ROOSEVELT’S MUTUAL AID PLAN IS PROMPTED IN MOMENTOUS LETTER

Press, Volume LXXXV, Issue 25767, 31 March 1949, Page 4

ROOSEVELT’S MUTUAL AID PLAN IS PROMPTED IN MOMENTOUS LETTER

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS:

the Rt. Hon. WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL,

BOOK II

[By

MJ>,l

XLVII

10 Downing Street, Whitehall. December 8, 1940. My dear Mr President. 1. As we reach the end of this year I feel you will expect me to lay before you the prospects for 1941. I do so with candour and confidence, because it seems to me that the vast majority of American citizens have recorded their conviction that the safety of the United States as well as the future of our two Democracies and the kind of civilisation for which they stand are bound up with the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Only thus can those bastions of sea-power upon which the control of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans depend be preserved in faithful and friendly hands. The control of the Pacific by the United States Navy and of the Atlantic by the British Navy is indispensable to the security and trade routes of both our countries. and the surest means of preventing wat from reaching the shores of the United States. 2. There is another aspect. It takes between three and four years to convert the industries of a modern State to war .purposes. Saturation-point is reached when the maximum industrial effort that can be spared from civil needs has been applied to war production. Germany certainly reached this point by the end of 1939. We in the British Empire are now only about half-way through the second year. The United States. I should suppose, is by no means so far advanced as we. Moreover, I understand that immense programmes of naval, military, and air defence are now on foot in the United States, to complete which certainly two years are needed. It is our British duty in the common interest, as also for our own survival, to hold the front and grapple with the Nazi power until the preparations of the United States are complete. Victory may come before two years are out; but we have no right to count upon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that is humanly possible. Therefore, I submit with very great respect for your good and friendly consideration that there is a solid identity of interest between the British Empire and the United States while these conditions last. It is upon this footing that I venture to address you. LOGISTICS 3. The form which this war has taken, and seems likely to hold, does not enable us to match the immense armies of Germany in any theatre where their main power can be brought to bear. We can, ‘however, by the use of sea power and air power, meet the German armies in regions where only comparatively small forces can be brought into action. We must do our best to prevent the German domination of Europe spreading into Africa and into Southern Asia. We have also to maintain in constant readiness in this Island armies strong enough to make the problem of an oversea invasion insoluble. For these purposes we are forming as fast as possible, as you are already aware, between 50 and 60 divisions. Even if the United States were our Ally, instead of our friend and indispensable partner, we should not ask for a large American expeditionary army. Shipping, not men. is the limiting factor, and the power to transport munitions and supplies claims priority over the movement by sea of large numbers of soldiers'. 4. The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster for the Allies and for Europe. The last five months have witnessed a strong and perhaps unexpected recovery by Great Britain fighting alone, but with the invaluable aid in munitions and in destroyers placed at our disposal by the great Republic of which you are for the third time the chosen Chief. THE CRUNCH OF THE WAR 5. The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by a swift, overwhelming blow has fcr the time being very greatly receded. In its place there is a long, gradually-maturing danger, less sudden and less spectacular, but equally deadly. This mortal danger is the steady and increasing diminution of sea tonnage. We can endure the shattering of our dwellings and the slaughter of our civil population by indiscriminate air attacks, and we hope to parry these increasingly as our science develops, and to repay them upon military objectives in Germany as our Air Force more nearly approaches the strength of the enemy. The decision for 1941 lies upon the seas. Unless we can establish our ability to feed this Island, to import the munitions of all kinds which we need, unless we can move our armies to the various theatres where Hitler and his confederate Mussolini must be met, and maintain them there, and do all this with the assurance of being able to carry it on till the spirit of the Continental Dictators is broken, we may fall by the way, and the time neded by the United States to complete her defensive preparations may not be forthcoming. It is therefore in shipping and in the air power to transport across the oceans, particularly the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the crunch of the whole war will be found. If, on the other hand, we are able to move the necessary tonnage to and fro across salt jvater indefinitely, it may well be that the application of superior air power to the German homeland and the rising anger of the German and other Nazi-gripped populations will bring the agony of civilisation to a merciful and glorious end. But do not let us underrate the task. * SHIPPING LOSSES 6. Our shipping losses, the figures for which in recent months are appended, have been on a scale almost comparable to that of the worst year of the last war. In the five weeks ending November 3 losses reached a total of 420,300 tons. Our estimate of annual tonnage which ought to be imported in order to maintain our effort at full strength is 43 million tons; the tonnage entering in September was only at the rate of 37 million tons, and in October of 38 million tons. Were this diminution to continue at this rate it would be fatal, unless indeed immensely greater replenishment than anything at present in sight could be achieved in time. Although we are doing all we can to meet this situation by new methods, the difficulty of limiting losses is obviously much greater than in the last war. We lack the assistance of the French Navy, the Italian Navy, and the Japanese Navy, and, above all, of the United States Navy, which was of such vital help to us during the culminating years. The enemy commands the ports all around the northern and western coasts of France. He is increasingly basing his submarines, fly-ing-boats, anfl combat planes on these ports and on the islands off the French coast. We are denied the use of the ports or territory of Eire in which to organise our coastal patrols by air and sea. in fact, we have now only one 6 ,£° Ut V°. J he British Islesnamely, the Northern Approaches, against which the enemy in increasingly concentrating, reaching ever farther out by U-boat action and longdistance aircraft bombing. In addition, there have for some months been merchant-ship raiders, both in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. And now we have the powerful warship-raider to contend with as well. We need ships both to hunt down and to escort harge as are our resources and preparations, we do not possess enough. NAVAL MARGINS r.-?inP’ e six , or seven months twill] bring relative battleshin home waters to a smaller m argm ft? 3ll 1S satisfactory. Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainly be in serJanuary. We have already King George V. and hope to have Prince of Wales in the line at thl same time. These modern ships are. of course, far better armoured, especi- , y against air attack, than vessels

