The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1949. BRITAIN, EUROPE, COMMONWEALTH

Press, Volume LXXXV, Issue 25994, 23 December 1949, Page 6

The Press FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1949. BRITAIN, EUROPE, COMMONWEALTH

In an article reported at some length in the cable news a few days ago the “ Economist ” crystallised all the vague, unexpressed doubts as well as the positive, open misgivings which are felt inside and outside Great Britain about Mr Bevin’s foreign policy, especially as it affects Britain’s relations with Europe. It is surely extraordinary that the country that two years ago took the initiative in making the Brussels Treaty and in responding promptly and energetically to America’s great offer of aid to Europe is now regarded in Europe and the United States alike as the main obstacle to European unity. And it is equally extraordinary that the Minister who in January, 1948, declared that “ the time is ripe for the consolida- “ tion of Western Europe ” should to-day be regarded widely as a very lukewarm supporter, if not an active opponent, of European co-operation or of British participation in European co-operation. British statesmen,especially Mr Bevin, have only themselves to blame for this unfortunate state of affairs. Their early enthusiasm for Western Union, their high-sounding speeches on the subject, were too sharp a contrast with the caution, or the seeming reluctance, with which they have since approached all the practical problems of union, or federation, or integration, or plain co-operation. JTor a long time observers within Britain and outside were charitably willing to excuse this caution as “realism”; but increasingly they have had to admit that British “ realism ”, if such it can justly be called, takes forms of action and expression which cannot fail to dampen the enthusiasm of other European nations that looked to Britain for leadership and were willing and anxious to be led. It is clear now that Britain was not prepared to go as far or as fast toward practical union as most of the European countries believed—and were entitled to believe from reading British speeches. Mr Bevin’s famous speech in January last year was ambiguous. It left room for all kinds of British reservations. But Europe at the time was in the mood for heroic measures and ready to be stirred by heroic speeches. The words of Mr Bevin and others were taken at their face value: Europe was not disposed to look for reservations or even to face realistically at the time the many obvious difficulties. < Mr Bevin and others encouraged expectations which could not be fulfilled quickly, if at all; and such slow progress as has since been made toward European cooperation has mocked the high hopes of Europeans and turned their early goodwill to Britain into doubt and distrust. The feeling, of course, was brought to a head by the dollar crisis and the sudden devaluation of- the pound. Every European country suffered some loss and a good deal of inconvenience through that decision; but even those which freely admit the necessity of the step have reason to complain -bitterly about the way in -which it was taken. As one British observer has written, it was thrown at the heads of Europe without consultation or warning of any kind; it was the very negation of any policy to “ integrate ” Europe’s economy. Distrust of Britain

It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a strong and general tendency now to overlook all the very real contributions which Britain has made to the development of European co-operation, including the recent British proposal to remove import restrictions from 50 per cent, of trade between the O.E.E.C. countries. It is not surprising, either, that when such a well-informed and temperate British journal as the “ Economist ” is completely unable to discern an intelligible pattern in British policy in Europe, citizens of west European countries should regard Britain’s policy not only as a mystery but as a sinister mystery. British statesmen lately have done nothing, to establish their country’s good intentions. There was unnecessary-rancour in Mr Bevin’s sneers, during the House of Commons debate on foreign policy last month, at the European Assembly at Strasbourg, an organisation which, for all its tentative experimentalism and lack of effective power, is to many Europeans a symbol of hope for the future. There was unnecessary coldness in Sir Stafford Cripps’s reply to the plea of Mr Hoffman, the American Marshall aid administrator, for the early “ integration ” of European economies. After speaking of Great Britain’s position as the centre of the largest multilateral trading area of the world, and of her special relationship with the Commonwealth and the sterling area, Sir Stafford Cripps declared: “ Our “ position is such that we could not “ integrate our economy into that of “Europe in any manner that would “prejudice the full discharge of “ these other responsibilities ”. And this blow was little softened by his assurances that Britain regarded herself as bound up in western Europe, not only in economic, strategic, and political interests, but “in cur cul- “ ture and indeed in our partici- “ pation in the heritage of Christian “civilisation”, and that Britain was always ready to consider sympathetically any scheme which involved her closer association with groups of other countries, provided that such association was consistent with her policy. And this brings the discussion back to the point of the “ Economist’s ” recent article: Has Britain yet evolved a policy? Has Britain yet sought to reconcile the two conflicting elements of her external relations—her position as head of the Commonwealth and her position

as a member, if not the leader, of a west European association? Britain clearly must consider very carefully her position at the head of th’e Commonwealth. As “The Times” put it recently, the British Commonwealth “is so real and so vital a “ thing that no statesman could “ hazard it for an uncertain and un“tested European Union”. But no one, not even Mr Hoffman and his Economic Co-operation Administration, wants Britain to rush blindly into far-reaching currency and customs unions, or political federations. What has been done to determine how far Britain can advance along the road of European co-operation without injuring Commonwealth interests or without demanding from the Commonwealth countries greater sacrifices than they are willing to make for the well-being of Britain and Europe, and therefore of the world? If anything has been done, nothing of it has reached the public ear. And American and European observers cannot be blamed if they jump to the conclusion that Britain is using her obligations to the Commonwealth as a convenient excusa for holding back from European union. They may well believe that Britain is reluctant to expose her high-cost economy to increased competition from Continental countries with a lower standard of living. But if Britain cannot soon hold her own in competition with countries only now recovering from the damage of war, there is no hope of her reaching a level of competitive industrial efficiency that will permit the dollar gap to be mastered by the time Marshall aid ends in 1952, This lies at the back of American insistence upon an economic “ integration ” in Europe which will spur each country toward trading efficiency. Commenting upon this consideration recently, the “ Manchester Guardian ” remarked that Europe now is economically far more divided, the movement of trade is much more restricted by quotas, bilateral deals, and inconvertible currencies than it was even in 1938. “ The present “ task ”, it added, “is not the “ launching of risky new ventures “ that would draw Britain into “Europe and away from the Com- “ monwealth. It is to get back—“in the new forms appropriate to “ changed conditions—to something “near the degree of freedom and “ therefore of competition, with “ which trade was conducted before “ the war Commonwealth Responsibility

If the Commonwealth is standing in the way of Britain’s joining a union that would have such beneficial, even salutary, effects, the fact should be acknowledged frankly. Two years ago it would have been possible to say that this was certainly not so. Within a few months of Mr Bevin’s exposition of his hopes for a Western Union, several Dominion statesmen had approved the idea or developed the theme. They included General Smuts, then Prime Minister of South Africa, and Mr St. Laurent, the Prime Minister of Canada. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers, at their London conference in October, 1948, were expected to go very carefully into the implications of British participation in a Western Union. They certainly gave some attention to the question, and went so far as to approve of Britain’s share in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation; but it remains doubtful whether the fundamental questions were examined carefully or at all. It may be that the British Government was unofficially but emphatically warned against pursuing very much further the aims to which British statesmen seemed to have committed themselves in Europe. If so. the Dominions took a very shortsighted view, as damaging to themselves in the long run as to Britain and Europe, in putting any kind of a barrier between Britain and its “ inevitable and indispensable part- “ ners ” in Europe. They will soon have the opportunity, at the Colojnbo conference early in the New Year, of reviewing the whole question. They will be unwise if they look at it from the standpoint of narrow or short-term self-interest. Provided their major essential interests are safeguarded—as they undoubtedly can be—they should - ot only permit but actively encourage Britain to play a constructive part in the economic and political integration of Europe. The time was never more opportune; and it may never be again.