CHAMBERLAIN DID NOT SENSE NEARING STORM

Press, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 25517, 10 June 1948, Page 4

CHAMBERLAIN DID NOT SENSE NEARING STORM

“ALL LAY IN SUSPENSE”

[By

the Rt Hon. WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL. MP.]

XLVII

The French Ministers came to London for a meeting of the Supreme War Council cn March 28. Mr Chamberlain opened with a full and clear description of the scene as he 5 . a , w . .■ To mv great satisfaction he said ms first proposal was that “A cert operation, generally known as the ‘Royal Manne,' should be put into operation immediately.” He described how this project would be carried out and stated that stocks had been accumulated for effective and continuous execution. There would be complete surprise. The operation would take place in that part of the Rhine used almost exclusively for military purposes. No similar operation had ever been carried out before, nor-had equipment previously been designed capable of taking advantage of river conditions and working successfully against the barrages and types of craft found in rivers. Finally, owing to the design of the weapon, neutral waters would not be affected. - The British anticipated that this attack would create the utmost consternation and confusion. It was well known that no people were more thorough than tne Germans in preparation and planning, but equally no people could be more completely upset when their . Pjap s miscarried. They could not vise. Again, he said the war had found the German railways in a precarious state, and therefore 'their dependence on their inland waterways had inCTeaied. In addition to the floating mines other weapons had been designed to be dropped from aircraft in canals within Germany itself where there was no current. He urged that surprise depended upon speed Secrecy would be endangered by delay, and the river conditions were about to be particularly favourable. As to German retaliation, he said that if Getmany thought it worth while to bomb French or British cities, she would not wait for a pretext Everything was ready. It was only necessary tor tne French High Command to give Hie ° He 7 ' then said that Germany, possessed two weaknesses; her supplies of iron ore and of oil. The main sources of supply of these were situated at the opposite ends of Europe. The iron ore came from the north. He unfolded with precision the case for intercepting the German iron-ore supplies from Sweden. He dealt also with the Rumanian and Baku oilfields, which ought to be denied to Germany, if possible, by diplomacy. I listened to this powerful argument with increasing pleasure. I had not realised how fully Mr Chamberlam and I were agreed. “WILFRED” It was at last decided that, after addressing communications in general terms to Norway and Sweden, we should lay minefields in Norwegian territorial .waters on April 5, and that, subject to the concurrence of the French War Committee, “Royal Marine” should be begun on April 4 by launching the fluvial mines in the Rhine, and on April 15 upon the German canals from the air. It was also agreed that if Germany invaded Belgium the Allies should immediately move into that country without waiting for a formal irvitation; that if Germany invaded Rolland, and Belgium did not go to her assistance, the Allies should consider themselves free to enter Belgium for the purpose of helping Holland* Finally, as an obvious point on which all were at one, the communique stated that the British and French Governments had agreed on’ the following solemn declaration: That dui-ing the present war they would neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. This pact later acquired high importance. On April 3 the British Cabinet implemented the resolve of the Supreme War Council, and the Admiralty was authorised to mine the Norwegian “Leads” on April 8. I called the actual mining operation “Wilfred,” because by itself it was so small and innocent. As our mining of Norwegian waters might provoke a German retort, it was also agi’eed that a British brigade and a French contingent should be sent to Narvik to clear the port and advance to the Swedish frontier. Other forces should be dispatched to Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim, in order to deny these bases to the enemy. » WAGING WAR BY COMMITTEE