We have recently had to use Rodney on trans-Atlantic escort, and at any time when numbers are so small

a mine or a torpedo may alter declsively the strength of the line of battle. We get relief in June when Duke of York wUI be ready, and shall be still better off at the end of 1941, when Anson also will have joined. But these two first-class modern 35.000-ton 15in-gun German battleships [Actually they were nearer 45.000 tons.] force us to maintain a concentration never previously necessary in this war. 8. We hope that the two Italian Littorios will be out of action for a while, and, anyway, they are not so dangerous as if they were manned by Germans. Perhaps they might be! We are indebted to you for your help about the Richelieu and Jean p a J’ t , and I dare say that will be all right. But, Mr President, as no one will see more clearly than you, we have during these months to consider for the first time in this war a fleet action in which the enemy will have two ships at least as good as our two best and only two modem ones. It will be impossible to reduce our strength in the Mediterranean, because the attitude of Turkey, and, indeed, the whole position in the Eastern basin, depends upon our having a strong fleet there. The older, unmodernised battleships will have to go for convoy. Thus even in the battleship class we are at full extension. VICHY AND TOKYO 9. There is a second field of danger. The Vichy Government may, either by joining Hitler’s New Order in Europe or through some manoeuvre, such as forcing us to attack an expedition dispatched by sea against the Free French colonies, find an excuse fcr ranging with the Axis Powers the very considerable undamaged naval forces still under its control. If the French Navy were to join the Axis, the control of West Africa would pass immediately into their hands, with the gravest consequences to our communications between the Northern and Southern Atlantic, and also affecting Dakar and, of course, thereafter South America.

10. A third sphere of danger is in the Far East. Here, it seems clear that Japan is thrusting southward through Jndo-China to Saigon and other naval and air bases, thus bringing them within a comparatively short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. It is reported that the Japanese are preparing five good divisions for possible use as an overseas expeditionary forpe. We have to-day no forces in the Far East capable of dealing with this situation should it develop. 11. In the face of these dangers we must try to use the year 1941 to build up such a supply of weapons, particularly of aircraft, both by increased

output at home in spite of bombardment and through ocean-borne supplies, as will lay the foundations of victory. In view of the difficulty and magnitude of this task, as outlined by all the facts I have set forth, to which many others could be added. I feel entitled..nay bound, to lay before you the various ways in which the United States could give supreme and decisive help to what is, in certain aspects, the common cause.

