The Press MONDAY. JULY 19, 1948. Berlin

Press, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 25550, 19 July 1948, Page 6

The Press MONDAY. JULY 19, 1948. Berlin

The Soviet reply to the Western Powers’ Notes on Berlin contains nothing that holds out hope of an early end to the present deadlock. Although much of it is devoted to the recapitulation of charges that the Western Allies alone are responsible for the failure of four-Power control and for the partition of Germany, it gives some interesting pointers to the direction of Russian policy. In the Soviet Government’s claim that “ if necessary it will not “ object to ensuring sufficient sup- “ plies for the whole of Greater Ber- “ lin by its own means ” there may be perceived a consciousness of the bad impression that Russian tactics are making on the people of Berlin and West Germany, and, it may be suspected, on many Germans in the Russian zone. Few Germans, least of all the 2,500,000 whose misery is being used as an instrument of blackmail, will believe this assertion to be sincere. The Western Allies have always supplied some 60 per cent, of the food and coal required for Berlin; and the Russians have shown no inclination in the past to assume a larger share of the responsibility for feeding the area which they now claim to be part and parcel of their zone.

The Soviet Note; far from closing the door to further negotiations, is in fact an invitation to the reopening of four-Power talks on the future of Germany. It is almost a plea for such talks. This raises issues far more vital than the control of Berlin. They were discussed by the “ Economist ” last week before the text of the Russian reply was known:

First, are the Western Powers prepared to consider a settlement of Germany which would take the Western zones out of the European Recovery Programme, and transfer the centre of economic and political power from Frankfurt to Berlin? If not. they should say so now, and explain to the Western electorates how and why Western German recovery is vital to the European Recovery Programme. Second, will the Soviet sacrifice its interests in Eastern Germany for the sake Of an understanding with the West? The evidence is that it cannot, at any rate in the immediate future.

If the answers to both questions are negative, what is t the use of pretending that a further conference to avert the division of Germany has any chance of success? The question underlying the issues raised in Berlin has to be faced now. while public opinion in Western Europe is tense with awareness of the obligations it imposes.

The dangers of the present situation in Berlin are obvious. The Russians, having blocked all road, rail, and water communications between Berlin and the Western zones, have been foiled, for the time being, by the success of the gigantic British and American air lift. Costly as this operation may be, it seems that it could be used to keep up food supplies almost indefinitely; with the expansion that is planned it may even supply Berlin with enough fuel tc. maintain those industries which have not been brought to a standstill by being deprived of electric power generated in the Russian sector. At the very worst, the Allies will be able to hold out for several weeks; and that is longer than the Russians bargained for. Inevitably it will tempt them to look for more decisive means of weakening the Allies’ position. There have, apparently, been attempts to hamper the air lift; but there has as yet been no active interference with Allied aircraft. That would involve risks which the Russians so far have seemed unwilling to take.