It is worth while looking back on the stages by which at last the decision to mine the Leads was reached. I had asked for it on September 29, 1939. Nothing relevant had altered in the meanwthile. The moral and technical objections on the score of neutrality, the possibility of German retaliation against Norway, the importance of stopping the flow of iron ore frem Narvik to Germany, the effect on neutral and world-wide opinion—all were exactly the same. But at last the Supreme War Council was convinced, and at last the War Cabinet were reconciled to the scheme, and indeed resolved upon it. Once had they given consent and withdrawn it. Then their mind had been overlaid by the complications of the Finnish War. On 60 days ‘‘Aid to Finland” had been part of the *Qabinet agenda. Nothing had come of it all. Finland had been crushed into submission by Russia. Now, after all this vain boggling, hesitation, changes of policy, arguments between good and worthy people unending, we had at last reached the simple point on which action had been demanded seven months before. But in war seven months is a long time. Now Hitler was ready, and ready with a far more powerful and well-pre-pared plan. One can hardly find a more perfect example of the impotence and fatuity of waging war -by committee or rather by groups of committees. It fell to my lot in the weeks which followed to bear much of the burden and some of the odium of the ill-starred Norwegian campaign, the course of which will presently be described. Had I been allowed to act with freedom and design when I first, demanded permission, a far more agreeable conclusion might have been reached in this key theatre, with favourable consequences in every direction. But now all was to be disaster.

He who will not when he may. When he will, he shall have Nay. In the war of armies on the ground .1 was under the thrall of defensive fire-power. On the sea I strove persistently within my sphere to assert the initiative against the enemy as a relief from the terrible ordeal of presenting our enormous target of sea commerce to his attack. But in this prolonged trance of the Twilight or “Phoney” war, as it was commonly called in the United States, neither France nor Britain was capable of meeting .the German vengeance thrust It was only after France had been flattened out that Britain, thanks to her island advantage, develoued out of the pangs of defeat and the menace of annihilation a national resolve equal to that of Germany. FRENCH FEAR REPRISALS Soon we learnt that the French War Committee would not agree to the launching of Royal Marine. They were in favour of mining the Norwegian Leads, but opposed to anything that might draw retaliation on France. Through the French Ambassador Reynaud expressed his regret. Mr Chamberlain, who was much inclined to aggressive action of some kind at this stage, was vexed at this refusal, and in a conversation wdth M. Corbin he linked the two operations together. The British would cut off the ore supplies of Germany as the French desired, provided that at the same time