A “DECISIVE ACT” PROPOSED 12. The prime need is to check or

limit the loss of tonnage on the Atlantic approaches to our Island. This may be achieved both by increasing the naval forces which cope with the attacks, and by adding to the number of merchant ships on which we depend. For the first purpose there would seem to be the following alternatives:—

(1) The reassertion by the United States of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas from illegal and barbarous methods of warfare, in accordance with the decisions reached after the late Great War, and as freely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935.' From this. United States ships should be free to trade with countries against which there is not an effective legal blockade.

(2) It would, I suggest, follow that protection should be given to this lawful trading by United States forces, i.e., escorting battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and air flotillas. The protection would be immensely more effective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for the duration of the war. I think it is improbable that such protection would provoke a declaration of war by Germany upon the United States, though probably sea incidents of a dangerous character would from time to time occur. Herr Hitler has shown himself inclined to avoid the Kaiser’s mistake. He does not wish to be drawn into war with the United States until he has gravely undermined the power of Great Britain. His maxim is, “One at a time.”

The policy I have ventured to outline, or something like it, would constitute a decisive act of constructive nonbelligerency by the United States, and. more than any other measure, would make it certain that British resistance could be effectively prolonged for the desired period and victory gained. (3) Failing the above, the gift, loan, or supply or a large number of American vessels of war, above all destroyers, already in the Atlantic is indispensable to the maintenance of the Atlantic route. Further, could not the United States Nava] Forces extend their sea control of the American side of the Atlantic so as to prevent the molestation by enemy vessels of tne approaches to the new line of naval and air bases which the United States is establishing in British islands in the Western Hemisphere? The strength of the United States Naval Forces is such that the assistance in the Atlantic that they could afford us, as described above, would not jeopardise the control of the Pacific.

(4) We should also then need the good offices of the United States and whole influence of its Government, continually exerted, to procure for Great Britain the necessary facilities upon the southern and western shores of Eire for our flotillas, and. still more important, for our aircraft, working to the westward into the Atlantic. If it were proclaimed an American interest that the resistance Great Britain should be the Atlantic route kept open for the important armaments now being prepared for Great Britain in North America, the Irish in the United States might be willing to point out to the Government of Eire the dangers which its present policy is creating for the United States itself. “EVERY TON OF SHIPPING” His Majesty’s Government would, of course, take the most effective measures beforehand to protect Ireland if Irish action exposed it to German attack. It is not possible for us to compel the people of Northern Ireland against their will to leave the United Kingdom and join Southern Ireland. But I do not doubt that if the Government of Eire would show its solidarity with the democracies of the Eng-lish-speaking world at this crisis a Council for Defence of all Ireland could be set up out of which the unity of the island would probably in some form or other emerge after the war.

13. The object of the foregoing measures is to reduce to manageable proportions the nresent destructive losses at sea. In addition, it is indispensable that the merchant tonnage available for supplying Great Britain, and tor the waning nf the war by Great Britain with all vigour, should be substantially increased beyond the 1| million tons per annum which is the utmost we can now build. The convoy system, the detours, the zigzags, the great distances from which we now have to bring our imports, and the congestion of our western harbours have reduced by about one-third the fruitfulness of our existing tonnage. To ensure final victory not less than SfiOChGOO tons of additional merchant shipbuilding capacity will be required. Only the United States can supply this need. Looking to the future, it would seem that production on a scale comparable to that of the Hog Island scheme of the last war ought to br laced for 1942. In the meanwhile we ask that in 1941 the United States should make available to us every ton of merchant shipping, surplus to its own requirements, which it possesses or controls, and to find some means

