The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1949. Import Control Policy

Press, Volume LXXXV, Issue 25766, 30 March 1949, Page 4

The Press WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1949. Import Control Policy

Almost every relevant circumstance having changed since 1939, the New Zealand Government was entitled to ask the United Kingdom Government to release it from the undertakings and assurances then given regarding its import control policy. That the United Kingdom Government should generously and freely grant the release is equally appropriate. The circumstances in which Mr Nash and the President of the British Board of Trade reached their agreement in 1939 need to be recalled. With sterling balances down to about £12,000.000 and certain to go lower, and a loan of £ 17,000,000 falling due for repayment, New Zealand had to seek a renewal loan in London as well as credits to finance ordinary importexport trade and her defence programme. After fairly long negotiations, Mr Nash obtained the help he needed on terms that have been described as “ stiff, but by no means “ harsh ” —he has himself spoken of “ duress ” —subject to certain assurances about the intention and effect of the import licensing system which the New Zealand Government had introduced to relieve its exchange difficulties. Britain was concerned—as many New Zealanders were concerned—that import control should not be used to protect New Zealand secondary industries (heavy capital expenditure on which had helped to bring the country close to financial default) against reasonable competition from British imports, or to foster uneconomic industries. Britain in this agreement recognised the need for import control in New Zealand’s immediate circumstances, but obtained an assurance that the control would be operated in the way least damaging to British interests. New Zealand has now been set free to pursue her control policy unfettered by the restraints, such as they were and to the extent that they were effective, of the 1939 agreement. The war, indeed, made the agreement almost at once a dead letter; and it certainly has little relevance to-day, when the British Government is pursuing very much the same kind of trade control policy as that which caused misgivings when introduced by the New Zealand Government before the war. New Zealand has pursued a policy helpful to Britain in the trade relations of the war and post-war years, as Britain has acknowledged in word and in act. New Zealand has been liberal—although no more liberal than was wise and proper—in accepting prices well below world parity and even below those paid by Britain to suppliers within the Commonwealth. The manifest goodwill of the Government and people of New Zealand is clearly a better guarantee than the loose bindings of the 1939 agreement that New Zealand’s trade policy, however it may be shaped and adjusted in the future, will .continue to reflect this country’s deep concern for Britain’s interest.

In the summary (released by Mr Nash) of the statement to the House of Commons by Mr Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade, one point needs to be clarified. Mr Wilson is reported to have referred to New Zealand’s “con- “ tinuing problem wit ft her balance “of payments”. This is a phrase which trips easily and frequently from Mr Nash’s own tongue, and belongs rather to Mr Nash’s longterm view of New Zealand’s international trade than to the present situation. Mr Wilson has in fact been persuaded, it is impossible to say by what evidence and arguments, to accept Mr Nash’s theory of a continuing problem and its continuing solution. Mr Nash wants import control to go on for ever. The international agreements he has signed permit him to carry it on, while he can show cause in a disordered or imperilled balance of payments. But they also bind him to pursue measures which will correct the disorder and remove the danger. He is not fond of talking about them; but he has his cue now.