Russian use of the veto, let us consider just what the veto is. It refers only to situations in which a proposal receives seven or more affirmative votes but is blocked by the negative vote of one of the permanent members —Big Five—of the Security Council. With this in mind, a few other facts should be remembered: 1. The tendency has been to bring to the Security Council those matters on which disagreement of council members has been pronounced. 2. When the other major Powers have voted “No” on recommendations by the Russians, these recommendations have been unable to muster seven affirmative votes, since the Russians are definitely in the minority of the East-West split. Now to the vetoes themselves: The

first veto in February. 1946, was nn proposal expressing confidence fk! foreign troops in Syria and LebaiS would be withdrawn. The troona >? ferred to were British, and the sians. not quite so confident of th2* withdrawal, wanted to press charS against Britain. Charges were diySS and the British got out. There were four vetoes on the Sn an ish question. The Russians wanted?’ bring charges against Franco for having aided Hitler; the WestS nations wanted first to set up an iS vestigating sub-committee. Althounh on the surface, the latter sounds fai enough to most, to the Russians u sounded like the prelude to a whih wash for Spain. In view of the recS remarks on that bountry made by sornJ United - States politicians, it WO uls seem that the Russian suspicions wer? not entirely unfounded. e Other Occasions Then there were six vetoes on tho Greek question, involving Greece Al bania, Bulgaria. Jugoslavia, and ttoE border difficulties. The flare-ups oc curred when the three eastern’Eurti* pean countries accepted guenilta fleeing from Greece. But then th? United States provided the Greek Gnv eminent with military aid. Both th? United States and the Russians through their satellites, acted unilater’ ally, not with the U.N. The veto on the Corfu Channel ques. tion again involved Albania, but did not- prevent further action. The Brit, ish and Albanians, with the aid of I n ’ ternational Court of Justice mediation, were able to settle amicably the. affair of the two damaged English warships Resolutions on the Indonesiantion were vetoed by both France and Russia. While agreement seemed to U general that the Dutch had acted aggressively, the disagreement wa ß ’n the action to be taken. The question of opportunity for future community expansion in Indonesia was obviously an important factor here; also continu. ance of colonialism in the Far East. Of the remainder of the vetoes, 21 dealt with the admission of new members. Many of these vetoes were on the same countries. For example Italy was vetoed four .times; Portugal’ Ireland and Transjordan, threq eart’ and four other countries, two each’ The Russians presumably would not have vetoed many of these nations if the western nations had not rejected four nations friendly to Russia. What should be obvious by now is that many of the Russian vetoes were on the same issues, and that the veto power, no matter how much its Ule may be deplored, is vital to the existence of the U.N. as long as the present international situation remains.