of putting into our service a larco proportion of merchant shipping now under construction for the National Maritime Board. UNEXAMPLED EFFORT ASKEn FOR 14. Moreover, we look to the Indus trial energy of the Republic for a reinJ forcement of our domestic capacity to manufacture combat aircraft. Without that reinforcement reaching us in sub. stantial measure we shall not achieve the massive preponderance in the air on which we must rely to loosen and disintegrate the German grip on Europe We are at present engaged on a programme designed to increase our strength to 7000 first-line aircraft by the spring of 1942.. But it is abun* dantly clear that this programme will not suffice to give us the weight of superiority which will force open the doors of victory. In order to achieve such superiority it is plain that we shall need the greatest production ot aircraft which the United States of America is capable of sending us. R is our anxious hope that in the teeth of continuous bombardment we shall realise the greater part of the produc. tion which we have planned in thia country. But not even with the addition to our squadrons of all the air. craft which, under present arrange* ments, we may derive from planned output in the United States, can we hope to achieve the necessary ascendancy. May I invite you then, Mr President, to give earnest considerstion to an immediate order on joint account for a further 2000 combat aircraft a month? Of these aircraft I would submit, the highest possinfo proportion should be heavy bombeix the weapon on which, above all others, we depend to shatter the foundationi of German . military power. I am aware of the formidable task that this would impose upon the industrial organisation of the United States. Yet in our heavy need, we call with confidence to the most resourceful and ingenious technicians in the world. We ask for an unexampled effort, believing thnt it can be made. 15. You have also received information about the needs of our aimiea. In the munitions sphere, in spite of enemy bombing, we are making steady progress here. Without your continued assistance in the supply at machine tools and in further releasee from stock of certain articles, we could not hope to equip as many as 50 divisions in 1941. I am grateful for the arrangements, already practically completed, for your aid in the equipment of the army which we have already planned, and for the provision of an American type of weapons for an additional 10 divisions in time for the campaign of 1942. But when the tide of Dictatorship begins to recede many countries trying to regain their freedom may be asking for arms, and there is no source to which they can Jook except the factories of the United States. I must therefore also urge the importance of expanding to the utmost American productive capacity for small arms, artillery, and tanks. 16. I am arranging to present you with a complete programme of the munitions of all kinds which we seek to obtain from you, the greater part of which is of course already agreed. An important economy of time and effort will be produced if the types selected for the United States Services should, whenever possible, conform to those which have proved their merit under the actual conditions of war. In this way reserves of guns and ammunition and of aeroplanes become interchangeable, and are by that very fact augmented. This is, however, a sphere so highly technical that I do not enlarge upon it. THE DOLLAR PROBLEM 17. Last of all, I come to the question of finance. The more rapid and abundant the flow of munitions and ships which you are able to send us, the sooner will our dollar credits exhausted. They are already, as you know, very heavily drawn upon IV the payments we have made to date. Indeed, as you know, the orders already placed or under negotiation, including the expenditure settled or pending for creating munitions factories in the United States, many times exceed the total exchange resources remaining at the disposal of Great Britain. The moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other, supplies. While we will do our utmost, and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make payments across the Exchange, I believe you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually disadvantageous in effect if at the height of this struggle Great Britain were to be divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone. Such B course would not be in the moral or economic interests of either of our countries. We here should be unable, after the war, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United States over and above the volume of our exports which is agreeable to your tariffs and industrial economy. Not only should we in Great Britain suffer cruel privations, but widespread unemployment in the United States would follow the curtailment o' American exporting power. “OUR COMMON PURPOSE* 18. Moreover, I do not believe that the Government and people of the United States would find it in accordance with the principles which guide them to confine'the help which they have so generously promised only to such munitions of war and commodities as could be immediately paid for. You may be certain that we shall prove ourselves ready to suffer and sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause, and that we glory in being its champions. The rest we leave with confidence to you and to your people, being sure that ways and means will he found which future generations on both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire. 19. If. as I believe, you are convinced. Mr President, that the defeat of the and Fascist tyranny is J matter of' high consequence to th® people of the United States and to the Western Hemisphere, you will reriira this letter not as an appeal for but as a statement of the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose. (To be continued) Copyright 1949 in U.S.A, by Tbe New York Times Company and Time, Inc. (publisher of Time and Life); in tne British Empire by the Daily TelegraOD Ltd.; elsewhere by International Cooperation Press Service. Inc. rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in part in any language strictly prohibited.