the French allowed us to retaliate by means of “Royal Marine” for all thp injuries we had suffered and were en. during from the magnetic mine. Keen as I was on “Royal Marine,” I had not expected him to go so far as this. Both operations were methods of makine offensive war upon the enemy, and bringing to an end the twilight period from the prolongation of which I now believed Germany was the gainer However, if a few days would enable us to bring the French Into agreement upon the punctual execution of th® two projects, I was agreeable to postponing Wilfred for a few days. The Prime Minister was so favour, able to my views at this juncture that we seemed almost to think as one. He asked me to go over to Bbris and see what I could do to persuade M. Daladier, who was evidently the stumbling block. I met M. Reynaud and several others of his Ministers at dinner on the night of the 4th at the British Embassy, and we seemed in pretty good agreement. Daladier had been invited to attend, but professed a previous engagement. It was arranged that I should see him the next morn, ing. While meaning to do my utmost to persuade Daladier, I asked permission from Cabinet to make it clear that we would go forward with “Wil fred” even if “Royal Marine” wn« vetoed. I visited Daladier at the Rue a Dominique at noon on the sth and had ' a serious talk with him. I commented on his absence from our dinner the night before. He pleaded his previous engagement. It was evident to me that a considerable gulf existed between the new and the former Premier Daladier argued that in three months’ time the French aviation would be sufficiently improved for the necessary measures to be taken to meet German reactions to “Royal Marine.” For this he was prepared to give a firm date ' in writing. He made a strong case about the defenceless French fartoriea. Finally he assured me that the period of political crises in France was over and that he would work in harmony with M. Reynaud. On this we parted. “MISSED THE BUS” SPEECH On Friday, April 5, 1940 the Prim* Minister addressed the Central Council for the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations In a spirit of unusual optimism: J “After seven months of war I feel 10 tirties as confident of victory as I did at the beginning. ... I feel during the seven months our relattve position towards the enemy has become a great deal stronger than it was. “When war did break out German preparations were far ahead of our I own, anc| it was natural then to expect that the enemy would take advantage I of his initial superiority to make an 1 endeavour to overwhelm us and Franew I before we had time to make good our I deficiencies. Is it not a very extra- I ordinary, thing that no such attempt I was made? Whatever may be the I reason—whether it was, that Httier I thought he might get away with what* I he had got without fighting for it or I whether it was that after all the pre- I parations were not sufficiently com- I plete—however, one thing is certain; I he missed the bus.” This proved an ill-judged utter- I ance. Its main assumption that we and I the French were relatively stronger fl than at the beginning of the war was ■ not reasonable. The Germans were 1 now in the fourth year of vehement I munition manufacture, whereas we I were at a much earlier stage prob- I ably comparable in fruitfulness’ to the | second year. Moreover, v/ith every month that had passed, the German Army, now four years old, was becoming a mature and perfected weapon, and the former advantat'® of the French Army in training and cohesion was steadily passing awav. The Prime Minister showed no premonition that we were on the eve of greet events, whereas it seemed almost cer- , tain to me that the land war was about to begin. Above all, the expression “Hitler missed the bus’ 1 was unlucky. , All lay in suspense. The various minor expedients I had been able to suggest had gained acceptance; but nothing of a major character had been done by either side. Our plans, such as they were, rested upon enforcing the blockade by the mining of the Norwegian corridor in the north, and | by hampering German oil supplies | from the south-east. Complete im- | mobility and silence reigned behind I the German front. Suddenly, the pas* 1 sive or small-scale policy of the Allies I was swept away by a cataract of vio- I lent surprises. We were to learn what | total war means. Before resuming the narrative I | must explain the alterations' in my I position which occurred during the | month of April, 1940. On the 4th a statement was issued from No. 10 Downing Street that ar-, rangements were being made for the First Lord of the Admiralty, as senior. Service Minister concerned, to preside over the “Military Co-ordination Committee.” HURLY-BURLY The Chiefs of Staff sat daily together after discussing the whole situation with their respective Ministers. They then arrived at their own decisions. If I wished to question any of these opinions, I could, of course, raise them in the first instance st my Co-ordinating Committee, where th® Chiefs of Staff, supported by their departmental Ministers whom they had usually carried along with them, were all present as individual members. There was a copious flow of polite conversation, at the end of which a tactful report was drawn up by the secretary in attendance and checked by the three Service Departments to .make sure there were no discrepancies. Thus we had arrived those broad, happy uplands where everything is settled for the greatest good of the greatest number by the common sense of most after the con- fl sultation of all. But in war of tje | kind we were now to feel the conch- 9 tions were different. Alas I niust | write it; the actual conflict had to J® more like one ruffian bashing the I other on the snout with a club, 2 I hammer, or something better. All this , ■ is deplorable, and it is one of the many | good reasons for avoiding war, and 11 having everything settled by I ment in a friendly manner, with taU | (tonsideration for the rights of namon- I ties and the faithful recording of | sentient opinions. Ido not pretend that, whatever my I powers. I should have been abl® take better decisions or reach gocj 1 solutions of the problems with which I we were now confronted. The impact z | of the events about to be described was so violent and the conditions so 1 chaotic that I soon perceived that only |< the authority of the Prime Minister | could reign over the Military Co- I ordination Committee. Accordingly <? n I the 15th I requested Mr Chamberlain | to take the chair, and he presided at I practically every one of our subse- I quent meetings during the campaign ‘ F in Norway. He and I continued i» | close agreement, and he gave I supreme authority to the views which | I had expressed. I was most inti* , mately ‘involved in the conduct of the unhappy effort to rescue Norway * when it was already too late. - * (To be continued.) (Copyright 1947 in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph, Ltd.; HJ U.S.A. by Time Inc. (nubliSher ut “Time” and “Life”) and the NeW j York Times Company; elsewhere bj Co-operation Press. Service. t wor"} rights reserved. Reproduction in or in part in any language strictly prohibited.)